











Jason E. Good 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
(Natural Resources and Environment)  



















Professor Andrew J. Hoffman, Chair 
Professor Wayne. E. Baker 
Professor James S. Diana 







The Tables Turned 
by William Wordsworth1 
 
Up! Up! my Friend, and quit your books; 
Or surely you'll grow double: 
Up! up! my Friend, and clear your looks; 
Why all this toil and trouble? 
 
The sun above the mountain's head, 
A freshening lustre mellow 
Through all the long green fields has spread, 
His first sweet evening yellow. 
 
Books! 'tis a dull and endless strife: 
Come, hear the woodland linnet, 
How sweet his music! On my life, 
There's more of wisdom in it. 
 
And hark! how blithe the throstle sings! 
He, too, is no mean preacher: 
Come forth into the light of things, 
Let Nature be your teacher. 
 
She has a world of ready wealth, 
Our minds and hearts to bless-- 
Spontaneous wisdom breathed by health, 
Truth breathed by cheerfulness. 
 
One impulse from a vernal wood 
May teach you more of man, 
Of moral evil and of good, 
Than all the sages can. 
 
Sweet is the lore which nature brings; 
Our meddling intellect 
Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things – 
We murder to dissect. 
 
Enough of Science and of Art; 
Close up those barren leaves; 
Come forth, and bring with you a heart 
That watches and receives. 
  
1 Wordsworth, W., & Gill, S. (1984). William Wordsworth: The major works. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
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“Here I am, heading out to sea free, and I have this abstract thing controlling me.” 
—Kodiak trawl captain 
 
1. Introduction 
 The practice of commercial fishing involves the processes through which vessel captains 
convert the potential catch embedded in natural systems into actual catch, under the terms 
defined by “controlling” and “abstract” regulations. In the face of hidden, submerged, or 
otherwise indeterminate natural systems, captains must make sense of how to most efficiently, 
safely, and legally produce desired material outputs. The practice of making sense, or 
“sensemaking,” is “the process through which people work to understand issues or events that 
are novel, ambiguous, confusing, or in some other way violate expectations” (Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014: 57). No research has been conducted, however, on the processes through 
which commercial fishing captains make sense of the natural systems upon which they depend 
for their livelihood, or on how regulatory systems impact that sensemaking. By investigating 
sensemaking as a key component of the practice of commercial fishing, this study aims to fill 
that gap.  
The practice of commercial fisheries scholarship, due to in part to its pervasive reliance 
on rational decision-making theory (e.g., Acheson, 2006; Branch et. al, 2006; Carlsson & Berkes, 
2005; Grafton et. al, 2006; Hilborn, Orensanz, & Parma 2005; Plummer & Fitzgibbons 2004), 
has largely overlooked how fishing captains make sense of indeterminate natural systems in 
order to make key decisions about how to extract material resources from them. Fisheries 
management scholar Daniel Holland speaks to this void in the following:  
When modeling fishing decisions, there should be more explicit consideration 
given to how fishermen incorporate information into complex decisions, and how 
they actually make decisions. . . If our goal is to understand and predict fishing 
behavior and design more effective fishery management tools, it is critical to 
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understand how fishermen actually make decisions, not how economic theory 
suggests they should make them. (2008: 342)  
Svein Jentoft, another fisheries management scholar, suggests some of what is needed to fill this 
void: “We should not only be looking for causal factors external to the individual actors 
involved, but also to the motivations that guide their behaviour and the interpretations and 
meanings they attribute to the particular circumstances that they find themselves in and the 
choices they make” (2006: 678). This dissertation employs a sensemaking perspective, while 
also drawing on other concepts used in the organizational theory literature (e.g., materiality, 
recurring action patterns, abduction), to understand the interrelated interpretations, meanings, 
choices, and actions that captains enact in the practice of commercial fishing. 
 Sensemaking’s key role in commercial fishing is captured by an axiom used by the 
Kodiak, Alaska-based trawl captains studied for this dissertation: ‘You never know until you 
tow.’ This axiom depicts the aspect of trawl fishing in which captains, due to the dynamic and 
obscured nature of ecological systems at sea, cannot know which species of fish they are 
catching, as well as how much of each species they are catching, until after they have caught it. 
This aspect of knowing in commercial trawl fishing aligns with a fundamental assumption of the 
sensemaking literature: “An individual cannot know what he is facing until he faces it and then 
looks back over the episode to sort out what happened” (Weick, 1988: 305-306).     
 The retrospective nature of sensemaking points to an important difference between a 
sensemaking perspective and a rational decision-making perspective of experience. This 
difference is the relationship between cognition and action. From a sensemaking perspective, 
“cognition lies in the path of action” (Weick, 1988: 308), but from a rational decision-making 
perspective, cognition precedes action, as Elster (1989: 22) implies in the following: “When 
faced with several courses of action, people usually do what they believe is likely to have the 
best overall outcome.” The captains’ axiom, ‘you never know until you tow,’ emphasizes 
cognition lying in the path of towing rather than towing lying in the path of cognition. A 
sensemaking perspective of the practice of commercial trawl fishing, therefore, requires the 
researcher to examine how captains, in the face of the indeterminacy of natural systems, act their 
way into understanding, rather than how they simply understand and then act. 
 Yet, captains must know something before they tow. They must, as it is commonly stated 
in the sensemaking literature, have “a workable level of certainty” (Weick, 1969: 40). 
Sensemaking scholarship concerns events that are occasioned by equivocality and ambiguity, and 
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focuses on the ensuing processes through which actors create the certainty they need by 
answering the questions, ‘what’s happening here?’ and, ‘now what do we do?’ (Blatt et al., 2006; 
Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). Sensemaking scholarship also 
emphasizes that in answering these questions, actors help enact the conditions that occasion 
future sensemaking (Weick, 1995; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). In its emphasis on the enacted 
nature of experience, a sensemaking perspective alerts researchers to the fact that “key 
organizational events happen long before people even suspect that there may be some kind of 
decision they have to make” (Weick, 2003: 186). Thus, a sensemaking perspective expands one’s 
focus beyond decisions to the processual and reciprocal nature of experience. 
 There are, however, situations that call for a rational decision-making analysis. Rational 
decision-making analyses are appropriate when studying situations in which actors know their 
constraints and opportunities, have selected an exhaustive set of alternative actions, and can 
conduct a comparative assessment of alternatives prior to acting. Such analyses assume that 
actors conduct this assessment in the interest of selecting an action that will allow them to 
maximize their utility (Elster, 1989). Yet, as Masten (1993: 127) notes, "Rules of behavior 
prescribed by economic models, however logical, cannot be normative if managers are incapable 
of implementing them or the assumptions upon which the models are built do not apply.” As the 
Kodiak trawl captains’ axiom suggests, the constraints and opportunities they face at sea in terms 
of the species they are attempting to catch are always at least somewhat indeterminate. A 
sensemaking analysis, in not being bound by the oversimplified focus on decisions and utility 
maximizing behavior, requires the researcher to examine individual and social processes that are 
enacted in the face of unexpected and unknown constraints and opportunities, and which are 
conducted in the interest of understanding and coherence of experience rather than mere 
maximal utility (Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick, 1995).  
 In a context in which managers must act in the face indeterminacy, a sensemaking 
perspective offers an expanded and more nuanced perspective through which to see and 
understand what at-sea fishing operations are rather than what rational choice scholars think they 
should be. In this study I demonstrate that the indeterminacy of Kodiak trawl captains’ future 
imposes a sensemaking demand on their present, and I construct a model of what that 
sensemaking looks like. Sensemaking scholarship was developed to “break the stranglehold that 
decision making and rational models have had on organizational theory” (Weick, 2003: 186), and 
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this dissertation aims to break the stranglehold that rational choice models have had on fisheries 
management, both its scholarship and practice. Understanding the sensemaking processes 
through which commercial fisheries are enacted can inform the creation of more appropriate 
management and regulatory processes, from which a more sustainable system can be 
constructed. 
 While I employ organizational theory to extend our understanding of commercial fishing 
practice and management, I also employ commercial fishing practice to extend our 
understanding of organizational theory. Although the natural world has long been considered a 
crucial part of understanding human organization (Bansal & Gao, 2006; Hoffman & Bansal, 
2012), the connection between natural processes and human organization remains underspecified 
(Whiteman & Cooper, 2011). There is a robust literature examining distal relationships between 
corporate processes and structures and the natural environment (e.g., Bansal & Roth, 2000; 
Flammer, 2013; Hoffman, 1999; Russo & Fouts, 1997), and several studies of organizational 
processes and structures within natural resource extraction industries (Bansal, 2005; Holm, 1995; 
Sharma & Henriques, 2005; Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008; Zeitsma & Lawrence, 2010). 
Yet, few organizational studies have examined proximate connections between human and 
natural processes (e.g., Keyes, 2004; Weick, 1993; Whiteman & Cooper, 2011). As Bansal and 
Knox-Hayes (2013: 63) state, “The discussion of the physical materiality [of the natural 
environment] has only minimally permeated organizational theory.” The current literature relies 
on intermediate relationships, characterized by “action at a distance,” while proximate 
relationships, characterized by “action by contact” (Cooper & Law, 1995), remain under-
researched. There is a vibrant body of work in the natural sciences on the proximate human 
dimensions of natural processes, yet within organization studies there is minimal work on the 
proximate natural dimensions of human organization. Examining sensemaking at the frontline of 
commercial fishing offers a way to understand the proximate natural dimensions of human 
organization, and will further expand organizational theory into the realm of natural systems.   
 In section 4 of this chapter I discuss in greater detail the gaps in the organizational theory 
literature that this study addresses. These gaps lie in the sensemaking literature and in the 
broader organizational theory literature that relates to materiality. Prior to that, however, in 
section 2 I describe the empirical problem I aim to address, namely fisheries bycatch. In section 
3 I state my overarching research question and break it into its constituent parts. In the next 
 4 
section, section 5, I describe the context in which this study was conducted, namely the Kodiak 
commercial trawl fleet in terms of ten common, yet not exhaustive, characteristics. The 
following section concerns my qualitative methodology and analytical processes, and finally in 
section 7 I provide a roadmap to the subsequent four chapters of this dissertation   
2. Problem Statement: Fisheries Bycatch 
 While commercial fishing industries deserve attention for the rich context they offer for 
developing rigorous theory about the natural dimensions of organizational theory, these 
industries also deserve the attention of organizational researchers because of their relevance to 
worldwide economies. The worldwide catch in marine fisheries fluctuates around 80 million 
tons, with the Northwest Pacific (e.g., South China Sea, Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan) contributing 
the largest amount at 25%, the Southeast Pacific (western coast of South America) second at 
16%, and the Western Central Pacific (e.g., Sulu-Celebes Sea, Arafura Timor Sea, the Gulf of 
Thailand) third at 14% (FAO, 2011). In 2008, commercial fisheries directly employed over 34 
million people worldwide, while in turn supplying over three billion people with at least 15% of 
their average animal protein intake (FAO, 2011: 3).  
 Focusing on Alaska, commercial fishing is one of the state’s largest industries, employing 
more than 30 thousand people a year from 2001 to 2011 (BLS, 2013). In relation to the broader 
US, Alaskan fishing ports, specifically Dutch Harbor and Kodiak, are typically listed as the 1st 
and either the 4th, 5th, or 6th largest fishing ports in terms of the amount of catch that crosses the 
dock, respectively. For instance, in 2011 Alaskan fisheries landings accounted for 1.9 billion of 
the 5.3 billion pounds of fish landed in the US (Whitney, 2012). Commercial fishing industries in 
Alaska and around the world rely on the organizing processes that we collectively know as 
natural resource management for their economic sustainability, embedded in which is ecological 
sustainability. These contexts, however important they are to worldwide economies, have been 
effectively overlooked by organizational researchers.     
 For commercial fisheries to sustain their positive economic benefits, two overarching 
problems within these industries must be continually addressed both at-sea by captains and on-
land by regulators and managers: overfishing and bycatch. These issues, however, emerge from 
different organizational processes. Overfishing tends to occur when a fleet catches too much of a 
species they are fishing for. Thus, captains know that they are catching a certain species, and 
choose to continue catching it. The issue is whether captains have the information they need 
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regarding overfishing limits to choose to stop fishing, and then whether they make that decision 
or not, and which factors influenced their decision. The overfishing problem tends to be 
characterized by issues of information, decision making, and incentives, and appropriate for a 
rational decision making analysis (e.g., Abbott & Wilen, 2011; Acheson, 1998; Fehr & 
Leibbrandt, 2011; Gatewood, 1984). The fact that rational choice tools and frameworks have 
been cemented into the foundation, and continue to guide the ongoing construction, of fisheries 
management literature is related to the long-standing, inveterate problem of overfishing.2  
 Bycatch involves catching or impacting animals incidental to the species one is targeting. 
Bycatch, defined as  “fish that are captured in a fishery but not retained for sale or personal use” 
(Patrick & Benaka, 2013: 470), is a relatively more recent concern among fisheries scholars and 
managers (e.g., Caruthers & Neis, 2011; Lewison, et. al, 2011; Pauley & Christianson, 1995). 
Nonetheless, bycatch is widely considered a major threat to marine ecosystems and the human 
economies that rely on them (Abbott & Wilen, 2009; Patrick & Benaka, 2013). The bycatch 
issue, however, is quite different from overfishing in that it is characterized by multiple species 
co-occurring in time and space (Heery & Cope, 2014), rather than one species that is fished over 
and over. Rather than merely a decision-making problem, bycatch tends to be a sensemaking 
problem in that the co-occurring species are ambiguous in relation to fishing practices. Due to 
this ambiguity, captains do not know what other species, and how much of those other species, 
they will catch while fishing for a target species, until after they have already fished. In other 
words, captains cannot know until they tow. Being a sensemaking issue, understanding bycatch 
requires different interpretive frameworks, research methodologies, and analytical procedures 
than those typically employed in research grounded in rational choice theory (Scott & Davis, 
2007; Weick, 1995, 2003).  
 At sea, captains attempt to efficiently catch what they can sell, and, to the extent it is 
profitable to do so, avoid catching what they cannot sell. Captains turn potential catch into actual 
catch, but their actual catch may turn out to be something other than what they thought it would 
be. Captains in fishing industries around the world face increasing pressure to be more selective 
2 In 1883, the British held the National Fisheries Exhibition, during which Thomas Henry Huxley, who 
was a member of the Great Britain Parliament Royal Commission on trawling, proclaimed that, due to the 
laws of evolution, most of the great sea was inexhaustible. This proclamation had profound effects on 
fisheries governance (Kurlansky, 1997). However, as early as 1946, the journal Nature had a brief report 
on an International Conference on Overfishing (Nature, 1946) 
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in terms of what they extract from natural systems (Kelleher, 2005; Patrick & Benaka, 2013), 
while also saddled with increasing economic pressure, due to surging fuel costs, to increase the 
efficiency of their fishing practice (Priour, 2009; Cheilari, Guillen, Damalas, & Barbas, 2013). 
Although trawl captains ‘never know until they tow,’ they face increasing pressure to make sense 
of the composition of hidden systems prior to extracting from them, and to be quick about it. 
Attempting to extract certain natural resources while not extracting certain other natural 
resources that have the same behavioral traits requires sensemaking. Yet, we know little of the 
sensemaking processes captains undergo at sea. This dissertation elucidates how captains make 
sense of the indeterminate natural systems from which they attempt make their living. 
3. Research Question 
 The empirical problem that trawl captains cannot know until they tow, but are increasingly 
pressured to know before they tow, suggests the following research question: How do frontline 
commercial fishing managers make sense of indeterminate natural systems as they attempt to 
extract material resources from them? In what follows, I address the six elements of this 
question. First, the frontline is the place where systems of different character collide. In the 
commercial fishing context, the frontline is the interaction of natural and social systems. Second, 
the frontline manager is housed proximate to such points of interaction, and is in charge of the 
day-to-day activities aimed at interrelating with natural systems. In commercial fisheries, this 
person is the vessel captain. Third, ‘indeterminate’ means “not known in advance” (Merriam 
Webster, 2014). The concept describes a relational characteristic in which perceptual cues of 
some entity are ambiguous, equivocal, hidden, or missing. At sea, a defining feature of being a 
commercial fishing captain is constructing fishing operations in relation to indeterminate natural 
systems. Key parts of natural systems in this context are submerged under water, hidden from 
view, making its species-level composition only fully determinable after part of it has been 
extracted and hauled on board.  
 Fourth, sensemaking occurs when people are thrown into the middle of things and forced 
to act without the benefit of a stable sense of what is happening. The process is constrained not 
only by past events, but also be the speed with which current events flow into the past and 
interpretations become outdated (Weick, 2001: 462). The essential sensemaking task of the 
frontline manager is to “create a coherent and plausible account of what is going on without ever 
really seeking a one true and final picture of how the world actually is” (O’Leary & Chia, 2007: 
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392-393). Put simply, through sensemaking the frontline manager continually attempts to create 
determinacy out of indeterminacy. Fifth, a system is an entity that is emergent from the 
organization of other entities, which become its parts. When “the whole is more than the sum of 
its parts,” the organization of the parts produces that which is “more than,” while the “sum” is 
simply the unorganized aggregation of parts (Buckley, 1967: 42). And sixth, systems are natural, 
as opposed to human, to the extent that they can “exist outside of society” (Bansal & Knox-
Hayes, 2013: 75). Natural systems are distally impacted by, but not proximately created by, 
human processes. I use the terms ‘natural systems’ or ‘natural process’ to refer to that which 
exists outside of society and is not yet integrated with human operations. Humans interrelate 
with natural systems and processes in the interest of extracting natural materiality from them.  
 To answer my research question, I apply sensemaking primarily, and other interpretive 
concepts secondarily (i.e., materiality, recurring action patterns), to ethnographic data of a 
commercial trawl fishing fleet based in Kodiak, Alaska. My focus is on the day-to-day fishing 
practices through which captains determine where to fish, what to fish from, and where to fish 
next, including how fisheries regulations structure those determinations. To gather data on this 
frontline fishing practice I conducted observations, participant observations, and interviews of 
fishing captains and both industry and agency managers, and I gathered archival data of 
regulations and regulatory processes. After doing so, I used grounded theory-based analytical 
procedures to generate theory about the interpretive and behavioral processes captains undertake 
to make sense of natural systems.  
4. Theoretical Orientation 
 This study of at-sea commercial fisheries management focuses on how captains make sense 
of indeterminate natural systems in order to extract material resources from them. The following 
elaboration of the theoretical framework used in this study focuses on two assumptions upon 
which I conduct my subsequent analyses. First, entities (i.e., actors, processes) that are 
constituted by both human and material components must have been constructed, at some point, 
by the interrelation and integration of distinct human and natural entities. The organizational 
theory literature, however, has overlooked interrelational processes aimed at the integration of 
distinct human and natural entities. Second, humans must make sense of natural systems in order 
to create integrated human and natural entities. While sensemaking scholars have investigated 
the interrelationship of human and natural systems, they have overlooked the sensemaking 
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processes through which humans intend to extract materiality from natural systems in order to 
create material artifacts. This dissertation takes a materiality and sensemaking-based look at how 
commercial fishing captains interrelate with natural systems to create the material artifacts that 
millions depend on for basic nutrition. The following elaborates this theoretical orientation.    
a. Sensemaking  
 A fishing captain’s primary duty is determining where to fish (Gatewood, 1984; Gezelius, 
2007; Orth, 1987), what to fish from, and where to fish next, whether it is the next set, the next 
trip, or the next season. What is “perhaps the fundamental problem of ordering and organizing” 
is a salient issue in the practice of commercial fishing: “the problem about what will come next” 
(Cooper & Law, 1995: 242). In contexts characterized by indeterminacy, determining what 
comes next is the province of sensemaking, which encompasses the activities through which 
actors answer the questions, “what’s the story here?” and “now what should I do?” (Weick et al., 
2005: 410). To answer these questions is to create a “workable level of certainty” (Weick 1969: 
40) about what is happening and what might, could, or should happen next. Workable levels of 
certainty “suggest plausible acts of managing, coordinating, and distributing” (Weick et al., 
2005: 411). Acts of managing, coordinating, and distributing are the organizing processes that, 
taken together, are the organization (Chia, 2003; Czarniawska, 2004; Law, 1994), which, in this 
context, is a fishing vessel (the fishing vessel as an organization is further discussed in section 5, 
part d.). Thus, the relationship between sensemaking and organizing is straightforward: “People 
organize to make sense of equivocal inputs and then enact this sense back into the world to make 
it more orderly” (Weick et al., 2005: 410). In other words, the relationship is recursive in that 
people organize to engage in processes collectively known as sensemaking, yet it is only through 
such sensemaking processes that they are able to organize. 
 I use sensemaking to understand how frontline managers in the commercial fishing 
context construct their operations in relation to natural systems. Thus, in this study sensemaking 
is a process that interrelates qualitatively different systems. To define sensemaking as a process 
that spans social and natural systems, alter the following definition given by Maitlis and 
Sonenshein (2010: 551): “Sensemaking is the process of social construction that occurs when 
discrepant cues interrupt individuals’ ongoing activity, and involves retrospective development of 
plausible meanings that rationalize what people are doing” (citing Weick, 1995 and Weick et al., 
2005). “Discrepant cues” in this study emerge when social and natural systems collide, which 
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potentially, or actually, leads to interruptions to ongoing activity. And if we replace “people” with 
“entities,” thereby noting that people attempt to make sense of both social (e.g. Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991; Maitlis, 2005) and material (e.g., Weick, 1993; Whiteman & Cooper, 2011) 
entities, we have a more inclusive start to a study of sensemaking as the process that interrelates 
social and natural systems.  
There are seven resources that actors draw from to make sense: sensemaking is social, 
informed by identities, retrospective in orientation, focused on extracted cues, always ongoing, 
beholden to a relative standard of plausibility, and shaped by, and dependent upon, enactments 
(Weick 1995, 2001). The following linear outline of a sensemaking process depicts the 
relationships among these properties: “Once people begin to act (enactment), they generate 
tangible outcomes (cues) in some context (social), and this helps them discover (retrospect) what 
is occurring (ongoing), what needs to be explained (plausibility), and what should be done next 
(identity enhancement)” (Weick, 1995: 55). Because thorough discussions of these sensemaking 
resources can be found elsewhere (e.g., Miller, 2003; Weick, 1995, 2001), I focus the remainder 
of this discussion of my theoretical orientation on a component of the organizational theory and 
sensemaking literatures that is most germane to my research question and context: materiality. 
b. Making sense of natural materiality 
 In examining how fishing captains make sense of natural systems, this study focuses on 
the role of materiality in sensemaking generally, and the role of materiality specifically. While 
unqualified ‘materiality’ is rarely defined, Orlikowski, in her important work on 
‘sociomateriality,’ provides multiple examples: “bodies, clothes, rooms, desks, chairs, tables, 
buildings, vehicles, phones, computers, books, documents, pens, utensils, data and voice 
networks, water and sewage infrastructures, electricity, and air systems” (2007: 1436). Although 
materiality-based concepts such as ‘sociomateriality’ becoming increasingly popular in 
organizational theory (Leonardi & Barley, 2010; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008), organizational 
scholars in general have long included material entities in their studies of social systems (e.g., 
Barley, 1986; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Orlikowski, 1992; Weick & Roberts, 1993). 
Sensemaking researchers in particular have also included materiality in their work, focusing on 
processes that are instigated by and aimed at understanding materiality that is ambiguous, 
equivocal, or in some way disruptive to organizing processes. Such materiality includes a nuclear 
power plant (Mills, 2003), an automotive assembly line (Patriotta, 2003), airplanes (Weick, 
 10 
1990), the NASA Columbia Shuttle (Dunbar & Garud, 2009), a heat wave (Boudes & Laroche, 
2009), an aircraft carrier (Weick & Roberts, 1993), and a complex of ecological processes 
(Whiteman & Cooper, 2011).  
Materiality is neither new to organizational research in general, nor sensemaking in 
particular. Yet, in a recent review of the sensemaking literature, Maitlis and Christianson (2014: 
101) state, “We are only just starting to understand sensemaking as [a process] in which 
sociomateriality plays a much greater role than we have to date recognized. We strongly 
encourage further scholarship in this area.” The overarching principle of sociomaterial research, 
drawn from the literature on the sociology of translation (e.g., Callon, 1986; Latour, 2007; Law, 
1994), is that researchers should not privilege one type of entity over another (Orlikowski, 2007; 
Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). Under this approach to scholarship, entities that are not wholly 
human are ‘material,’ and entities that are wholly human are ‘social.’ The corrective advanced by 
sociomaterial scholars is that social and material entities should not be assumed to be “distinct” 
or “pre-formed” but instead should be viewed as “constitutively entangled” (Orlikowski, 2007). 
These entanglements form entities such as “sociomaterial ensembles” (Pentland, Hrem, & 
Hillson, 2011), “agencements” (D’Adderio, 2008), and “silent artifacts” (Cacciatori, 2012).  
Yet, because the materiality studied in this domain of research is almost always some 
form of artifact (e.g., Mazmanian, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2013; Nicolini, Mengis & Swan, 2012; 
Oborn, Barrett, & Dawson, 2013), it is, by definition, already a product of social processes. 
Thus, this materiality has been constitutively entangled with social processes prior to being 
studied as part of a sociomaterial process. In their commitment to investigating the role of 
sociomateriality in organizational processes, scholars have overlooked the processes through 
which non-social materiality is interrelated with social processes, from which artifacts emerge. 
By primarily investigating artifactual materiality that is further integrated into social processes, 
the materiality in this domain of research is doubly social, muddling the prescription to not 
privilege one type of entity over another. 
 There is, however, organizational scholarship that involves materiality that is not born of 
social processes. This type of materiality includes what Bansal and Knox-Hayes (2013) call, 
emphasizing its temporal and spatial attributes, “physical materiality,” and what Whiteman and 
Cooper (2000, 2011) call, emphasizing its ecological and biological attributes, “ecological 
materiality.” Taken together, I call this materiality ‘natural,’ a label that encompasses all non-
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social, non-artifactual actors, objects, and processes. As noted above, what is natural can exist 
apart from what is social (Bansal & Knox-Hayes, 2013). Thus, this materiality is not part of a 
sociomaterial process, though it may be a target of social processes aimed at its constitutive 
entanglement into material artifacts.  
 Studies that have included natural materiality in their analyses tend to focus on 
reactionary social processes characterized by crises born of unexpected interactions with natural 
systems. The social goal in these events is to interrelate with, but physically separate from, 
natural systems. For example, Weick (1993) examined the crisis-oriented sensemaking practices 
enacted by wildland firefighters facing natural systems characterized by dangerous 
indeterminacy, and focused on the social processes they enacted in order to interact with, but 
eventually escape from, the natural system. Whiteman and Cooper (2011), also studying a crisis 
event, brought social and natural systems closer together in arguing that an actor’s quality of 
“ecological sensemaking” is influenced by their prior extent of embeddedness in the local 
ecological materiality. Whiteman and Cooper were interested in the extent to which the social 
entity knows the natural system, and examined how depth of knowledge influences how well the 
social entity can save itself from succumbing to the potentially pernicious natural system. Taken 
together, scholars in this area of material research have not elucidated the mundane, day-to-day 
mechanics of the processes through which social entities interrelate with indeterminate natural 
systems in order to extract material resources from them in a sustained, continual manner.   
The result of these two domains of material research is either an over-socialized 
understanding of interrelationships between social and material entities - characteristic of the 
artifact-based material literature - or an omission of contexts and processes in which social 
systems interrelate with natural systems on a daily, mundane basis with the intention of creating 
material artifacts - characteristic of the domain that incorporates natural materiality. What is 
missing is an understanding of the processes through which frontline managers interrelate with 
“distinct” and “pre-formed” materiality in order to extract and integrate them into social systems. 
Such processes are characteristic of natural resource extraction contexts.  
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Figure 1 depicts the current structure of the organizational theory literature involving 
materiality, as well as this study’s place in it. Moving from left to right, research in which natural 
materiality interacts with, but is studied as distinct from, social processes, falls in the first 
segment of the natural domain (e.g., Christianson et al., 2009; Keyes, 2004; Weick, 1993; 
Whiteman & Cooper, 2011; Wicks, 2002). The relationship between social and natural systems 
depicted in these studies, perhaps due to their tendency to focus on crises, is one of interaction 
only; thus, the social processes studied in this segment are not ongoing interrelational processes 
aimed at extracting and integrating natural materiality into their own operations, as is the case in 
natural resource extraction contexts. Natural resource extraction contexts are characteristic of the 
next part of the diagram, which is the segment that this study occupies. Studies that would 
occupy this segment elucidate ongoing, repeated interrelational processes between natural and 
social systems, which are intended to, or actually accomplish, integration of natural and social 
systems. Moving further to the right, the solid black line indicates the point at which natural 
materiality is irreversibly integrated into a social system, and becomes artifactual. Thus, all the 
materiality that is included in research to the right of the black line stems from interrelational 
processes that could be the subject of research to the left of the line. 




 Further to the right in the diagram is the preponderance of organizational research that 
includes materiality. What is characteristic about this research is that it separates materiality from 
social processes and focuses primarily on social processes, as Orlikowski (2007) convincingly 
argued (e.g., Boje, 1991; Maitlis, 2005; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2002). Moving on to the next 
segment, as noted above, there have long been studies in organizational theory that examine 
interactions between artifacts and social processes, and in which the materiality is acknowledged 
as part of organizational processes (e.g., Barley, 1986; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Orlikowski, 
1992; Weick & Roberts, 1993). And finally, to the far right is the sociomateriality segment, 
which portrays artifactual materiality as integrated with social processes, forming sociomaterial 
ensembles (e.g., D’Adderio, 2008; Mazmanian, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2013; Nicolini, 2012).  
 In examining interrelational processes aimed at integration, rather than mere interaction, 
this study clears more of the trail that was first mapped by Weick’s (1993) examination of 
sensemaking in the frontline context of wildland firefighting, and later blazed by Whiteman and 
Cooper's (2011) examination of sensemaking in the front-line context of subsistence hunting. In 
doing so, this study also expands our horizon beyond cases selected for their actual or potentially 
extreme outcomes; this study examines day-to-day sensemaking processes through which 
managers pursue basic goals, such as economic sustainability, and do so by interrelating with 
natural systems in the interest of extracting and integrating natural materiality into their 
operational processes.   
 5. Context 
 This study expands fisheries management to incorporate organizational theory as one of its 
tools for managing frontline fishing practices, while also expanding organizational theory by 
incorporating fisheries management within its fold. My findings, recommendations for practice, 
and future research, all aimed at these dual goals, are derived from an ethnographic study of the 
Kodiak, Alaska trawl fleet. While the commercial fishing industry “has long been the primary 
economic activity of Kodiak” (Kodiak Chamber of Commerce, 2013: 33), the trawl feet is a 
primary component of that activity. For example, in 2011, 350 million pounds of fish was 
delivered to Kodiak’s docks, worth $178 million. Of these fish, 264 milling pounds (77% of the 
total) was “groundfish,” which includes pollock, rockfish, flatfish, Pacific cod, sablefish, and 
lingcod, which was worth $78.4 million directly off the vessel. Groundfish is fished by the trawl 
fleet, as well as the pot and longline fleets, making it difficult to determine how much of this fish 
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was delivered by trawlers. Yet, we do know that only the trawl fleet fishes for pollock and 
rockfish, which accounted for 50% of the groundfish delivered to Kodiak in 2011, worth $23 
million in ex-vessel value (Kodiak Chamber of Commerce, 2013). And we can safely assume the 
trawl fleet delivered a large portion of the remaining 49%.   
 I focused my research efforts on how trawl captains interrelate at sea with indeterminate 
natural processes to produce the catch that helps drive Kodiak’s economy. Embedded in at-sea 
operations are regulatory structures and agency management processes, both of which are 
primarily aimed at ensuring the fleet overfishes neither their target quotas nor their bycatch 
limits. Thus, a description of the at-sea context of commercial fishing requires, in addition to a 
description of fishing operations, a description of the regulations constructed and the in-season 
fishery management conducted on-land.  
 This section discusses ten common, yet not exhaustive, elements of the Kodiak trawl fleet, 
which are depicted in Figure 3. The Kodiak trawl fleet fishes under the same regulatory 
authority, with the same type of gear, using the same type of vessel, with the same organization 
structure, under the same quota allocation regimes (race vs. privatized), in mostly in the same 
fisheries, for the same species, within the same in-season agency management processes, and 
often under their own management structures.    
Figure 2: Regulatory fishing areas in the Gulf of Alaska (NPFMC, 2011) 
 15 
a. Fishing under the same regulatory authority  
 The regulatory portion of the at-sea fishing processes studied in this dissertation is enacted 
by a federal government organization known as the North Pacific Fishery Management Council 
(Council). There are eight Regional Fishery Management Councils in the US, each regulating 
fisheries within the federal waters that surround the US (Figure 4). Although the Council 
regulates fisheries solely off the coast of Alaska, it is constituted by political appointees 
representing Alaska, Washington, and Oregon, and, at the same time, various fishery 
stakeholders. With input from scientific and industry advisory groups, as well as and the public, 
the Council creates fishery management plans (FMP). FMPs are designed to structure fishing 
effort to comply with federal laws, primarily the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA), and secondarily 
other laws such as the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act. The 




c. Type of vessel
d. Vessel organizational structure
e. Quota allocation regimes
f. Fisheries
g. Target & bycatch species
h. In-season agency management
i. Fleet-generated structures
j. Additional temporal and spatial closures
Figure 3: The elements of the Kodiak trawl fleet discussed in this section 
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waters: The Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands, the Gulf of Alaska, and the Arctic Ocean. The 
Council has also constructed different FMPs for species with widely differing morphological and 
behavioral characteristics, such as ‘groundfish’ (e.g., pollock, cod, flatfish, rockfish), shellfish 
(crab, scallops), and salmon. 
 At the heart of the MSA, and each FMP, are 10 National Standards. The Standards that 
most heavily influence at-sea fishing processes are the following: 
1. Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while 
achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery. 
9. Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (A) 
minimize bycatch, and (B) to the extent bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the 
mortality of such bycatch. (US Department of Commerce, 2007: 58-59) 
One of the primary duties of the Council is balancing the competing demands of Standards 1 and 
9: encouraging the “optimum yield” of target species, while also minimizing the bycatch that is 
Figure 4: The 8 Regional Fishery Management Councils created by the Magnusson-Stevens Act in 1976  
(From North Pacific Fishery Management Council website, http://www.npfmc.org/wp-
content/PDFdocuments/meetings/IntrotoProcess.pdf) 
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caught along with target species. ‘Target species’ are “those species primarily sought by the 
fishermen in a particular fishery” (NOAA, 2006: 53), and bycatch is, as described in the previous 
section, species caught incidental to target species, but which is not retained for personal use nor 
for sale. “Optimum yield” is “The harvest of a species that achieves the greatest overall benefits, 
including economic, social, an biological, considerations” (NOAA, 2006: 34). The need to 
balance optimum yield and bycatch minimization is grounded in the common circumstance in 
which species besides those being targeted display similar temporal and spatial patterns of 
behavior at certain times of the year to those being targeted. This overlap of behavioral patterns 
fosters catching both when only targeting one. The need to minimize bycatch is heightened by 
circumstances in which target and bycatch species that are caught together also tend to display 
different spatial and temporal behavioral patterns at other times of the year. These different 
behavioral patterns foster the formation of distinct fisheries for these species. Thus, at one period 
the species co-occur and are caught together, and at other times of the year they are caught in 
distinct locations. For instance, Chinook salmon is often bycaught in pollock fisheries far out in 
the ocean, yet this bycatch becomes especially salient when it is perceived to impact the 
optimum yield of Chinook fisheries that occur at the mouths of rivers. 
b. Fishing with the same gear 
 The Kodiak trawl fleet is foremost defined by the type of gear they deploy to catch fish and 
the type of vessel they use to deploy it. Trawling involves using a large net to catch fish that are 
located either on the bottom or in the water column. The largest of these nets approaches a mile 
around, typically with an opening of around 80 ft. high by 240 ft. wide, mesh as big as 120 feet 
at the front, “large enough to drive a car through,” tapering to about five inches at the back of the 
net, in a section called the ‘codend’ (see Figure 5). The codend is where caught fish collect as the 
Figure 5: Trawl net diagram (Rose et al., 2010: 1) 
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captain tows. Codends are typically 120 
feet around and anywhere from 60 feet to 
over 1200 feet long, varying with the type 
of fish targeted. The larger codends in the 
Kodiak fleet hold as much as 100 tons of 
catch (see Figure 6).  
 To trawl, a captain must locate 
schools of fish and overtake them with a 
net, in contrast to more static gear that 
uses an attractant, such as bait, to draw 
fish to it (e.g., hook and line, pots). Once 
the captain set the gear behind the vessel, 
he steams forward at two to three knots, 
pulling two large rectangular and concave 
metal ‘doors’ that are connected to either 
side of the front opening of the net. Each 
door has about 60 square feet of surface 
area and weighs around 1500 to 3000 lbs 
in the water. When the vessel steams 
forward, the concavity of the doors pushes 
against the density of the seawater, 
creating hydrologic resistance that opens 
the mouth of the net. At this point the net 
is fishing, and the captain will work to 
maintain it at a depth that aligns with the fish he is attempting to catch, and, depending on how 
rocky the bottom is, also at a depth that also avoids hitting the bottom and tearing the net. To 
know where to trawl, captains rely on a sonar to ‘see’ the bottom and things in the water column 
as they move under the vessel. Depending on the variability of the bottom topography and the 
location of schools of fish, trawling may require ongoing adjustment of the net’s location in the 
water column.  
Figure 6: An 80 to 100 ton codend of rockfish (photo 
courtesy of Alaska Whitefish Trawlers Association) 
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 To fish with a trawl net is to conduct a tow, which is the basic event of a trawl fishing 
operation. The tow starts with setting the net and ends when the captain hauls the net up and the 
deck crew dumps the codend either straight into the fish hold or onto the trawl deck for sorting. 
Individual tows constitute a fishing trip, which is the period from when a vessel leaves the dock, 
heads out to the fishing grounds, fishes either until its fish holds are full or it catches its pre-
determined amount of fish, and returns to the dock to unload its catch. Individual trips are 
conducted within fishing seasons, which last either as long as the fleet or individual has quota to 
fish (discussed below), a prohibited species bycatch limit has not been reached (also discussed 
below), or simply for a regulatorily-defined period of time. The length of a fishing season tends 
to be a factor of the size of the quota, the extent of vessel capacity aimed at catching it, and the 
nature of natural systems in which vessels are fishing - primarily the extent to which target fish 
are aggregated and how amenable the weather is to fishing. If the natural conditions are ripe for 
trawling, then fishing will likely be “fast,” and the season will be relatively short.   
 While tows add up to a trip and trips add up to a season, the information garnered from 
tows informs subsequent tows in the same trip, subsequent tows in subsequent trips, and 
subsequent tows in subsequent trips in subsequent seasons. Running a fishing operation is a 
concatenated process in which knowledge from one clearly demarcated event is imported into 
subsequent events. This is the reason that a determination of where to fish is always a 
determination of where to fish next. The only difference is the proximate or distal relationship of 
the previous fishing event to the next fishing event.  
c. Fishing with the same types of vessels 
 All commercial fishing fleets in Alaska are defined by whether they deliver their catch 
from a fishing trip to a shoreside processing plant or instead process the fish onboard. The 
Kodiak trawl fleet is constituted almost entirely by catcher-vessels (CVs), which are vessels that 
Figure 7: Examples of Kodiak trawl vessels (photo courtesy of Alaska Whitefish Trawlers Association) 
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deliver their catch to a shoreside fish 
processing plant. The alternative to the 
CV is the CP (catcher-processors), 
which houses its own processing plant 
on board. CV and CP fleets, even if they 
use the same type of gear and fish for the 
same species, tend to be regulated 
differently. For example, CPs are not 
allowed to fish for pollock in the Gulf of 
Alaska, while they are allowed in the 
Bering Sea.3  
 The Kodiak fleet consists of a 
stable core of CVs that primarily fish in 
the Central Regulatory Area of the Gulf 
of Alaska, as well as a group of more transient vessels that move from the Gulf to the Bering Sea 
to the coasts of Washington and Oregon. The size of the fleet fluctuates with how lucrative local 
fisheries are compared to fisheries in other areas. Nonetheless, the fleet is typically around 35 
vessels. About 25 vessels homeport in Kodiak, and the remainder homeport primarily in 
Washington or Oregon. Approximately 15 vessels are owner-operated, which means the owner 
runs the vessel part of the year, while several owners own multiple boats. In addition, 
corporations that own fish processing plants also own a few boats in the Kodiak fleet, and the 
number of “corporate boats” appears to be increasing every year.   
 Vessels in the Kodiak fleet range in length from around 58ft to around 125ft, with an 
average length of around 80ft feet (See Figure 6 for examples of Kodiak trawl vessels). While 
vessels vary in how much fish they can carry in their fish holds, about half of the fleet meets or 
exceeds their regulatory fishing trip limit of 300,000 pounds, while the other half holds anywhere 
from 150,000 to 280,000 pounds (this trip limit is one of the Steller sea lion protection measures, 
which are further described below). The Gulf-wide trip limit means that even though a vessel 
may hold more than 300,000 pounds of fish, it can only bring that amount to port in a 24-hour 
period. The fleet as a whole, based on trip limits, can hold about 3,800 tons of fish at once.    
3 There is one trawl CP that is allowed to fish for pollock and cod in the Gulf. 
Figure 8: Deckhands dumping a codend of cod (photo courtesy 
of Alaska Whitefish Trawlers Association) 
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d. Fishing with the same organization structure 
 Each Kodiak vessel is an organization in that each is constituted by “social structures 
created by individuals to support collaborative pursuit of specified goals” (Scott & Davis, 2007: 
11). All Kodiak vessels have the same goals - to fish profitably, safely, and legally. And all 
Kodiak vessels have the same general organizational structure constituted by a captain, first 
mate, engineer, and one or two deckhands. Each of these roles comes with its own generic rules, 
procedures, and contributions to the overarching operation. Thus, a vessel is also an organization 
in that it has “generic subjectivity” (Wiley, 1988). The first mate usually works on deck with the 
deckhands, helping with and managing their work as they conduct the hundreds of interlinked 
maneuvers, adjustments, and connections required to set a trawl net into the water, haul it back 
on board, and dump its contents (see Figure 7 a picture taken during a haulback). The engineer is 
responsible for all vessel mechanics, from maintaining the one or two diesel engines employing 
anywhere from 500 to 1200 horsepower (most of the fleet operating at around 900 horsepower, 
which is twice the average horsepower of a semi truck), to operating the hydraulics as they pull 
the net on board, to fixing a malfunctioning head. The captain oversees the first mate, deckhands 
and the engineer, while also determining where to fish, and, once he finds a place to fish, 
determining how to catch them. Vessels usually have two captains who alternate running the 
boat throughout the year, and most crew alternate as well.  
 The captain is also responsible for everyone’s safety and overall compliance with the 
numerous regulations a vessel has to follow while at sea. These regulations include which fish 
can be sorted from the catch once it is dumped on the deck, what type of trash can be tossed at 
sea, which areas the vessel can fish in, or even ‘transit’ in, and so on. Two captains, while 
interviewing them in their wheelhouse, waved a thick book of regulations at me, emphasizing the 
complexity and magnitude of regulations they have to abide by at sea. This book is issued by 
NMFS. The local NMFS manager charged with enforcing those regulations also waved this book 
at me in his office, also emphasizing it size and complexity.   
e. Fishing under the same quota allocation regimes  
 Captains, mates, and deck crew use catcher vessels and its trawl gear to fish for species that 
they have been allocated quota to catch. In the Gulf, quotas are allocated either at the fleet or the 
vessel levels. When quotas are allocated at the fleet-level, all the vessels in that fleet fish for the 
same quota. This type of management structure is known as a ‘race,’ ‘derby,’ or ‘Olympic-style’ 
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fishery. For example, 100% of the pollock quota is allocated to the catcher-vessel fleet. Any 
vessel that belongs to the catcher-vessel fleet and has a permit to fish for pollock in a regulatory 
area (e.g., 610, 620, 630) can fish for the pollock quota allocated to that fleet and to that area.   
 The length of a race fishery varies greatly. They may last only a day or they may last 
weeks depending on the size of the quota, the extent of fishing effort, how aggregated the species 
is, how plentiful those aggregations are, and how amenable the weather is to catching those 
aggregations. If we assume amenable weather and plentiful target fish, when a fleet fishes under 
the same quota and its collective capacity to catch the target fish is high in relation to the size of 
the quota, the result is typically competition. This means that the amount of fish one captain 
catches may detract from the amount of fish another captain has the potential to catch. Captains 
race one another to catch as much as they can before they collectively reach the quota. For 
example, from 2002 to 2008 a winter pollock race fishery in area 630 was open for as few as two 
days and as many as 26 days, with an average of 10 days. This extreme range is due to varying 
levels of effort, which is shaped by a variety of factors, one of which is that this fishery tends to 
sit open while the fleet fishes for cod. When the fleet turns its attention to this fishery, however, 
it is typically over in a few days. In conditions of plentifully aggregated pollock, vessels usually 
get in one to two trips before the fishery closes. Yet, if a vessel is faster than other vessels, it may 
get in three trips in this fishery. The race fisheries the Kodiak fleet engages in are pollock, cod, 
and flatfish.  
 Alternatively, when percentages of a quota are allocated to individual entities, such as a 
community, cooperative, or vessel, captains fish for predetermined amounts of fish. Assuming 
that all conditions of plentifully aggregated target species, this means that the amount that one 
entity catches does not detract from the amount another has the potential to catch. These types of 
management structures are known as ‘privatized’ or ‘rationalized’ fisheries, and include catch 
shares and individual fishing quotas. Another benefit of the privatized nature of this quota 
allocation structure is that the length of a fishery typically aligns with regulatorily-defined dates, 
and captains can fish at their leisure within those dates. For example, the Central Gulf rockfish 
fisheries, the only rationalized trawl fisheries in the Gulf, have been ‘rationalized’ since 2007. 
From 2000 to 2006, this fishery opened around July 1 and tended to close around July 10. Since 
2007, vessels have had their own rockfish quotas that captains can catch any time between May 
1 and November 15. Taken together, the Kodiak trawl fleet has experience fishing in both 
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rationalized and race fisheries, both across and within years in which they move from one to the 
other. 
f. Fishing in the same fisheries 
A fishery is the merging of a quota for a target species, whether it is a race or privatized 
quota, a management structure defining the timing and location of fishing effort for that target 
species, as well as the types of vessels that can fish in that area and for that species, “one or more 
stocks of fish which can be treated as a unit” (MSA, 2007: 7), and fishing effort. Thus, a fishery 
is the integration of relatively abstract structures and relatively concrete fishing activity. The 
spatial and temporal structuring of fisheries is discussed below.        
 The spatial structuring of fisheries in the Gulf is a factor of three regulatory demarcations. 
First, with the passage of the MSA came the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). For the 
preponderance of the resource management era prior to the MSA, the US’s territorial waters 
extended three miles offshore. Then in 1966 Congress added a nine-mile contiguous fishery zone 
adjacent to its territorial waters. This act relegated the three-mile zone to state control, and the 
adjacent nine miles to federal control. The MSA expanded the US’s federal waters, now the 
EEZ, to 200 miles offshore. While trawling is allowed in the EEZ, most state waters are closed to 
bottom trawling year-round, with a small number open to pelagic (mid-water) trawling (e.g., 
Prince William Sound, Middleton Island winter fisheries). Second, federal waters are further 
divided into the Arctic Sea, the Bering Sea, the Aleutian Islands, and the Gulf of Alaska. And 
third, the Gulf is divided into regulatory areas (610, 620, 630, 640) (see Figure 2). Each of these 
areas has its own fisheries. The Kodiak trawl fleet primarily operates in the Central Gulf, which 
encompasses areas 620 and 630, and sometimes crosses into areas the Western Gulf (610) and 
the Eastern Gulf (640). The neighboring Sand Point CV trawl fleet, however, primarily operates 
in the Western Gulf, while sometimes crossing into the Central Gulf.  
 Fisheries are further temporally structured into seasons. The creation of seasons in the Gulf 
trawl fisheries is largely a product of the 1990 listing of the Steller Sea Lion (SSL) under the 
Endangered Species Act. Since its listing, NMFS has enacted multiple structures, known as the 
SSL protection measures (PM), designed to distribute fishing effort across time in order to limit 
the extent to which fishing activity impacts the life history patterns of SSLs. As stated in the 
ESA Biological Opinion, the seasonal structure is “intended to temporally disperse pollock 
catches in the [Gulf]” (NMFS, 2010: 62). Starting in 2001, the PMs required that trawl fishing 
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start each year on January 20th rather than January 1st, which is when non-trawl Gulf groundfish 
fisheries begin. The PMs also require the annual pollock TAC to be split equally among four 
seasons: two winter seasons (A, B), and two fall seasons (C, D). Each season occurs in each 
regulatory area (610, 620, 630), resulting in 12 pollock fisheries in the Gulf every year. 
Regulators allocate each season’s 25% of the pollock quota among the three areas based on the 
predicted spatial distribution of the pollock biomass in the winter and in the fall. The cod 
fisheries are treated similarly, with an A season that occurs in the winter, and a B season that 
occurs in the fall.  
 Despite these seasonal structures, trawl fisheries overlap in time and space. The flatfish 
fisheries, temporally unaffected by the PMs, last all year; the rockfish fisheries, also not included 
in the PMs, last from May 1 to November 15. At particular times of the year, all trawl fisheries 
overlap, while at other times of the year just cod, pollock, and flatfish seasons overlap. Thus, the 
Kodiak fleet can engage in multiple overlapping fisheries. Due to the overlapping seasonal 
structure, and based on quota allocation structures, how relatively large target quotas are (each 
December the Council announces the quotas for all fisheries in the next year, while also setting 
preliminary quotas for the following year), and the value of individual species, vessel owners 
tend to construct annual fishing plans. Fishing plans outline which season a vessel will be fishing 
in at any given period throughout the year. These plans are based on the overarching trawl 
business model, which is to always be fishing, and to do so in the most profitable manner 
possible. Kodiak owners structure their fishing plans around the regulatory start dates for the 
most lucrative Central Gulf fisheries - pollock, cod, and rockfish, as well as other fisheries in 
other areas, depending on where their vessel is permitted to fish. 
 Thus, the Kodiak fleet tends to fish in the same fisheries at the same time, collectively 
moving from one fishery to another, with some individual variation. This fleet-level movement is 
based on an attempt to organize fishing operations to align with certain action patterns of target 
species, but under the constraints imposed by seasonal structures, as well as other regulation. For 
instance, the structure that divides pollock and cod fisheries into winter and fall fisheries forces 
captains to fish for these species in the fall, when they tend to be relatively less aggregated. 
When captains tow on thinly aggregated fish, they tend to catch more bycatch. Captains 
uniformly lament having to fish for cod and pollock in the fall seasons.  
 In the remainder of this study, I use “fishery” to refer to either a fishery or a season, as is 
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typically the case in both management and industry. In all but the cod and pollock fisheries, 
“fishery” and “season” are interchangeable, for in the flatfish and rockfish fisheries, there is but 
one season. However, I will use “season” when it is necessary to distinguish one season from 
another, or when it is necessary to point out that I am discussing phenomena at the more specific 
season-level rather than the more general fishery level.   
g. Fishing for the same target species, bycatching the same non-target species   
 The Kodiak fleet is a multi-target species fleet. Unlike the CV trawl fleet in the Bering Sea, 
which fishes almost solely for pollock, Kodiak vessels target pollock, cod, several species of 
flatfish, and several species of rockfish. A target species is created when regulators assign a 
quota to a species, the amount of which is derived from on a combination of scientific 
recommendation and regulator opinion, and allow fishing to occur for that species. All non-target 
species that are not retained are labeled ‘bycatch’ (NOAA, 2006), but not all bycatch is created 
equally. Some species are rendered bycatch because there is no market for them or because 
captains or processing plants do not retain them for technical reasons (e.g., too big to bring on 
board, too small to be processed), while others are rendered bycatch by regulatory prohibition. 
Although captains cannot retain certain bycaught animals due to other laws (e.g., marine 
mammals, birds), a certain group of fish species has been regulated as ‘prohibited species’ in 
Gulf trawl fisheries. Prohibited species can neither be targeted by trawl captains nor retained if 
caught while targeting other species; thus, they cannot be sold by trawlers even if there is a 
market for them - and the species that are prohibited in the Gulf trawl fisheries are some of the 
most valuable in Alaska. Prohibited species in the Gulf trawl fisheries consist of tanner (‘snow’) 
crab, king crab, Pacific herring, Pacific Halibut, steelhead trout, and Pacific salmon, which, in 
terms of the Gulf, refers to Chinook and chum salmon.    
 Two prohibited species have a profound impact on how Gulf trawl fisheries unfold. This is 
because catch amounts of these species can determine whether a fishery opens or not, and can 
cause a fishery to close before its quota has been caught. In Gulf trawl fisheries, Pacific halibut 
and Chinook salmon have prohibited species catch limits, and can have such impact. While 
halibut limits have been in place since 1985, the limit for Chinook bycatch in the Gulf pollock 
fisheries was an outcome of the 2010 bycatch event which is the subject of Chapter Four. Prior to 
that event there were no in-season management limits on how much salmon could be bycaught in 
trawl fisheries. 
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 The difference between a ‘limit’ and a ‘quota’ is that ‘quota’ is used for a target species in 
a specific fishery, while ‘limit’ is used for prohibited species, and applies to all fisheries in which 
that species is caught over a certain period. When a prohibited species limit is reached, all open 
target fisheries in which that species might be bycaught close, and they do not open until more 
limit becomes available. The halibut limit is divided and released several times a year, while the 
full Chinook limit is released at the beginning of the year. A trawl fishery in which halibut is 
caught as bycatch will close when the halibut limit is reached - even if there is target species 
quota remaining. And all target fisheries in which halibut might be caught will not open until 
more halibut limit becomes available. To use an analogy, prohibited species catch limits function 
as a bank account for target quotas – they are used to fund fishing for target species. Once 
prohibited species catch funds are spent, NMFS managers will close whichever fisheries the 
prohibited species is typically bycaught in. Pacific halibut prohibited species catch tends to 
impact cod and flatfish fisheries, and Chinook salmon prohibited species catch can impact 
pollock fisheries.  
 The ability for prohibited species catch limits to constrain how much target quota captains 
can catch is one of the primary reasons that the axiom ‘You never know until you tow’ raises 
critical issues for Kodiak trawlers. The issue is that by the time captains know what they are 
catching in terms of amounts of prohibited species, it may be too late - that fishery in which they 
are fishing, and perhaps multiple subsequent fisheries, may be closed, stranding millions of 
dollars. In fact, on multiple occasions a few bad tows by one or two vessels have been known to 
shut down fisheries due to high halibut bycatch, leaving large amounts of target quota uncaught. 
Kodiak trawl captains do not like to “leave quota on the table,” for doing so impedes the extent 
to which they can enact a profitable fishing business. As the Kodiak fleet’s fisheries management 
consultant described at a fleet meeting, fishing a target quota when there is increased potential to 
catch high amounts of halibut means “you are gonna shoot yourself in the head.” 
h. Fishing within the same in-season agency management processes 
 In-season management is the active control of fishing effort to meet the regulatory 
imperatives of preventing overfishing of target species and minimizing bycatch of prohibited 
species, while also fostering the ability to achieve optimum yield. In-season management is 
conducted by NMFS employees. At the time of this research, there were two such employees in 
charge of managing all federal Alaskan fisheries. They describe the inherently tensional goal of 
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in-season management the following: 
“[We] have quotas that we make sure are not exceeded. If people want to fish they 
have to follow what we say. But we also want to maximize the allocations once 
they are set. . .  If the fleet wants to do something, it's our job to make sure they 
don’t go over their allocations. We don’t like to see negative numbers on the 
catch reports. . . . When we make closures we know they are affecting people, that 
it affects their pocketbooks, and we don’t close fisheries without keeping that in 
mind.” 
Fisheries open and close on noon of the dates prescribed by regulation - unless in-season 
managers use the tool of closing fisheries early in order to not see negative numbers on weekly 
catch reports (which state the percentage of quota that remains, and when a quota is exceeded a 
negative percentage is given). In-season managers close fisheries early for one of two reasons: 
they predict a fleet will catch its target quota or they predict a fleet will reach its prohibited 
species catch limit prior to the regulatory end date of the fishery.  
 The process in-season regulatory managers go through for closing a fishery early is largely 
the same for both a target quotas and prohibited species catch limits. First they monitor and track 
target species and prohibited species catch amounts. From these data, in-season managers 
formulate target and prohibited species catch rates, which enables them to predict when a fleet 
will exhaust a quota or reach a limit, accounting for predictable changes in fishing effort or 
weather. The data in-season managers rely on come from NMFS fisheries scientists placed on 
fishing vessels and in processing plants, and from the processing plants themselves. In-season 
managers will also contact industry managers, owners, and captains to get a less abstract 
understanding of fishing operations.     
 In-season management is still, however, somewhat abstracted from at-sea fishing 
processes. Managers often receive target catch data, which is collected by processing plants, one 
to three days after it was caught, and prohibited species catch data, which is collected by on-
board or in-plant fishery scientists, a week or more after it was caught. The further behind fishing 
activity that in-season management process are, the further into the future they have to predict 
when a quota or limit will be reached, and thus the less precise such predictions may be. In-
season managers discussed this predictive process, and how their detachment from fishing 
activity influences it, when asked to describe a typical day:  
“Fisheries are different every year, every season. You don’t expect it to be the 
same. . . We have to re-learn how a fishery will react every season. We have to 
learn how the weather is going to affect things, moon phases, I mean just about 
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everything affects these fisheries. But we have learned over time what to look for, 
but we are still learning. . . The dynamics are always changing, and our reception 
of fishing activity data is always behind what is actually happening, so we have to 
project for that. . . If we [close a fishery] a day under or a day over depending on 
catch rates, that can be a big deal. If we are a day under, we might then have to re-
open the fishery.”    
Not only do inseason managers have to predict days in advance due to both delays in getting 
catch data and the inherent unpredictability of fishing, they also have to predict into the future 
because they have to post closures in the Federal Register for them to be enforceable. It takes 
several days to post a closure in the Federal Register, more if a weekend or holiday is 
approaching, as the in-season managers discuss in the following:  
“We are beholden to the Federal Register. . . .If we have to close a fishery, we 
will pick a closure date, send it to headquarters in DC, it gets some review there, 
then we send it to the Federal Register. But the Federal Register isn’t open on the 
weekends or on holidays, so we have to project. With holidays we have more days 
to project to determine a closure, and if the holiday is in the middle of the week 
we have to project differently.”  
Captains operate according to the whims of the weather and the unpredictability of the ecology, 
on weekends and on holidays, while in-season managers operate according to predetermined 
bureaucratic schedules.  
i. Fishing in the same fleet-generated structures 
 The Kodiak fleet’s movement from one fishery to the next is not only shaped by ecological 
and weather conditions, the relative sizes of quotas and values of species, and the actions of in-
season managers, it is also shaped by an industry-level logic that each vessel should have fair 
access to a shared quota. Thus, in race fisheries in which vessels do not have their own 
individual-level quota, each has access to a fleet-level quota. The actual amount a vessel catches 
is beholden to the vessel’s effectiveness in terms of being able to find fish, and efficiency in 
terms of how much time it needs to fill its hold. Nonetheless, because fisheries overlap, the fleet 
tends to work together to structure that movement in order to maintain fair access. For example, 
in the winter, both pollock and cod seasons open on January 20th, enabling the fleet to 
contemporaneously fish for both quotas. Yet, captains are uncomfortable with the potential for 
situations to arise in which one group of captains, or even one captain, fishes from a quota in one 
fishery, such as cod, while another group of captains is fishing for pollock. When this situation 
occurs, the captains fishing in different fisheries at the same time diminish each other’s 
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opportunity to catch as much as they can of both quotas (e.g., the captains fishing for pollock 
catch the quota that the captains fishing for cod could have the opportunity to catch after they 
have exhausted the pollock quota). To prevent situations in which captains contemporaneously 
diminish one another’s opportunity to have fair access to a quota, Kodiak captains organize on 
land to create ‘fleet agreements.’ 
 The most common fleet agreements are the ‘fair start’ and the ‘stand down.’ In these 
agreements, which are signed by all fleet members, captains agree to delay their fishing effort 
(‘stand down’) and start fishing on a chosen date that is after the regulatory-defined start of the 
season (‘fair start’). These agreements structure the temporal nature of individual fishing 
operations in order to maintain fair access. Returning to the example above of the cod and 
pollock fisheries, in most years the fleet agrees to stand down in the pollock fishery when it 
officially begins on January 20th, and schedule a fair start in that fishery for a date after they 
predict they will have finished catching the cod quota. The fleet separates their fishing effort 
using a self-generated temporal structure, and in doing so create fair access to both the pollock 
and cod quotas. These agreements mean that one captain fishing for pollock cannot “catch the 
quota out from underneath” another captain fishing for cod.  
Fleet agreements are also meant to, to the best of the fleet’s ability to work within the 
regulatorily-prescribed timing of fishing seasons, align their fishing operations with life history 
traits, such as the aggregating behavior of all their target species and roe development in pollock. 
In the following a captain outlines this reasoning for delaying fishing for pollock in the winter 
seasons: 
“The longer you delay any [winter pollock] season, the better off the fleet is. The 
last time we had a big roe year was 2007 when B season came and we sat because 
of weather. It was 10 days after [the season started],when we left the dock and we 
had big numbers. . . There is no downturn about it. So, I think we should come up 
with a plan everyone likes, and go from there. The longer we postpone it the 
better off we all are truthfully”. 
When setting out to fish, captains search for a place to fish, with the time in which they go 
fishing being largely predetermined - either by regulation or fleet agreement. This is why 
sensemaking at sea, which starts at the docks, is largely focused on where to fish when captains 
set out to sea, rather than when to fish. And that is why this study examines processes through 
which captains determine where to fish, not when to fish.  
Another important type of fleet agreement is the voluntary catch share. This is also aimed 
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at allowing fair access, often in cases in which in-season managers determine that there is too 
little quota, in relation to potential fishing effort, to open a race fishery at all. The reason is that 
fisheries must be open for a 24 hour period, but the fleet will likely overfish their quota in that 
period. In 2010 in-season managers started working with and allowing the Kodiak fleet to self-
manage certain fisheries by monitoring and controlling their own catch amounts. The basic 
structure of such an agreement is a predetermined amount, based on the quota and fish hold 
capacity, that each vessel gets to catch. With such an agreement in hand, in-season managers will 
open the fishery for the amount of time the fleet requests to catch the quota, taking factors such 
as the time it takes to steam to the grounds, weather, and probable fishing quality (i.e., extent of 
aggregating behavior) into consideration. The fleet then tracks their catch amounts while 
operating at sea and processing plant managers monitor catch amounts when captains offload. 
For example, since 2010 Kodiak captains have self-managed all the A and B 630 fisheries, and 
have caught an average of 95% of the 630 A and B quotas. From 2003 to 2009, however, 
captains overfished either the 630 A or B pollock quotas each year, catching an average of 128% 
of the fish they were allowed to catch. In two of those years, in-season managers did not open the 
B season at all in order to compensate for the overfishing that occurred in the A season. And in 
one B season the fleet caught 323% of the quota. As one in-season manager commented, “A 
fishermen can come in on their quota a lot better than we can project.” This dissertation helps us 
understand the interpretive and decision-making processes captains undergo in order to enact 
such precision. 
j. Fishing in the same regulatorily-limited areas 
The fleet-level movement in which captains attempt to align their operations with the 
behavioral patterns of their target species is further limited, both spatially and temporally, within 
fishing seasons. These limitations are primarily due to the SSL PMs, yet also due to other 
regulatory structures. In addition to the trip limit and the seasonal structures described above, 
there are a “complex” and “complicated” “mosaic” of temporal and spatial closures trawl 
captains face, making it  “impossible to easily sum these various closures and determine how 
much of the area is closed to fishing” (NMFS, 2010: 59 - 60). The purpose of spatial and 
temporal closures is to control the relationship between fishing effort and SSL rookeries and 
haulouts. Rookeries are “terrestrial areas used by adult Steller sea lions during the breeding 
season”; haulouts are “terrestrial areas used by adult Steller sea lions during times other than the 
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breeding season and by non-breeding adults and subadults throughout the year” (NMFS, 2010: 
96). There are 148 area-based closures that impact pollock fishing in Alaska, 79 of which are in 
the Gulf. In general, fishing for pollock is prohibited less than 10 nautical miles around haulouts 
and 20 nautical miles around rookeries. Yet, the absolute or temporal existence, or spatial range, 
of many closures depends on whether the vessel is using bottom or pelagic trawl gear.  
Yet, there are additional spatial closures that structure trawl fishing activity in the Gulf. 
There are eight areas closed to protect red king crab rearing and breeding around Kodiak Island, 
some of which are closed for part of the year, others for the entire year, and others are contingent 
on king crab ‘recruitment events.’ In 2010 the Council added new tanner crab closures near 
Kodiak Island. Other closed areas intended to protect crab stocks include the Cook Inlet Non-
Pelagic Trawl Closure Area and the Southeast Outside Trawl Closure. In addition, there are 
several Essential Fish Habitat closures in the Gulf (i.e., Coral Habitat Protection Area; Alaska 
Seamount Habitat Protection Areas; Slope Habitat Protection Area), as well as the Sitka 
Pinnacles Marine Reserve. Taken together, these restrictions are based on gear, time, space, and 
the nature of certain life history events of certain species. 
6. Methodology & Analytical Approach 
 This dissertation is a case study of the Kodiak trawl fleet with the goal of extending 
organizational theory, primarily sensemaking, and secondarily recurring action patterns, to the 
frontline of commercial fishing. Theory extension is appropriate when existing ideas can provide 
the foundation for exploration of new theoretical territory (Lee, Mitchell, & Sablynski, 1999). 
An example of theory extension is Dutton and Dukerich’s (1991) case study of the New York 
Port Authority. In elucidating how their subjects dealt with issues related to homelessness, the 
authors elaborated theory of organizational adaptability with the role of consistency in the 
interrelationship between identity and image. In this study, the salient dynamic among regulatory 
structures and processes, at-sea fishing practices, and indeterminate nature systems provides a 
fruitful context for extending sensemaking into the realm of natural resource management. 
 Case studies are appropriate when the goal is theory extension (Eisenhardt, 1989). A case 
study design is used when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are posed, rather than questions 
concerning ‘who, what, where, how many, and where next.’ The former questions seek to 
explain, the latter seek to predict (Yin, 2009). In addition, case studies are appropriate when the 
research questions necessitate a longitudinal perspective, and when the focus is on real world 
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events that cannot be divorced from their contexts (Lee 1999; Yin, 2009). Simply stated, “The 
case study is a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present within 
single settings” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 534). The overall goals of my research are to understand 
rather than predict organizational phenomena, to elaborate rather than test organizational theory, 
and to depict dynamic and longitudinal processes rather than cross-sectional relationships, all in 
a discrete real-world setting. A case study approach is somewhat of a mainstay of sensemaking 
research (e.g., Dunbar & Garud, 2009; Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Maitlis 2005; Patriotta, 2003), 
and is an appropriate choice for this study. 
 I chose to study the commercial fishing context because of my background in the Alaskan 
fishing industry. I spent three years and two summers working as a fisheries observer for the 
National Marine Fisheries Service primarily trawlers in the Bering Sea and off the coasts of 
Washington and Oregon. Being a fisheries observer meant that while I lived on board with the 
crew, I was an outsider, a ‘fish cop’ as fishermen were wont to characterize. My duty was to 
sample the catch according to statistical protocols and monitor fishing operations for regulatory 
violations, and provide data that is the primary information upon which regulatory management 
decisions are made in Alaskan federal fisheries. In total I logged 669 days at sea on 17 different 
vessels, 15 of which were trawlers. This background gave me an in-depth understanding of at-sea 
fishing operations while also giving me the legitimacy I needed, primarily as someone who has 
extensive experience at sea and knowledge of trawl fisheries, to gain access to the Kodiak trawl 
fleet to conduct ethnographic research. 
 I chose the Kodiak trawl fleet for as my case practical and topical reasons. In terms of 
practical reasons, the fleet has a reputation for being a local, community-based fleet, while also 
being a large industrial fleet. I knew that many trawl captains who fished out of Kodiak also 
lived there. From preliminary research, I realized that there were local industry and regulatory 
managers, industry personnel, and community groups I could also study while the fleet was 
fishing. Being in the community was being at the frontline of commercial fisheries management. 
In terms of topical reasons, my initial interest was in fleet self-regulatory processes when 
engaging in a ‘rationalized’ catch-share fishery. The Gulf rockfish fishery had just been 
converted to a catch-share fishery in 2006, and my goal was to study the Kodiak fleet as they 
moved inter-annually from competitive fisheries, such as pollock and cod, to the non-competitive 
rockfish fishery. Yet when I arrived in the field in 2011, I found that the issue that was of salient 
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concern to the Kodiak fleet and the broader community was Chinook bycatch. This concern 
transitioned to halibut bycatch in 2012. Thus, a few months into my fieldwork, I realized that I 
was no longer studying the fleet as they managed their operations in and out of a catch share 
fishery, but as they managed their bycatch in all fisheries. Because of the ethnographic nature of 
my research methods, my case shifted with shifting focal issues on the ground, whether I wanted 
it to or not. 
 I used qualitative methods to collect data due to their sensitivity to individuals’ 
interpretations, activities, and interrelated interpretations and activity sequences, as well as 
contextual elements and processes (Langley, 1999, 2007; Lofland, et al., 2006). My primary 
fieldwork spanned a two-year period (2011, 2012). I spent January through May of each year in 
Kodiak, Alaska observing the Central Gulf trawl fleet as they enacted the same winter fisheries 
each year. In both years the fleet started fishing Pacific cod, transitioned to the A and B pollock 
fisheries, yet in 2012 the fleet transitioned back to cod mid-way through pollock, and then 
transitioned again back to pollock (all in the interest of fishing the species that was most 
aggregated). In both years the fleet fished flatfish and then rockfish after pollock and cod. I 
arrived in 2011 prior to the 2011 A season, which was the first pollock season after the 2010 D 
season, during which the at-sea portion of the Western Gulf bycatch event occurred (which is the 
subject of Chapter Four).  
 My data sources include semi-structured interviews, observation, participant observation, 
and archival documents and recordings. Interviews can be an effective tool for understanding 
how organizational participants come to attach meaning to events (Berg 1998). As such, 
interviews provide an opportunity to see how organizational members organize their world. As 
Czarniawska (2004: 49) explains, “what people present in the interviews is but the results of their 
perception, their interpretation of the world, which is of extreme value to the researcher because 
one may assume that it is the same perception that informs their actions.” I conducted semi-
structured interviews of Kodiak trawl captains (26), fish processing plant managers (4), salmon 
and halibut captains (7), industry managers/consultants (11), and National Marine Service 
managers (6). Captains had an average of 25 years of experience at the helm of a fishing vessel, 
ranging from 16 to 41 years. Two of these captains took part in the Western Gulf bycatch event, 
but all had experience targeting pollock and catching, as well as attempting not to catch, Chinook 
salmon bycatch. Table 1 provides examples of the questions that loosely structured interviews 
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with captains. I recorded interviews with an electronic recorder when given permission, 
otherwise I took hand-written notes. Recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim, and hand-
written notes were typed as soon as possible in order to merge notes and memory into as accurate 
a transcription as I could manage. Interviews typically lasted between one and two hours, with 












How long have you been fishing? How long have you been a captain? 
Is there anything that surprises you at sea? 
Please describe a normal day of fishing. 
What makes a good captain? What characteristics separate one captain from another? 
What is your approach to dealing with Chinook bycatch? 
Who do you communicate with at sea? Why do you communicate with that person? 
What makes another captain good to work with? 
Has communication changed at sea since the big Chinook bycatch event in the Western 
Gulf?  
What would you change about the current bycatch management system? 
 
 Observation and participant observation are ethnographic study techniques. Ethnography 
is the close, detailed, and intensive observation of, and writing about, social life (Schwartzman, 
1993). Like interviews, ethnography is also suited to an emphasis on meanings and 
interpretations, including describing in detail how organizational actors make sense of equivocal 
events in work settings (Patriotta, 2003; Zilber, 2002). Zilber (2002: 237) elaborates this point in 
stating that ethnography “can be aimed at uncovering not only overt behavioral patterns, but also 
the subjective experiences of organizational reality and the ongoing negotiations between 
members and subgroups over the interpretations and understandings of this reality.” 
 I conducted observation and participant observation in a variety of settings. First, I 
observed 15 Central Gulf trawl fleet meetings, each lasting one to three hours. Second, I 
observed two meetings of the local fisheries advisory group - the Kodiak Fisheries Advisory 
Committee (KFAC). Third, I spent one day of observation on board two vessels, each conducting 
non-fishing, industry-organized research trips to test devices designed to exclude salmon from 
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the catch. Fourth, I conducted participant observation during two fishing trips, one of which  
targeted flatfish on the other rockfish. These two trips together lasted seven days. Thus, in total I 
observed operations on four fishing vessels. Fifth, I observed five to six days of three Council 
meetings, which last nine days, one of which was the April 2011 meeting in which the issue of 
Chinook salmon bycatch in the Gulf was a primarily agenda item. Sixth, I conducted seven 
months of participant observation in a local industry organization that helps manage the Central 
Gulf trawl fleet. 
 My data collection approach was simply to write down everything I could, in as much 
verbatim language as I could. This included spoken words, actions, intentions, and appearances 
(Hoyle, Harris, & Judd, 2008). To aid note-taking efficiency, as well as recall, I followed Berg’s 
(1998: 147-148) suggestions of 1) recording key words and data in the field, 2) taking notes 
about the sequence of events, 3) limiting the time in the setting, 4) writing up the full notes 
immediately after leaving the setting, and 5) writing up the notes before sharing them with 
others. I took hand-written notes during meetings and fishing trips, while also obtaining official 
recordings of Council and KFAC group meetings. I transcribed notes from fleet meetings and 
fishing trips as soon as possible so that they were as accurate as I could manage. In terms of the 
local consultancy organization, I took hand-written notes when possible during my first year of 
fieldwork. Later in the second year I was allowed to record the time I spent in this organization. 
 The primary archival research I conducted was recordings of Council meetings. Council 
administrative staff records each meeting and uploads the files to an internet data storage service 
(box.net), which is accessible by the public. These recordings include Council discussions, 
deliberations, as well as public testimonies. Four Council meetings comprised the on-land 
portion of the Western Gulf bycatch event: December 2010, February 2011, April 2011, and 
June 2011. The Chinook salmon bycatch portion of each meeting ranged from half a day to one 
and a half days of Council activity. I transcribed all of the public testimony period of the 
Chinook salmon bycatch portion each meeting, and the entire Chinook salmon bycatch portion of 
three meetings (limited time being the reason a fourth meeting was not transcribed). Nonetheless, 
I listened to the non-transcribed meeting multiple times, each time taking notes. My focus of 
these meetings was their public testimony period. 
 Public testimony consists of stakeholders describing their involvement in an issue, stating 
their concerns with an issue, and telling the Council the action they should take on an issue. 
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Individuals are allowed three-minute statements and groups are allowed six-minute statements. 
Council members ask stakeholders questions in return. In the meetings of concern, some 
members of the public found themselves testifying for as long as half an hour, and others as short 
as three minutes. Often the exchanges between stakeholders and Council members are spirited 
and candid, and often they are systematic in which Council members ask multiple stakeholders 
the same questions for the stated purpose of finding commonalities. Table 2 provides the array of 
stakeholder testimonies analyzed for this chapter, comprised of 57 testimonies and 36 unique 
testifiers, which added up to 115 pages of single-spaced transcribed text. 





















Dec. 2010 12 2 6 0 0 20 38 
Feb. 2011 1 2 1 1 0 5 14 
April 2011 6 5 6 1 1 19 27 
June 2011 4 5 4 0 0 13 36 
Total  23 14 17 2 1 57 115 
Unique 
testifiers 17 7 9 2 1 36  
 
 The data derived from these methods were coded primarily with Nvivo and analyzed 
using grounded theory principles (Glaser & Strauss, 1965). My primary approach was constant 
comparison, in which I iteratively compared themes derived from the data to the organizational 
theory literature (Charmaz, 2006). I began the analytical process with interviews of captains. 
From this initial step, dominant themes began to emerge, such as “interrelating with ecological 
processes,” “working with processing plants,” and “updating to avoid Chinook.” With initial 
dominant themes in mind, I moved to fishing trip data and added and refined themes. From there 
I moved to other interviewees, to fleet meetings, and then to Council meetings, each time adding 
and refining themes. I worked through my data and revised my themes iteratively. Council public 
testimony was coded a second time using Microsoft Word. On multiple occasions I took a break 
from coding to organize themes into a coherent theoretical framework. After multiple iterations 
of coding data and organizing frameworks, I finally settled on one that, as perhaps put best by 
Pratt (2000: 462), “I believed offered a strong contribution to theory without doing undue 
violence to my experience.” And, like Pratt, I have also discussed my framework with key 
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participants, altering it according to their suggestions [to be completed]. 
7. Roadmap to Subsequent Chapters 
 The ensuing chapters consist of three empirical chapters and the study’s conclusion. In 
Chapter Two I begin to examine at-sea sensemaking at the individual-level, examining why 
captains interrelate with natural systems, what elements of natural systems they interrelate with, 
and how they interrelate with them. I start by exploring the role of profitability in fishing, 
primarily in terms of the efficiency imperative it puts on captains. Then I move to discussing the 
material components of at-sea processes (i.e., target species behavior, the ocean bottom, and 
weather). I explain how the characteristics of these materialities influence how captains 
interrelate with them. A key finding is that based on how these materialities recurrently 
interrelate in time and space, Kodiak trawl captains have a disposition to fish where they have 
fished before. Yet, due to the inherent indeterminacy of natural systems, this disposition is 
always a conjecture, and the process of determining exactly where to fish is largely an abductive 
process. From these findings I produce an individual-level model of abductive sensemaking at 
sea, which I further explore in Chapter Three and apply in Chapter Four.  
 In Chapter Three I expand the individual-level work of Chapter Two to the social level. 
This chapter examines the sensemaking that captains undertake as they work through the three 
primary environments they enact at sea: the plotter-based environment, the sonar-based 
environment, and the trawl deck-based environment. Using the model produced in Chapter Two, 
I model the social processes captains construct as they progress through each environment, and I 
discuss how sharing experience can increase one another’s ‘abductive capacity’ for making sense 
of indeterminate natural systems. Furthermore, in this chapter I demonstrate how sharing 
information about past experiences with materiality in certain times and spaces, or actually 
sharing those times and spaces, can create discontinuity in captains’ progression through their 
fishing process. This chapter also shows how the retrospective nature of creating meaning at sea, 
in that captains only know what they were towing from after they have towed from it, can create 
incongruence between the concrete part of their experience (e.g., actual extracted fish) and the 
abstract part of their experience (e.g., expectations of extracted fish). I also discuss how captain 
resolve both discontinuity of progression and incongruence between the abstract and concrete 
aspects of experience.   
 Chapter Four is the final empirical chapter. In this chapter I apply the models and 
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findings from chapters One and Two to an extreme real-world event: the Western Gulf Chinook 
salmon bycatch event. This event was the largest catch of Chinook bycatch in a fishing season on 
record in the Gulf. This seasonal catch resulted in an annual catch of Chinook in the Western 
Gulf that was 11.5 times higher than the 15-year average (NPFMC, 2011), and which also 
exceeded the Endangered Species Act (ESA) trigger for inter-agency consultation (due to the 
presence of Chinook in the Gulf from ESA-listed streams in the Pacific Northwest). The 
consultation meant that the Council had to act, and the product of an ensuing seven-month 
regulatory process was an annual limit on the amount of Chinook Gulf trawlers could catch when 
fishing for pollock.   
 The event had both at-sea and on-land components. My examination of the at-sea 
component reveals that sensemaking functions to connect captains’ patterns of activity with their 
target species’ recurring patterns of activity, creating interaction patterns that span social and 
natural systems. Yet other species, such as Chinook, often enact the same or similar action 
patterns as target species, such as pollock, do. When captains do not differentiate between these 
action patterns, they produce bycatch. When this lack of differentiation occurs in a “hot spot,” a 
large-scale bycatch even can occur. Chapter Four demonstrates that due to a lack of expectations 
for catching high amounts of Chinook bycatch, a high ‘acceptable level of ignorance’ in the face 
of concrete cues that something could be amiss, and regulatory and natural conditions that made 
changing locations costly, trawl captains did not attempt to differentiate their target species from 
Chinook salmon.  
The regulatory response to the at-sea portion of this event was a rational decision-making 
process aimed preventing the creation of large-scale bycatch events. To do so, the Council 
instituted a limit on the amount of Chinook the trawl fleet can catch, the purpose of which is to 
incentivize captains to operate at the species-level in addition to the action-pattern level. The 
Council created a ‘sensemaking incentive,’ which was intended to encourage captains to take 
action to ‘know, at the species-level, before they tow.’  
 And finally, Chapter Five concludes this dissertation. After reviewing the content from 
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From the Past, Through the Present, and Into the Future: The Basics Elements of 
Sensemaking at Sea 
 
“Consider the subtleness of the sea; how its most dreaded creatures glide under water, 
unapparent for the most part, and treacherously hidden beneath the loveliest tints of azure.” 
--Melville, H. Moby Dick, p. 247 
 
1. Introduction 
 The research question driving this study is, How do frontline commercial fishing 
managers make sense of indeterminate natural systems as they attempt to extract material 
resources from them? In this chapter I begin to answer this question by examining the elements 
of the process through which Gulf of Alaska (Gulf) trawl captains interrelate with natural 
systems in the interest of creating a profitable fishing practice. Captains seek a “workable level 
of certainty” (Weick, 1969: 40) regarding which particular natural systems, processes, or actors 
(‘entities’) to organize with. In order to create a workable level of certainty, captains engage in 
sensemaking to answer the question, “What’s the story here?” in terms of the contextual 
conditions in which they are or may be operating, and, “What’s next?’ (Weick et. al, 2005: 410) 
in terms of how to move toward their goals, whether they are short-term or long-term, of 
enacting certain future events. The goal of this chapter is to build a basic model of the 
sensemaking that captains conduct in order to interrelate with natural systems at the frontline of 
commercial fishing. My purpose is to produce a model that allows researchers to analyze 
sensemaking processes in similar contexts.  
To build an analytical model of sensemaking at sea, I draw primarily on data from fishing 
trip and fleet-meeting observations and personal interviews4 in order to examine the elements of 
sensemaking at sea, using the following questions to structure this analysis: 1. Why do captains 
go fishing? 2. What natural systems do captains fish from? 3. How do captains make sense of 
which specific natural systems to fish from? Thus, each section below is constructed using a 
4All informants in this chapter are Kodiak trawl captains, unless otherwise noted in the text; all data were 
collected by the author. 
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different adverbial tool (why, what, and how), to elucidate parts of the sensemaking at-sea 
process. A key finding is that captains, as managers of the business organization that is a fishing 
vessel, have an imperative to fish efficiently, and, coupled with the predictability offered by 
recurring relationships among natural systems, and facing the indeterminacy of the specific time 
and location, and composition of a target species aggregation, makes sense of where to fish using 
the operating model of fishing where they have fished before. Yet, the selection of an actual spot 
to fish in, from the many they have fished before, is influenced by current conditions of natural 
systems, primarily the particular behavioral traits of target species, the nature of the ocean 
bottom, and weather conditions. Because captains must choose a fishing spot efficiently, yet they 
must also choose one that will plausibly offer them the ability to enact a profitable fishing trip, 
they engage in abductive sensemaking. Abduction is the process of “comparing existing 
conditions to a relatively simple operating model” (Abolafia, 2010: 353). This chapter 
demonstrates that captains not only make sense of experience by ‘connecting the abstract with 
the concrete,’ (Weick et al., 2005: 412) but they also merge the past and the future, from which 
they produce a story of what is happening, from which they conjecture what action to take next.. 
Focusing on the process of determining where to fish, this chapter dissects the sensemaking at-
sea process into the abstract, concrete, past, and future parts of experience, and produces a model 
in which captains draw from these parts of experience in order to tell a story of what is 
happening and conjecture what should happen next. In the next chapter I set this model in motion 
by examining episodes of abductive sensemaking throughout a fishing trip.  
2. Why: Profitability 
 At the heart of a successful fishing process is the ability of the captain, crew, and owner 
to, as several interviewees put it, “make a living from it.” Whether a fishing vessel is a small, 
owner-operated operation or part of a corporate conglomeration of vessels and processing plants, 
captains have a common duty of enacting profitable fishing processes because, as is the case with 
most businesses, profitability is the overarching goal of commercial fishing. In fact, to even go 
fishing captains must consider the venture to be a contribution to running a profitable business, 
as the following example of a captain sitting at the dock, rather than fishing, exemplifies: 
“That's why I'm not fishing right now is the [processing plant] wasn't going to pay 
enough money for the fish. . . They wanted me to go rock sole fishing, and I said, 
‘I can't do it.’ The money isn’t there because you are only getting 26 cents [per 
pound] for those big rock sole . . . I mean, on an average trip this boat here will 
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burn almost two thousand gallons of fuel, at $3.80 a gallon. So you are looking at 
seven thousand dollars off the top on just fuel costs.”  
Going fishing was a not a viable option for this captain because he determined he would pay 
more for overhead costs, particularly fuel, than he would make from fishing for rock sole, which 
is a type of flatfish. As another captain put it, he would “go backwards.”  The reason this captain 
was able to make such a determination is because he knew, to an approximate degree, what his 
trip was going to cost. Such knowledge is apparent in another captain’s description of the 
common overhead costs embedded in trawl fishing: “It’s not cheap to take these things out 
fishing, it's not cheap. It’s probably close to three thousand dollars a day just for fuel, plus 
observer5 costs and groceries and everything else.” Captains know, at a general level, what each 
fishing trip will cost due to predictable overhead costs; as another captain stated: “Between the 
cost of the fuel and the cost of the [NMFS fisheries] observer, you have some pretty heavy fixed 
costs on a daily basis.” The captain’s job is to find a place to fish that offers the possibility of 
catching enough fish, and doing so in a sufficiently efficient manner, to pay such costs, and have 
as much profit left over as they can muster. To accomplish this task, captains must continually 
wrest determinacy from indeterminate material systems, so that they can know, to a workable 
degree, the economic viability of a embarking on a certain fishing trip, of going to a certain 
fishing spot, and of a making certain tow.  
 In addition to profitability, other factors that can determine the viability of a fishing 
process include safety and regulatory compliance. Thus, like profitability, an actual or potential 
violation of a regulation can render a potential fishing process unviable. Yet, while certain 
regulations were salient topics of interviews and observed conversations, such concerns were 
usually framed in terms of how regulatory compliance actually or potentially impacted 
profitability. The following comment exemplifies this relationship between profitability and 
5 Fisheries observers are biologists who work onboard fishing vessels and within processing plants to 
collect data according to statistical models on the catch amounts and composition. As stated in the 
Observer Manual (2013: 2-18), “The Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska Fisheries are among the best 
managed in the world, in large part due to the data collected by observers. Statisticians and fisheries 
managers rely heavily on observer data and also rely heavily on the assumption that these data have been 
collected a specific way.” NMFS uses their data, along with landings data provided by processing plants, 
to determine how much of each species Kodiak vessels are catching, keeping, and discarding. Observers 
also collect data on fishing locations and times. Kodiak trawl vessels have to carry observers for 
approximately 30% of their fishing time. The industry-funded pay structure has recently changed, from 
vessels paying a daily rate depending on when an observer is on their vessel to paying a % of their income 
to a pool, from which observers are paid.  
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regulatory compliance:  
“It’s frustrating, but most of the time how I deal with it is I go, “Ok, these are the 
rules, and am I going to fucking make money like this.” So I go out there, no 
matter what [regulation] I've got shoved up my ass, I've got to just go out there 
and not think about it and think about, ok, here's my options, and how do I still 
make a living for this vessel and my crew and everybody else? And that's what I 
got to do, and that's what I think about.”  
In addition, although all study participants would agree that safety is the primary concern when 
fishing, because there was only one marine casualty during my research, such concerns tended to 
live more in the background of interviews and observations of fleet meetings and fishing 
processes. Only in one interview, in which a captain had just returned from a fishing trip in 
which his vessel turned on its side due to a rogue wave, was safety a primary topic of 
conversation. The ability for invested parties to make a living from at-sea operations, due to 
efficient operations, was, however, a topic of conversation in nearly all of my interviews and 
observations.  
 Profitability is simply the income from selling the resources extracted from natural 
systems minus the costs of extracting those resources. Yet, within the profit derived from 
commercial trawl fishing is the incomes of the captain and crew. Thus, because incomes are 
typically derived from a share of the profit, how much the captain and crew make from a fishing 
trip depends on how profitable the trip was. Therefore, the lower the cost of catching fish, the 
more fish that are caught, and the more the caught fish are worth, the more the captain and crew 
will make. Put differently, how efficiently a captain enacts a fishing trip, part of which is how 
effective he is at choosing good fishing spots, has a direct impact on how much both he and his 
crew make from that trip. Income at the frontline of commercial trawl fishing lies in the nature of 
how captains organize with natural systems.   
A profitable future imposes a demand on the present for an efficient means of bringing itself 
to life. At sea the onus falls upon captains to fashion an efficient pathway out of the past, through 
the present, and into the future. Captains noted that the skill required to continually keep the 
margin of income above the margin of costs is one of the aspects of being a captain that they 
value most, as the following exemplifies:  
“That's kind of why we are all fishermen - because the future is not dictated to us. 
We make our future. Whether we are successful with this or not, at least I leave 
town and my future is dictated by me, not by AT&T or Apple or who owns that 
company. Your talent dictates how successful you are, not some CEO of some 
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corporation.”  
Or, as another captain analogized, “We like the challenge, we like the competition, the 
professional athletics.” The challenge captains face is to interrelate with indeterminate natural 
systems so that their margin of income is as far above their margin of costs as they can safely 
and legally manage, and the talent of doing so involves sensemaking at the frontline: creating a 
workable level of certainty in the face of the indeterminate, that enables them to efficiently 
extract fish and fill their vessels. Captains face an efficiency imperative at sea that shapes all  
Table 3: Dimensions of the efficiency imperative captains face at sea 
Dimension Representative Quotes 
General relationship 
between fuel costs and 
towing a trawl net 
“These are high volume, low margin fisheries. Unlike the crab 
fishery, we have high operating costs, the trawlers have the highest 
overhead. With towing you burn a lot of fuel. The other guys just 
drop their pots and pick them up. We have to tow a big net.”  
Spatial influence of fuel 
costs: fishing as close to 
town as possible 
“We run to the closest spot and we fill the boat in three or four 
hours.” 
“We pretty much go to the closest area that's open.” 
“[Area] 630 is vast, it goes all the way from Seward to the south end 
of [Kodiak] and the whole fleet catches their two pollock trips in 
about 15 minutes ten miles from town.”  
Spatial relationship 
between fuel costs and 
searching for fish 
“Especially with rockfish, sometimes you just need to drive around 
and look for a long time. You try to figure out where they are and 
how congregated they are. But that is difficult with the costs of fuel 
and other fixed costs.” 
Biological and economic 
source of Ttemporal 
pressure induced by : 
deteriorating fish quality  
Interviewer: “Is there a certain time you have to be back at the plant 
by?” 
Captain: “Well, once that fish [in the fish hold] gets about three days 
old, that's about it. . . That's what the problem is; we've been out here 
for four or five days so we are not gonna stop to get a good night's 
sleep.” (fishing trip observation) 
Temporal pressure 
induced by competition 
for a shared quota 
“Thirty minutes could make or break a trip during this race for fish. . 
. I don’t want to get lapped at the dock, I don’t want to miss out on 
my last trip of the season over 30 minutes. . . This is a short little 
season, and this is our make or break time of the year - March is 
everything.” (personal observation, fleet meeting observation) 
Generalized sense of 
temporal pressure  
“I don’t know if it ever goes away, maybe the next generation of 
fishermen that's gonna grow up with catch shares will not have it, 
but you always have this sense of, we got to hurry up, got to fill the 
boat, got to get turned around, we got to get back there, we got to fill 
it up.”  
Relationship between 
fuel costs and temporal 
pressure  
“It would be nice if we could stop and sleep, but the clock is 
running. . . .with the cost of fuel for you to come out here, you got to 
bring some fish back.” (fishing trip observation) 
Combined spatio-
temporal aspect of fuel 
“Fuel is cheap in the winter when the weather is bad, and fuel gets 
more expensive in the summer when weather is good. So guys are 
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costs and deciding when 
to fish 
going try and fish when the fuel is cheap, no matter what.”  
aspects of at-sea processes, including how they make sense of natural systems. 
Table 3 elaborates different dimensions of the efficiency imperative that captains face at sea, 
primarily focusing on space and time. Fuel costs are used to elaborate spatial demands for 
efficiency, for every movement of a vessel at sea, whether for the purpose of trawling or merely 
steaming, requires an expenditure of fuel. In fact, of all the costs of operating a vessel, fuel costs 
is the one that informants were most concerned with: captains mentioned “fuel prices” as a 
concern 14 times while on four fishing trips, and 22 captains mentioned issues related to fuel 
costs 51 times, and concerns with fuel costs were common topics of conversation in fleet 
meetings. One of the reasons for this concern is dramatically rising fuel prices, something 
captains in fisheries around the world face (Cheilari, Guillan, Damalas, & Barbas, 2013; 
Tyedmers, Watson, & Pauly, 2005). In Kodiak, fuel costs have increased over the past 10 years 
from an average of $1.40 per gallon in 2003, to $2.78 per gallon in 2007, to $3.63 per gallon in 
2012 (archival data6). The sources of temporal pressure for efficiency are many, from the 
influence of competing with other captains for a shared quota in a “race” fishery, to the time 
restrictions canneries put on how long fish can sit below deck in a hold before they will start to 
lower the amount they will pay for them, to simply a more generalized sense of always having to 
hurry. Fuel also imposes impose temporal pressure, for the longer a vessel takes to steam or fish, 
the higher the fuel costs. Time is money at sea because, whether fishing or steaming, passing 
time is accompanied by burning fuel, as well as other accumulating overhead costs. It is these 
factors, among others, that constitute the efficiency imperative captains face when organizing 
their vessel with material systems at the frontline of commercial fishing. 
3. What: Nexuses of Natural Materiality 
 A determination of where to fish is largely a determination of what materiality to fish 
from. Captains make sense of their ability to efficiently interrelate three interlinked natural 
systems - ecological processes in the form of aggregating behaviors of target species, the ocean 
bottom in its many manifestations (e.g., mud, rock, mountain, slope), and weather. Natural 
processes, at the level of concern in this study, are created by relationships among natural 
materialities, which, at a lower-level of organization, are themselves created by natural 
6 Monthly fuel prices for Kodiak were extracted using the database provided by the Fisheries Economics Data 
Program of the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission; http://www.psmfc.org/efin/data/fuel.html 
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processes. The concept ‘natural materiality’ describes objects and processes that have mass, can 
be assigned their own points on a geographical coordinate system, and “can exist outside of 
society” (Bansal & Knox-Hayes, 2013: 75). This type of materiality merges what Bansal and 
Knox-Hayes (2013), emphasizing its temporal and spatial attributes, call “physical materiality,” 
and what Whiteman and Cooper (2011), emphasizing its ecological and biological attributes, call 
“ecological materiality.” Natural materiality is not born of social processes, though it may be 
impacted by them.  
This section examines the role that particular natural materialities (organized below as, a. 
Fish aggregations; b. The ocean bottom; c. Weather) play in Kodiak captains’ sensemaking at 
sea. An element of this role, which is addressed in each section, is whether each materiality is 
primarily a source of indeterminacy or determinacy when captains attempt to find a place to fish 
that meets their efficiency imperative. The data suggest that captains are disposed to interrelate 
not so much with distinct ecological and geophysical systems, but instead with recurring 
relationships among them. The sections below discuss these natural systems, including how they 
tend to interrelate recurrently.  
a. Fish aggregations  
When finding a place to fish, captains attempt to align their operating processes with their 
target species’ behavioral processes. First, captains attempt to find a particular place and time 
(i.e., a fishing spot) in which individuals of their target species are interrelating in time and 
space, or aggregating. Each trawl target species typically aggregates in certain places at certain 
times of year, whether they do so to feed or for spawning.7 Yet, different target species aggregate 
differently. For example, certain rockfish form “little schools” in which fishing them is “like 
target practice,” while certain flatfish tend to gather on particular bottom types. In addition, 
schools of the same target species aggregate differently depending on factors such as location 
and time of year. For example, in certain spots pollock tend to gather with multiple other species 
in mid-water “feed bands,” while in other spots pollock pack tightly to the bottom, forming what 
7 For example, fisheries ecologists who study flathead sole populations in the Gulf area state, “Adults 
exhibit a benthic lifestyle and occupy separate winter spawning and summertime feeding distributions on 
the EBS shelf and in the GOA. From over-winter grounds near the shelf margins, adults begin a migration 
onto the mid and outer continental shelf in April or May each year for feeding. The spawning period may 
range from as early as January but is known to occur in March and April, primarily in deeper waters near 
the margins of the continental shelf” (McGilliard, Palsson, Stockhausen, & Ianelli, 2013: 614). 
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captains call “carpet.” Regardless of these differences, captains routinely attempt to fish their 
target species when its individual fish are gathered in space and time.  
Yet, while there is variation in aggregating behavior depending on location and time of year, 
there is also variation in the size and frequency of aggregations across years. For example, the 
arrowtooth flounder biomass has increased steadily since the early 1990s, and since 2004 it has 
been the largest target species biomass in the Gulf (A’mar, Thompson, Martin, & Palsson, 2011: 
247); meanwhile, the size of the cod biomass in the Gulf has varied immensely in recent years, 
increasing from 233 thousand metric tons in 2005 to 520 thousand metric tons in 2007 and 753 
thousand metric tons in 2009, then dropping back to 501 thousand metric tons in 2011 (National 
Marine Fisheries Service, 2013). Such trends impact the extent to which captains can find 
significant aggregations of target species to fish from, as the following captain describes in terms 
of trends in the pollock biomass:  
“The Shelikoff [Strait] has been really consistent the last three or four years - just 
a lot of fish over there. But five, six, or seven years ago you go over there and tow 
and maybe get 10 thousand pounds an hour. You would tow for over a day to get 
a full trip. Generally it seems like the last few years you can fill up pretty fast. . . 
it gets really good over there at the end of February and March, like towing for 
150 thousand an hour.”   
Yet, even in times of relative scarcity, captains still attempt to find target fish that are sufficiently 
aggregated. Kodiak trawl captains are disposed to fishing from temporal and spatial 
interrelations of target species, i.e., aggregations, even if ecological factors constrain their ability 
to do so.  
The fleet-wide disposition to fish from aggregations is driven by the dependency of trawl 
mechanics on aggregating behavior and the efficiencies that aggregating fish offer a trawl 
process. In terms of the dependency of trawl mechanics on aggregated fish, trawl gear works by 
actively overtaking fish rather than passively drawing fish to it through an attractant, such as bait 
on a hook or in a pot. Therefore, for a trawl net to be effective it has to be towed through an 
appreciable biomass of fish, a necessity a captain explained in detail during a fishing trip:   
“This area is huge, thousands of square miles of fishable ground. There's flathead, 
rex, dover, all the species of sole live in this area. All the species of midwater 
pelagic fish of Alaska live in this area too. But the problem with this area is it’s 
vast, and we're only covering 500 feet of it, and the net is only actually covering 
56 feet of it. Theoretically we are herding fish toward the net with our sweeps (see 
Figure 4 in Chapter One), but how absolutely effective that is, we don’t know. So 
the fish have to be aggregated to some degree to catch very much.”  
 54 
Trawl gear requires its target to be gathered to a certain degree, otherwise gear that more 
passively draws fish to it would be a more profitable approach.  
Within a trawl net's effectiveness is its main appeal - the temporal efficiency it brings to a 
fishing process. Thus, the primary benefit of trawl gear is that it offers a relatively high rate of 
catch, which is dependent on its interpenetration with fish that are significantly aggregated. A 
captain explains the relationship between aggregated fish and efficiency in the following:  
“When the fish are congregated together, when they are schooled up and are more 
interested in spawning or feeding or whatever, it’s the easiest for us to catch them. 
When there's a million pounds between here and the jetty (pointing to a chart), it’s 
easy for us to catch them, but when they are dispersed in the water column, it’s 
difficult for us to catch them.”   
What this captain means by “easy” fishing is what other captains refer to “fast fishing.” If other 
factors such as weather or the structural nature of the ocean bottom (e.g., muddy, rocky) do not 
impede fishing, a general rule is the more aggregated target fish are, the quicker the vessel can 
fill its fish hold, and the quicker the vessel can finish a trip. These efficiencies tend to reverberate 
throughout the fishing process: the quicker a vessel can finish a trip, the less its captain and crew 
will likely spend (from their own income) on overhead costs, as well as the quicker the vessel 
will likely offload its catch at a processing plant and get back out fishing. Which means that, in a 
fleet that fishes in multiple fisheries, and in seasons that overlap, many of which involve captains 
attempting to fish as fast as they can before they collectively exhaust a shared, fleet-level quota, 
the greater the chance that the captain and crew will get in another trip. As one captain described,  
“You are directly competing with other boats and you only have limited amount 
of time to get your fish. . . If it takes you three or four hours longer than the other 
guy to fill your boat, that could end up costing you a trip over the season, or two.”  
An additional trip is about a $30 to $50 thousand net difference, depending on the target species. 
Captains and crew operate on potential, and efficiencies tend to increase their potential to either 
“make a living from it.” 
Another general rule is that the more a captain fishes from aggregating fish, the less 
prohibited species bycatch he will produce. Thus, we can further specify the efficiency–based 
benefits of fishing from an aggregation in terms of prohibited species bycatch efficiency. As is 
described in Chapter One, two prohibited species in the Gulf trawl fisheries have their own catch 
limits: Pacific halibut and Chinook salmon. Prohibited species catch limits are shared by the 
fleet, and they apply to all the target fisheries in which they are caught. These bycatch limits 
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function as a sort of quota for halibut and Chinook, and regulatory fisheries managers work to 
prevent the fleet from overfishing these limits. For regulatory manager to either open a fishery in 
which these species are bycaught, or to keep such a fishery open, there must be prohibited 
species limit available to support the Chinook and halibut that might be caught in them. 
The amount of halibut or Chinook a captain catches in one trip, or even in one tow, can 
deplete the amount that is available for subsequent trips and seasons for the entire fleet. A plant 
manager describes the effect that catching a lot of Chinook or halibut can have on the fleet and 
on subsequent fisheries in the following:  
“[If one boat] goes out and destroys the whole limit, that means everybody in 
town is done fishing, not just our boats, everybody's boats are done, whether they 
caught a Chinook or not. They can go out and fish cleanly and just because one 
boat caught all the salmon they can't fish anymore.”  
The reason that fishing from aggregated fish tends to produce prohibited species bycatch 
efficiency is largely due to ratios. Simply, an aggregation of target fish tends to contain within it 
high ratios of target species to prohibited species. Thus, even if the amount of a prohibited 
species in the water is such that it could potentially constrain subsequent fishing, when this 
amount is coupled with high amounts of target species, it is diluted. The effect is that when 
fishing aggregations, less prohibited species bycatch limit tends to be used to catch target 
species, which leaves more of prohibited species catch limit available for use by all captains in 
subsequent tows, trips, and seasons. As the Kodiak fleet’s fisheries management consultant 
stated during a fleet meeting, fishing where there is a low ratio of target species to prohibited 
species means “you are gonna shoot yourself in the head” in terms of limiting their ability to 
continue to fish for target species. Kodiak trawl captains prefer not to shoot themselves in the 
head. As one further explains,  
“Now the managers say you only got X amount of halibut, so when your halibut's 
done then you are done fishing; so if you go out there and you are careless your 
season lasts three days and if you are careful it will last three weeks.”  
Because, as discussed in Chapter One, “you never know until you tow,” one difference between 
being careful and being careless is fishing from aggregated fish rather than fishing un-aggregated 
fish. Targeting and fishing from aggregations is a recurring means by which captains move from 
an unworkable level of certainty toward a workable level. 
The above discussion does not mean, however, that captains always fish from aggregations. 
One captain analogized fishing for flatfish in a certain area to “mowing your lawn,” in which 
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they “tow down one strip, move over and tow down another strip.” This captain further 
contrasted that approach to fishing for cod in which he will “drive over them a few times and set 
on them and pick them up and go find another school,” which is an approach to fishing for cod 
that other captains noted as well. When captains do not fish from aggregations of a significant 
size (i.e, that offers a desirable level of efficiency), they are doing what they call “scratching.” 
Captains may scratch because they cannot find aggregated fish due to ecological dynamics, 
because they do not have the time to go out and search for aggregated fish due to constraints 
imposed by having to compete with other vessels for shared quota, or, as one captain critically 
noted, they simply choose to not ”go out and look.” Even though there are natural, structural, and 
individual sources of variation in the extent to which this fishing approach is enacted, an 
individual disposition for fishing for a target species when and where its individual fish are 
interrelated is a fleet-level characteristic of being a Gulf trawl captain.   
i. How this natural system influences fishing practice 
A primary source of indeterminacy involved in fishing from aggregated fish is the 
particularity of where and when a certain target species will aggregate. While most target species 
tend to aggregate at the same general times and in the same general places, the specific times and 
places in which aggregations show up is a source of indeterminacy nestled within more general 
determinacy. As one captain commented, “Basically, we know when the fish are going to show 
up, it’s a matter of finding them.” To “show up” means that individual fish are aggregated to an 
extent that they can be effectively caught with a trawl net. The effectiveness of fishing with a 
trawl net, and the efficiency of trawling in general, is reliant on targeting a species that 
aggregates predictably at a general level, and then finding particular aggregations. One of the 
primary duties trawl captains are charged with is moving from the abstract predictability of 
general places and times in which aggregations might be found to the concrete particularity of 
specific places and times in which aggregations will be found. It is demonstrated below that this 
movement is accomplished through sensemaking.  
b. The ocean bottom    
 While the nature of trawling requires that captains attempt to fish from aggregations of 
target species, doing so requires captains to also organize with geophysical processes, manifested 
as the ocean bottom, that these aggregations tend to be found on or near. There are three 
interrelated characteristics of the ocean bottom that impact where a trawl captain will choose to 
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fish. First, the Kodiak fleet fishes ‘groundfish,’ which means, just as it sounds, that most of their 
target species live on or close to the ocean bottom. This in turn means that, when targeting an 
aggregation with a trawl net, captains must drag their net across the ocean bottom. For instance, 
when fishing cod the net must, depending on the area, “hug the bottom;” whereas when fishing 
for certain rockfish species captains try to fish “a little lighter on the hard bottom” in order to 
prevent too much damage to the trawl net.  
 The second characteristic that impacts where a trawl captain will choose to fish is the 
tendency of certain species to associate with certain types of ocean bottom. For example, two 
species of rockfish are typically found around rocky bottom, while another is found in the deeper 
water, ‘off the edge’ or ‘up and down the bank.’ Some flatfish are found on sandy bottom, others 
are found ‘on the edge’ between sandy and rocky bottom, while pollock is found off the bottom 
in some places and tightly packed on the bottom in other places. In the following a captain, while 
on a fishing trip, describes targeting one type of flatfish, arrowtooth flounder, while trying not to 
catch another flatfish, Pacific halibut, which the crew must immediately sort out of the catch and 
toss back into the water:  
“The problem is right now there's arrowtooth fishing at four or five thousand 
pounds a minute, 10 thousand pounds a minute, but its right on the edge of where 
the hard bottom and soft bottom meets. So if you get a little far this way (pointing 
to a place on a nautical chart) you will get 100 thousand pounds of arrowtooth but 
you will also get three thousand pounds of halibut. Well, it’s a pain in the ass to 
put the arrowtooth down [into the fish hold] and not put the halibut down too. 
You will get a fine if you put down too much halibut, so you got to sort it out. So 
it’s kind of a fine line.”  
A common characteristic of fishing for flatfish is attempting to catch one type of flatfish, such as 
arrowtooth flounder, while trying to avoid catching another type of flatfish, Pacific halibut, due 
to its stature as a prohibited species. Having to sort out and discard a lot of halibut takes time, 
and therefore impacts the efficiency of a fishing process. A key point is that the captain above 
described organizing his fishing process with relationships – the relationship between his target 
species and one bottom type and another relationship between Pacific halibut and another bottom 
type. An implication is that captains organize not so much with fish or with the bottom, but with 
relationships between fish and bottom. 
The third characteristic of the ocean bottom that influences where a captain chooses to 
fish is the ability for certain bottom types to damage a trawl net. The effect is that certain bottom 
types constrain where captains can trawl, as one captain describes in the following: “A trawl can 
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only fish in specific areas, and they are very limited areas. They can't fish in rocky bottom, they 
can't fish on too muddy of a bottom.” During my fieldwork, a common concern captains had on 
fishing trips was “hanging up” on rocky bottom, which often meant tearing a net (which are 
typically made of nylon). A torn net can reduce efficiency by detracting from fishing time, for 
crews usually repair torn nets at sea. Nets that sustain too much damage, however, have to be 
repaired on land, and a common sight in Kodiak is a trawl net laid out over a parking lot with 
three or four crewmen sewing it back together while multiple bald eagles scavenge from it. The 
reason captains, and owners, are disposed to undergo such risk is due to the level of profit that 
can be derived from fishing for rockfish (primarily the species ‘sablefish’ that is caught along 
with rockfish). Similar to interrelating with ecological systems, captains' disposition for 
organizing with the ocean bottom is shaped by the need for profitability, and that need manifests 
in a disposition toward efficiency, which can vary depending on the level of potential profit. 
i. How this natural system influences fishing practice   
While the specific location of an aggregation is a source of indeterminacy when deciding 
where to fish, the bottom can be a source of determinacy. This determinacy is derived from a 
combination of the relatively slow rate in which the ocean bottom changes, which means that the 
nature of the ocean bottom that captains encounter in a particular place does not, from their 
perspective, change from year to year, and the fact that wheelhouse electronics and nautical 
charts provide captains with a priori knowledge regarding the spatial characteristics (e.g., 
shapes, relative distances) and depths of the bottom in any given area. When captains pair these 
concrete spatial characteristics of a particular stretch of bottom with past experiences fishing on 
that bottom, or bottom similar to it, they are equipped to formulate a conjecture regarding how a 
certain stretch of bottom and a trawl net will interrelate, before actually fishing there. The 
following demonstrates a captain producing such a conjecture:  
“A trawler is not gonna be able to fish where it goes from 50 fathoms to 13 
fathoms, so a trawler is not gonna be able to fish here at all (pointing to the chart). 
He will be able to fish right here, he will be able to fish maybe right here 
(pointing to different spots on the chart). If you try to come out of 50 fathoms and 
go up over this hard spot, you wont be able to tow there because your net will 
hang up on the hard bottom. This is hard, rocky bottom right here. . . 99.9% of the 
time you couldn't tow out of 50 fathoms over 13 fathoms and back down and not 
hang up, tear your gear, or lose it altogether. . . Usually the reason this bay is here 
is probably a glacier came down and pushed this down into here, and the moraine 
that created this fjord will all be piled up here, rocks the size of this building 
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maybe.”  
By merging abstractions from past experience in the form of knowledge of geological processes 
and distillations of trawling events with cues from more concrete circumstances in the form of 
the topographical details in a nautical chart, this captain was able to hypothesize about a 
trawler’s ability to tow on particular stretches of bottom. These hypotheses are the product of 
sensemaking about a potential future event – they are sense the captain makes of a potential 
place to fish. The relatively unchanging determinacy of the ocean bottom, paired with both the 
generalized predictability of aggregating behavior over time and the propensity for certain target 
species to associate with certain bottom types results in a recurring coincidence of certain bottom 
types and aggregations of certain target species. Figure 9 below captures this relationship 
between these three factors. The seed of predictability from which captains make sense of where 
to fish is born of the recurring nature of these relationships.   
c. Weather processes   
Like the ocean bottom, weather can constrain where a captain can fish, and captains must 
manage their relationship with weather as well. While in the field, the rockfish trip I observed 
was delayed a day due to bad weather and the route the captain took to the fishing grounds was 
influenced by bad weather. In addition, one captain I interviewed had just returned from a fishing 
trip in which his vessel turned 90 degrees on its side, nearly capsizing due to bad weather. The 
start to several fisheries was also delayed due to bad weather. When captains talk about where or 
when they will fish, their discussion usually contains a weather qualification, such as the one 
stated nearly in unison by four captains when, during a fleet meeting, the fleet was asked when 
they were going to start fishing: “It depends on the weather.” A more detailed example of the 
Spatio-temporal continuity of bottom types
Spatio-temporal recurrence of target aggregations
Propensity for certain species to associate with certain bottom types
Recurring coincidence of certain bottom types and target species aggregations
Figure 9: Recurring relationship between two natural materialities: Bottom types and target species 
aggregating behavior 
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weather’s influence on a potential fishing trip was given by a captain when asked if he planned 
to fish for rockfish on his next trip:  
If the weather is good. We don't want to deal with rockfish in tough weather, we 
don't want to be hung to the bottom in rough weather. It will be entirely 
dependent on the weather - if the weather is good we will be rockfishing, if the 
weather is lousy we will be tied up in town.  
As this quote suggests, one of the reasons the weather plays such an influential role is that it 
impacts whether or not captains can organize with interrelated aggregations and bottom types.  
i. How this natural system influences organizing  
Unlike the determinacy of the ocean bottom, captains must manage the indeterminacy 
weather imposes into a determination of where to fish. While abstract annual weather patterns 
lend themselves to predictability, the particular weather in a particular fishing spot lends itself to 
varying levels of unpredictability. The manner in which weather does this is twofold, the first 
being the temporal unpredictability of weather, the second is its spatial unpredictability. Unlike 
the bottom that changes on a geological time scale and aggregations that change on an annual 
time scale, the weather changes on a daily or even hourly scale, as one captain observed during a 
fleet meeting:   
“I don't know about you all, but I’ve only been here for 27 years but I don't think 
any of us could call the weather on the 15th or 16th which is four days from now; 
I can't call the weather frickin’ 24 hours ahead.”  
In terms of spatial indeterminacy, finding a place to fish often involves potentially not knowing 
the specific nature of the weather on certain fishing grounds. If a captain is first to the grounds or 
is lacking information from captains who are already there, he cannot be sure of the weather on 
those grounds until he is actually there. In the following, a captain describes having to abandon a 
fishing trip because he did not realize how bad the weather on the fishing grounds was until he 
got there:  
“I've gone over [to the grounds] the day before the fishery closure and I've 
steamed back home empty because of the weather. I made a decision of safety 
over dollars. And that's the decision and its a tough one to do. I turned around five 
times, steamed, steamed back, shitty; steamed, steamed back, shitty. Five times I 
did it, and I finally said, “fuck it I'm going home, safety first,” and forfeited a 
load.”  
This captain could steam about in the inclement weather, but he decided he could not fish from 
an aggregation due to the weather. The relationship between the weather and other frontline 
materialities is yet another frontline relationship that captains attempt to organize their fishing 
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processes with. Thus, although a captain may have an idea of a certain spot to fish in, embedded 
in which is a potentially profitable co-incidence of a target aggregation and bottom type that is 
conducive to trawling, his decision to fish in there is always made in light of the likely weather 
conditions in that spot. 
The upshot of the natural materialities and relationships among them described thus far - 
the spatio-temporal recurrence of aggregations of target species, the spatio-temporal continuity 
of the ocean bottom, the co-incidences of certain species with certain bottom types, and the 
embeddedness of all of these relationships in variably constraining and enabling weather - is that 
captains attempt to organize with certain ‘nexuses’ of relationships among natural materialities. 
A nexus of natural materiality occurs when different materialities share the same spatial and 
temporal properties. Thus, a nexus of natural materiality is created by different materialities that 
are interrelating as a larger whole which can be assigned its own location on a Cartesian 
coordinate system.  
Nexuses of natural materialities are what captains organize their operations with. Figure 
10 depicts the combination of spatio-temporal relationships among materialities that form a 
nexus. Table 4 further explores the intersection of nexuses of material relationships and captains’ 
processes of attempting to organize with them, primarily in terms of the certainty such 
relationships can offer captains’ attempts to gain workable levels of certainty of where to fish.  
 











of target species and 
different bottom types  
“There’s a couple places that we fish the exact same strip [of bottom] – 
there’s a strip where the sand meets the gravel and right in there is 
where you catch the fish.” (fishing trip observation) 
Predictable coincidence 
of target species and 
specific bottom areas  
“A pollock net is extremely fragile, and we have two areas that have 
soft bottom where you can fish. . . There are two areas that produce, 
and I’m just shooting from the hip, 80% of the pollock here. And 
typically there is not fish in both areas – if the fish are in one, they are 
not in the other – they are not in both areas at the same time”  
Predictable coincidence 
of target species and 
bottom depths  
Interviewer: “Where do Pacific ocean perch [rockfish] like to hang 
out?”   
Captain: “They just slide up and down the bank here, they hang out 
deeper – they live off of the edge. You get them, like on that coral 
patch there (pointing to a chart), they go up there sometimes, but they 
normally they stay outside of 70 [fathoms]. That’s where they usually 
are.” (fishing trip observation) 
Enabling effect of 
weather on organizing 
with relationships 
between bottom and 
target species 
 
Interviewer: “How much of catch fish is experience and how much of 
it is technology?  
Captain: “Well, there is some fancier stuff that we don’t have that 
would help, there's Doppler current sounders, there's real fancy stuff to 
put on your net that we don’t have, but a lot of it is experience and 
luck. But, I've just learned that, after a while you just look back at all 
the times you ever were really successful catching rockfish, its almost 
always been when the weather was really good” (fishing trip 
observation) 
 
“Northern rockfish especially, they are in little schools, and you just 
have to hit 'em, you can't be off. . . If the weather is good, or if I can 
tow into the weather, then I can usually hit a pretty small spot. But 
when you are going sideways to the weather the boat has to turn, it 
makes the gear go goofy. The gear tends the bottom best when it’s just 
straight behind the boat. So when you start trying to force your way on 
to the rockpile, it usually doesn’t end well. . .” (fishing trip 
observation) 
 
4. How: Integrating Dimensions of Experience 
Captains are predisposed to fish from aggregations, which are embedded in larger 
nexuses of natural materiality. Yet, individual nexuses offer nothing to a captain’s determination 
of where and when to fish - it is their potential recurrence in time and space that enables nexuses 
to be targets of fishing effort. Recurring nexuses are wellsprings of potential, offering captains an 
ability to create the “workable level of certainty” (Weick, 1969: 40) they need to interrelate with 
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indeterminate systems, and it is the captain’s duty to convert that potential into profitable reality.  
Due to the predictability offered by nexuses that tends to recur, Kodiak trawl captains are 
disposed to fish the same places over and over. This disposition is a fleet-level characteristic of 
being a Kodiak trawl captain, from which arises identifiable patterns of action. One captain 
elaborates this strategy for determining where to fish in the following:  
“We fish the same spots; for one reason, some of the bottom isn’t conducive to 
fishing. There’s fish there, but the bottom's not good and after you have had to 
repair enough nets, you find out that its not beneficial to go into these places, so 
you don’t go in there. I mean, you got to have pretty good reward to take a big 
risk. So you've learned that you fish these other areas - fish come in there 
different times a year, and you fish them.”  
The data show that Kodiak trawl captains have a fleet-level disposition for organizing their 
fishing operations with recurring nexuses of natural materialities. This disposition is born of past 
profitable experiences with recurring nexuses. Table 5 provides examples of captains describing 
their fleet-level disposition to fish in the same spots during interviews, as well as examples of 
captains actually deciding to fish in a spot that they have before while on fishing trips. Inherent 
in these examples is both a demonstration of a common strategy, as well as its diverse 
manifestation in terms of patterns of fishing activity. 
Table 5: Strategies and practices of fishing the same spots over and over 
Characteristic Representative Quotes 
Strategy of fishing in 
the same spots 
 
“We fish the same spots; for one reason, some of the bottom isn’t 
conducive to fishing. There’s fish there, but the bottom's not good and 
after you have had to repair enough nets, you find out that its not 
beneficial to go into these places, so you don’t go in there. I mean, you 
got to have pretty good reward to take a big risk. So you've learned that 
you fish these other areas - fish come in there different times a year, and 
you fish them.” 
“There's only a few places we can fish, and we fish the same places year 
after year after year, and they are always productive. . . Like Chiniak 
Gulley, we've been fishing there for 30 years and you can still go out 
there at certain times of year and just load up in 24 hours on sole flatfish.”  
“I know I've made this tow (indicates a place on a chart) 250 different 
times in my life, and I know that I can go back there and make this tow in 
a given year in a given circumstances and I will catch the same amount of 
fish.”  
“So if you look at the data, we tow in the same place year after year, for 
40 mother fucking years, we are towing on the same edge of Chiniak 
Gulley or any of our other spots, and we are still going there today. . . If 
you overlay the data for 40 years, the draggers will be here, here, and here 
(pointing to areas on a chart), year after year after year.” 
“I have fished out there for 30 years. You go to the same place, to the 
same dot on the chart. The tides come, and within one day you can’t find 
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a trace of the trawl, but the fish are there year after year.” 
Practice of fishing in 
the same spots 
 
Interviewer: Is this a tow you have done before? 
Captain: Yeah, you can see all the times I've been through here  
Interviewer: So what influenced you to fish here? 
Captain: Oh it’s just where I've caught duskies before, I've done pretty 
well out there.  
Interviewer: “Are these all tows you’ve done before (pointing to 
markings on the wheelhouse plotter)?” 
Captain: “These are all fish, where I've towed for duskies. This one 
(pointing to a mark on the plotter) I think is what I'm gonna try - the last 
time I dusky fished a couple of years ago I did ok up in there, and then 
this over here has always been fairly good (pointing to a different mark 
on the plotter).”  
Interviewer: “So are you typically going to go to where you have gone 
before? 
Captain: Yeah, or somebody tells you about a spot”  
 Interviewer: “Why did you chose to fish up there?” 
Captain: “It’s just been traditionally a really great spot and we don’t have 
to compete with other groups when we go there. Like this time of year 
usually its cleanest, winter time is usually the time to fish in Portlock 
because the halibut aren't there.” 
 “This my other spot here, as you can see I've made a few tows there, I 
might go check that out. . . I know they are gonna be there, because that's 
where they have always been.”  
 “When we left town, most of the fleet was already out. I talked to them, 
asked how it was going, half the fleet went to one area, half went to 
another area. The three boats I control, we all went to the same spot we 
each went to last year. That’s what most people do.” 
 
To make sense of where to fish using the strategy of fishing the same spots, captains 
import certain places and times someone has fished either successfully or unsuccessfully before - 
a past fishing event - into the present. Yet, what events they import from the past are shaped by 
regulatory factors of the present, such as the specific fishery they are fishing in, open and closed 
fishing areas, and conditions of natural materialities, such as what the weather is like in a certain 
area. Captains then integrate potential fishing spots with current abstract and material conditions, 
with one reciprocally modifying the other, from which they produce a conjecture of a place to 
fish. A conjecture of a place to fish is a sense of what to do next. In the following a captain 
discusses the strategy of integrating past experiences with current conditions in order to find a 
profitable fishing spot:  
“Nobody knows the ocean floor better than a fisherman. We see, eat, sleep, and 
breathe that ocean on a day-to-day basis. And some days there will be more fish 
than you know what to do with on a particular rock, and the next 10 days there 
will be no fish on that rock. And knowing those days and the weather conditions 
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and the things that produce the right conditions to make those fish school up on 
those rocks is something that fishermen spend their whole entire lives trying to 
learn.”  
Sensemaking at sea involves the merging of the abstract and concrete sides of experience, as 
understood from past experience, with the goal of enacting certain future experiences. 
Sensemaking at sea is aimed at creating a sense that a potential fishing spot, one that a captain 
has fished before, is the “right” spot under the current natural – and regulatory - conditions. This 
sense is emergent from the integration of human and natural processes: recurring patterns of 
natural relationships provide the substrate from which captains integrate past experiences and 
potential future events, in light of current abstract and conditions, in order to conjecture what to 
do next. 
Finding a current fishing spot within a larger time and space and set of past fishing spots 
is a process of inquiry that is neither completely deductive, nor completely inductive, but rather 
‘abductive.’ Abduction is a process of “intelligent guessing” aimed at creating conjectures and 
hypotheses that are “marked by good sense” (Peirce, 1931-1958, cited in Rescher, 1978: 42). As 
the concept’s founder Charles S. Peirce argued, abduction is the first stage of all inquiries when 
there is something in need of explanation (Fann, 1970: 5, citing Peirce, 1931-1958). What is in 
need of explanation to fishing captains is where to find sufficient aggregations to fish from, and 
what the composition of those aggregations may be. Abduction is the stage of inquiry in which 
we attempt to create theories or explanatory hypotheses that we later assess. As Peirce (1995: 
171) outlines, “deduction proves that something must be; Induction shows that something 
actually is operative; Abduction merely suggests that something may be.” Abduction is the only 
kind of reasoning that is ‘synthetic’ in that it merges the abstract and the concrete parts of 
experience, and due to its synthetic nature, abduction is the only kind of reasoning capable of 
producing new ideas (Peirce, 1931-1958, cited in Rescher, 1978: 42).  
The problem of what may be, or what may come next, “is perhaps the fundamental 
problem of ordering and organizing” (Cooper & Law, 1995: 242). This problem is also a salient 
issue in commercial fishing – the problem of expending resources to steam to a certain fishing 
spot and extracting materiality from indeterminate natural systems. Abduction is the primary 
method captains use to make sense of where to fish next, which is exemplified in the following 
response a captain gave when asked why he was going to a certain area to fish during a flathead 
sole fishery: 
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“I'm going over here because I have a feeling that there's gonna be some flathead 
over here . . . And its gonna be better weather over here. . . You know, in the 
spring they spawn, and I’ve been seeing flathead my last three trips, some nice 
flathead with some eggs in them. There is a volume here - there is quite a bit of 
flathead over here all the time, year round there's flathead over here, it’s just 
whether or not they are together enough to make a living fishing for them. . . And 
I know I'm not gonna hang up on anything, so it’s a pretty easy fishery on 
everything except for the fuel you burn.” 
This captain converged cues from current concrete conditions, such as amenable weather, 
conducive bottom type, and recent flathead aggregating behavior, with more abstract knowledge, 
derived from past experiences, of recurring flathead behavioral patterns. The product of this 
convergence was “a feeling.” This feeling was a conjecture of what to do next, namely that 
towing in that spot would, at a workable level of certainty, contribute to creating a profitable 
fishing trip. Past experience, converged with current conditions, enabled the captain to produce a 
conjecture of what to do next. Thus, while the extent of actual flathead aggregation was 
indeterminate at the time of towing (“whether or not they are together enough”), the captain’s 
convergence of past experience with current conditions gave him sufficient certainty to go ahead 
and tow.   
When determining where to fish, captains look to fishing events in the past to determine 
where to fish in the future. This disposition provides a source of actionable similarity in a sea of 
interminable variety. Yet, because they will never steam into the same ocean twice, captains 
know that their past experience must be informed by the current conditions of their material 
context. Captains integrate past experiences with cues from current natural materialities with the 
goal of telling a story of what is happening, from which they can produce a plausible conjecture 
of what to do next in order to move toward a desired future event. Captains’ general desired 
future event must be, as demonstrated above, a profitable fishing trip. Both telling a story of 
what is happening and conjecturing what to do next in order to move to a certain future 
constitute an ‘abductive sensemaking episode.’ 
a. Analyzing the abductive sensemaking episode 
The abductive sensemaking episode is an analytical framework anchored in two 
dimensions of experience: pastfuture and abstractconcrete. What it means to be 
‘abstract’ and ‘concrete,’ however, requires some elaboration. ‘Abstract,’ as it is used here, refers 
to things that are “comprehensible without reference to some one particular occasion of 
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experience. To be abstract is to transcend particular concrete occasions of actual happening” 
(Whitehead, 1925: 159). In being transcendent, according to Whitehead, abstractions have 
“connections with other occasions of experience.” As common parts of different occasions of 
experience, abstractions function to render one occasion relatable to another. Whenever someone 
says, “there it is again,” abstractions are the things that can “be again” (1919: 144). Thus, to be 
concrete is to be a particular event, occasion, or bracketed portion of experience that is never to 
“be again.” A particular codfish is never to “be again,” but its name, the category into which a 
bracketed entity is conceptually fitted, will “be again” many times over. Similarly, a fishing spot 
can be again, but the particular occasion of being there, and the particular tows captains conduct 
there, cannot. And, just as ‘past’ and ‘future’ are relative terms in that we cannot know one 
without the other, ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ are relative as well. We cannot know what is abstract 
without reference to some concrete aspect of experience, and we cannot know what is concrete 
without reference to some abstract part of experience.  
While a primary activity of perhaps any sentient entity is managing the transition from its 
past to its future, another primary activity is managing the relationship between its abstractions 
and its experience. As Hernes (2008: 57) states: “The dimension of concrete experience versus 
abstraction captures a central activity of organization.” Weick (2009: 28) describes the often ill-
fitted and troubling relationship between abstract categories or labels and the portions of 
concrete experience we apply them to: 
Labeling imposes order, but often at a cost. When organizations generalize and 
compound their abstractions, they put increasing distance between direct 
perceptions of continuous flow and indirect recasting of those perceptions into 
discrete conceptions. The benefits of compounded abstractions are that they 
facilitate shared images and allow collective coping. The cost if compounded 
abstractions is that people lose sight of differences that make a difference. 
It is demonstrated here that the dimensions of abstract  concrete and past  future, when 
integrated within the same model, capture a central activity of sensemaking in commercial 
fishing contexts: In order to solve the problem of where to fish, captains integrate past, future, 
abstract, and concrete elements of experience to conjecture that a certain fishing spot they fished 
before will be viable again under current conditions. 
 Figure 3 depicts a sensemaking episode that is embedded in, and anchored by, the 
pastfuture and concreteabstract dimensions of experience. As the model depicts, the 
abstract—and pastfuture dimensions are broader than any one episode, and any one 
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episode is a slice of ongoing experience. These slices, however, can have profound impacts on 
organizing. While these constituents of an episode overlap in actual experience, the purpose of 
the model is to dissect episodes of sensemaking into 1) identifiable parts, and 2) relationships 
among those parts. In doing so, researchers are better equipped to understand how captains, or 
other frontline managers, organize with indeterminate systems (whether natural or human).  
The model captures the moments of sensemaking in which actors answer the questions, 
“What’s the story here?” and, “Now what should I do?” (Weick et al., 2005: 410). These answers 
bring an event into existence by telling its story as well as giving it operative meaning by 
conjecturing how it shapes ongoing operations (Weick et al., 2005: 410). Together, these 
questions and answers give captains the “workable level of certainty” (Weick, 1969: 40) they 
need to interrelate their operations with indeterminate natural materiality. 
Thus, the model in Figure 11 breaks the abstractconcrete and pastfuture 
dimensions of sensemaking into parts, while also emphasizing their interconnectedness. These 
interconnections are partitioned into two levels in the model: the outer arrows (1, 2, 3, 4) and the 
inner arrows (a, b, c, d); these levels, however, are themselves interconnected. If we trace our 
way through the model, starting with the concrete side, desired future events impact what 
captains look for and see in the concrete side of their experience (arrow 4). Yet, at the same time 
past experiences influence what captains look for and see in the materiality of current experience 
(arrow 3). The focus of this study - how frontline managers make sense of indeterminate natural 
systems in order to extract resources from them - means that the concreteness of concern is some 
form of natural materiality. Thus, both past experiences and a desired future event work together 
to influence which cues captains will see and attend to from the natural materiality they are 
currently organizing their operations with (arrow c).  
In terms of the abstract side of an episode, captains employ ‘interpretive schemata’ to 
give meaning to extracted concrete cues from natural phenomena. Interpretive schemata, which 
several scholars note are a key component of sensemaking (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Rerup, 
2011) are “structured units or clusters of thematically related knowledge” that actors draw on “to 
interpret, understand, and respond to events and data,” which helps them “negotiate a complex 
and confusing world” (Balogun & Johnson, 2004: 525). Abstractions from both desired futures 
(arrow 1) and past experiences (arrow 2) are part of the interpretive schemata that captains use to 
give meaning to cues from concrete phenomena (arrow a). These abstractions include past 
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fishing experiences, knowledge of fishing regulations, and profitability-related knowledge, such 
as how much fish one needs to catch in a certain period of time to be profitable. This is all 
conceptual knowledge that can ‘be again’ in that it is not tied to any specific concrete 
phenomena. When captains integrate arrow a and arrow b, merging that which can never be 
again with that which can be again, and what is abstract with concrete phenomena, making them 
congruent, they tell a story (i.e., sense) of what is happening. As the model indicates, this story is 
already shaped by future events and past experiences. Thus, “to make sense is to connect the 
abstract and the concrete” (Weick et al., 2005: 410), but in a manner that is shaped by the past 
and future.  
But the sense made is mere abstract understanding of elapsed experience unless it helps 
the captain answer the second sensemaking question - “Now what?” (Weick 2003: 186) The 
answer to this question is a conjecture - it is a prediction of an event that has yet to occur. Yet, as 
the model depicts, the conjecture is the temporal sense made of what to do next (arrows b & d), 
embedded in which is a sense of what is happening (arrows a & c). Thus, the internal arrows 
signify that the created sense of current experience is re-integrated with the past and future as a 
Figure 11: The abductive sensemaking model, embedded in the past—future and 
abstract—concrete dimensions of experience 
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conjecture that connects the two. While the emphasis in the external arrows is on creating a story 
of what is happening under the terms defined by what has happened in the past and what can 
happen in the future, the emphasis in the internal arrows is on creating a sense of how to move 
from the past to a particular future under the terms defined by a story of what is happening. Thus, 
to conjecture is to connect the past and the future, but in a manner that is shaped by the selective 
influences of the abstract and the concrete.  
A final aspect of the model is that the selective influences depicted by the external arrows 
(1, 2, 3, 4) are bi-directional. Thus, in terms of arrow 1, interpretive schemas influence the nature 
of the future that is brought into current experience, such as when lessons from past experiences, 
captured in interpretive schemas, define what is possible in the future; likewise, abstracted future 
events that are part of interpretive schemata may influence which past experiences are brought 
into the present (arrow 2). In terms of the concrete side of experience, the concrete materiality a 
captain is confronting can impact the potential future he desires (arrow 4), as well as which past 
experiences he may consider in the present (arrow 3). While all eight external selective 
influences are present in any episode of sensemaking, some will be more salient and/or 
influential than others. 
5. Conclusion 
The research question that motivated this chapter was, how do frontline managers 
organize with natural systems in the commercial fishing context? The findings show that when 
captains set out to fish, they set out to organize with recurring nexuses of natural relationships, 
for doing so offers “a workable level of certainty” (Weick, 1969: 40) that their fishing process 
will be efficient in terms of both vessel operations and prohibited species bycatch. Yet, captains 
may have certainty in terms of what they want to fish from, but they do not yet have certainty of 
where they will actually fish. Captains may fish in different places than they did previously, or 
they may fish in the exact same areas, but how they alight on a certain spot is a product of the 
day-to-day mechanics of sensemaking.  
Captains start the process of gaining a workable level of certainty of where to fish by 
fishing where they have fished successfully before. This is a disposition for action (Birnholtz, 
Cohen, & Hoch, 2007) that is characteristic of being a Gulf trawl captain. In acting according to 
this disposition, captains seek an aggregation of target species they can profitably tow from, 
which is associated with a bottom type they can profitably tow on, in a weather system they can 
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safely tow in. Thus, captains attempt to organize their fishing operation with natural organization 
of ocean bottom, fish aggregation, and weather. The recurring nature of these natural 
relationships disposes them to predictability, which captains take advantage of by acting 
according to their past experience. Thus, a primary means of determining where to fish is 
accomplished by merging past experience, in the form of abstract knowledge of system 
characteristics and past fishing events, with current relationships among natural conditions in 
order to determine what to do next.  
Captains create workable levels of both natural and economic certainty by merging 
experience abstracted from the past with cues extracted from more concrete conditions, with the 
goal of moving toward a particular future. The product of this abductive process is a conjecture 
or hypothesis of what to do next. Such products are objects of certainty that captains need in 
order to steam out to the grounds so that they can tow before they actually know what they will 
be towing from. These aspects of gaining a workable level of certainty are captured in the 
abductive sensemaking model.  
The fishing captain leaving the dock is presented with a vast ocean of possibility in terms 
of where to fish. The captain’s task is to abduct a particular place to fish by merging past 
experience and concrete conditions, thereby forging a workable level of certainty in terms of a 
specific aggregation to fish from. Similarly, as philosopher of science Nicholas Rescher explains, 
“The task of abduction is to determine a limited area of promising possibility within the overall 
domain of theoretically available opportunity, a region which is at once small enough for 
detailed examination and research, and large enough to afford a good chance of containing the 
true answer” (Rescher, 1978: 42). For a fishing captain, the ‘true answer’ is a fishing spot, 
composed of interrelated ecological, geological, and atmospheric processes, that contains within 
it the opportunity to make his fishing process a profitable one. The analysis above shows that 
captains find a profitable place to fish by taking past experience, captured in abstracted events, as 
well as in more general knowledge of natural processes, such as geology or target species life 
history traits, and merging it with cues bracketed from concrete experience, such as interrelated 
ecological, geological, and atmospheric processes. This approach is a strategy of abduction. 
In terms of the broader relationship between abduction and sensemaking, sensemaking 
scholars have addressed abduction in several ways. Scholars have theorized about the overlap 
between abductive modes of inquiry and sensemaking (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Weick, 
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2006, 2010, 2012), they have used an abductive lens to interpret data (Cunliffe & Coupland, 
2012; Kramer, 2007), and one has explicitly studied the abductive processes that organizational 
actors themselves enact (Abolafia, 2010). In addition, scholars have implicitly studied various 
forms of abductive processes, such as constructing ‘detective stories’ by merging plots and clues 
(Patriotta, 2003), employing metaphors to merge individual accounts and societal expectations 
(Cornelissen, 2012), and using stories to make sense by “relating the particular and the 
universal” (Islam, 2013: 34).  
The overlap of abduction and sensemaking, however, is perhaps most apparent in 
discussions of the basic structures of each. In terms of abduction, Harrowitz (1983: 190) 
demonstrates that abduction merges an observed fact with an explanatory rule, in which “the 
observed fact is read through the rule” to produce a new understanding, idea, or “case.” 
Similarly, Schruz (2008: 205) characterizes abduction as consisting of the merger of ‘beliefs or 
cognitive mechanisms which drive the abduction’ with ‘evidence which the abduction intends to 
explain,’ which produces a hypothesis or conjecture. And Weick (2012: 149) formulates 
abduction as “cue + frame + connection,” from which order is produced. Meanwhile, the basic 
conceptual structure of sensemaking bears a striking resemblance: Weick et al. (2005: 410) state, 
“To make sense is to connect the abstract with the concrete,” while according to Mills (2003: 
53), “In essence, everyday sensemaking involves a frame, a cue, and a connection;” and, as 
Jeong and Brower (2008: 230) state, sensemaking is “a kind of combining process in which the 
cue is connected to a frame of reference, through which a state of affairs (meaning) of the cue is 
constructed.” Both the abductive and sensemaking process concerns merging the abstract with 
the concrete, from which some form of sense, be it a conjecture, hypothesis, or idea, is produced.   
The phenomena analyzed here suggest one addition to the way abductive processes have 
been conceptualized thus far. This is the added dimension of time. At the heart of sensemaking at 
sea are abductive approximations of the future in the present, based on the past. The future is 
read through the past, in the present, the product of which is sense of what to do next. Thus, there 
is always an abstract component of sensemaking in relation to a concrete component, and there is 
also always a future component in relation to a past component. Together, these component form 
sensemaking episodes, which act as a sort of vector in that they move actors further along in an 
organizing process by producing a conjecture of what to do next in terms of moving toward a 
desired future event of a profitable fishing process.  
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While sensemaking has is understood to be a process of connecting the abstract and the 
concrete (Mills, 2003; Jeong & Brower, 2008: Weick, et al., 2005), the present to the past (Mills, 
2003; Taylor & Van Every, 2000; Weick, 1995; Weick, et al., 2005), and a growing body of 
literature is devoted to examining how sensemaking connects the present to the future (Gephart, 
Topal, & Zhang, 2010; Gioia, Corley, & Fabbri, 2002; Hernes & Maitlis, 2010; Stigliani & 
Ravasi, 2012), scholars have yet to conceptualize and investigate these aspects of sensemaking 
as interdependent parts of the same process. The internal horizontal arrows in Figure 3 represent 
the Janus-faced, retrospective and prospective nature of a sensemaking (Gioia & Mehra, 1996; 
Weick, 1979, 1995), and the internal vertical arrows represent sensemaking as a process of 
connecting the abstract and the concrete (Jeong & Brower, 2008; Mills, 2003; Weick et al., 
2005). Together, they are the parts of a conjecture that is required when one needs a sense of 
what to do next. Furthermore, Weick’s (1995) influential seven properties of sensemaking, 
introduced in Chapter One, do not include a temporal dimension or a concrete component. This 
study demonstrates that both are inherent properties of the sensemaking process. The model 
constructed here and further developed in Chapter Three interconnects dimensions of 
sensemaking that have thus far been disconnected in the literature, while making the case that 
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Chapter Three  
From Plotters to Sonars to Codends: A Sensemaking Progression Through a Fishing Trip 
 
“Consider also the devilish brilliance and beauty of many of its most remorseless tribes, as the 
dainty embellished shape of many species of sharks.” 
--Melville, H. Moby Dick, p. 247 
1. Introduction 
 In the last chapter I produced a foundational model of the abductive sensemaking 
episode. Abductive sensemaking is a process of “comparing existing conditions to a relatively 
simple operating model” (Abolafia, 2010: 353), in light of past experience and desired future 
events, in order to answer the two questions of sensemaking: “what’s the story here?” and “now 
what do I do?” (Weick et al., 2005: 410). Thus, the process concerns telling a story about 
ongoing experience, from which actors can produce a conjecture or hypothesis (Harrowitz, 1983; 
Rescher, 1978; Weick, 2006, 2010, 2012) of how to move forward to a desired future event. But, 
when charged with making a profit by interrelating with indeterminate natural systems, 
abductive sensemaking is typically not an individual affair. While Chapter Two explored the 
basic elements and process of abductive sensemaking, it did not explore its social character. This 
chapter demonstrates that in order to efficiently interrelate with indeterminate natural systems, 
Kodiak trawl captains seek information about natural conditions from other captains in order to 
increase their capacity to enact an efficient fishing trip. While researchers have studied 
sensemaking as a social process (e.g., Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Donnellon, Grey, & Bougon, 
1986; Dunbar & Garud, 2009; Maitlis, 2005; Weick & Roberts, 1993), and social interaction and 
interdependency is considered one of sensemaking’s primary characteristics (Weick, 1995; 
Weick, et al., 2005), the relationship between sensemaking’s abductive function and its social 
nature has garnered little attention (Weick, 2006). 
This chapter extends the model of the sensemaking episode produced in Chapter Two by 
analyzing the sensemaking processes Kodiak trawl captains undertake as they progress through a 
fishing trip. The analysis shows that captains use other captains’ experiences to increase their 
capacity to not only, upon leaving the dock, conjecture that a certain fishing spot will offer them 
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the ability to enact an efficient fishing process, but to also make sense of the natural materiality 
they find in that spot once they get there, as well as determine where to fish next once they have 
extracted materiality and turned it into a artifact of the fishing process. This chapter introduces 
the concept of ‘abductive capacity,’ and demonstrates that captains increase their capacity to 
produce accurate conjectures by using the experience of other captains to enhance their own 
experience. 
To further elaborate the abductive sensemaking model, I track sensemaking episodes as 
captains progress through different stages of a fishing trip.8 These stages are delimited by key 
shifts in the environments captains must make sense of - their progression of ‘enacted 
environments.’ Enacted environments are the sources of information that actors confront as a 
result of their own actions (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985; Taylor & Van Every, 2000; Weick 
1979). Enacted environments are outputs of organizing, yet inputs to sensemaking (Weick, 2003, 
8 The analysis in this chapter is based on interviews of Kodiak trawl captains, conversations during 
fishing trips aboard Kodiak trawlers, as well as observations of Kodiak fleet meetings. All quotes are 
taken from these interviews, conversations, and observations. The text distinguishes one context from 
another when it is meaningful to do so.. 
Figure 12: The stages of a fishing trip based on the progression from one enacted 
environment to the next. While a captain may move back and forth between environments, 
this chapter is organized as a progression from the plotter to the sonar to the catch on deck. 
Once the catch is on deck, the captain map return to his plotter, or he may return to his 
sonar, depending on if he chooses to update the natural materiality he is interrelating with.  
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1979). Taylor and Van Every (2000: 145) vividly explain the concept of the enacted environment 
in the following:  
Imagine yourself in a dark field, at night, with only a flashlight. The objects you 
can pick out dimly around you with your unaided sight are ambiguous: Is that just 
a bush, or is it a dangerous animal, crouching to attack? By turning on the 
flashlight, you create a circle within which things are made clear, and you can 
now act with some assurance. It was the initial action of turning on the light that 
effectively created a new environment where things become interpretable. But it 
is still just a circle of light, and what is outside the circle remains as mysterious as 
ever, until you redirect your flashlight beam to it. 
As captains progress through a fishing trip, they move from one circle of illuminated context to 
the next - from one type of enacted environment to another (see Figure 12). Thus, when captains 
set out to sea, their “flashlight” is an instrument called a ‘plotter,’ from which they tell a story of 
what is happening and conjecture that a certain fishing spot, of the many past fishing spots they 
have fished before and which are displayed on their plotter, will offer them the ability to enact a 
profitable fishing trip. When captains get to a particular fishing spot, their sonar enacts their next 
environment, from which they tell a story of what is happening and conjecture that a particular 
bracketed portion of natural materiality (i.e., an aggregation of fish and/or a strip of ocean 
bottom, or part of a particular aggregation) is what they should extract fish from. 9 And when 
captains bring their catch on board after fishing from a certain aggregation or strip of bottom, 
they are presented with an enacted environment of actual fish – catch on deck. From the enacted 
environment of catch on deck, captains tell a story of what they were doing when they were 
fishing, from which they decide what to do next, i.e., whether to fish again from the same 
materiality or move to a different spot in order to update the materiality they will extract. In a 
context in which “you never know until you tow,” it is only when captains enact an environment 
of actual fish on deck that they finally know what they were steaming to and what they were 
fishing from. The progression of a fishing trip is the progression of making sense of one enacted 
environment in order to produce a conjecture that enacts the next environment. But, while 
9 I use certain prepositions to denote the different relationships between a fishing vessel and natural 
systems, natural materialities, or a particular intersection of time and space (i.e., a fishing spot). I use the 
phrase “fish within” when describing captains interacting with systems that are both under (ocean bottom, 
aggregations) and above (weather) the vessel. When I describe the relationship between a vessel and the 
natural materiality of an aggregation of fish I used the phrase “fish from,” for in this relationship captains 
are attempting to extract fish from a thing they are spatially separated from. And when describing a 
fishing ‘spot,’ I use the phrase “fish in,” for an entity typically acts ‘in’ time or ‘in’ space rather than 
‘within’ time and space, and ‘from’ time or space connotes a different meaning. 
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captains illuminate a unique enacted environment at each stage, their sensemaking of it is always 
embedded in a network of other captains’ experiences, upon which they draw in order to enhance 
their own sensemaking.  
The analysis below is organized in three stages of enacted environments. I examine the 
processes in which captains make sense of 1) which spot to steam to based on their plotters, 2) 
what the composition of the materiality will be that they extract at that spot based on their sonars, 
and 3) where to fish next - whether to fish within the same systems, from the same materiality, or 
update the materiality they are interrelating with. After analysis of these three stages, I review the 
primary findings in the Discussion section.  
2. Going fishing: Creating a workable level of certainty of where to fish  
Going fishing at the start of a fishing season sets in motion a concatenation of events, 
which ultimately leads to a determination of where to fish next, but which must along the way 
produce a determination of where to fish first. To fish from a nexus of natural materiality that 
will contribute to a profitable fishing trip, captains must first gain a workable level of certainty 
that they will find such a nexus within a particular space. To analyze how captains gain the 
certainty they need to bet their profitability, and therefore both their and their crew’s income, for 
a trip on a certain spot, this section first describes the enacted environment that captains must 
make sense of, the primary element of which is their ‘plotter.’ Then the section describes how 
captains make sense of this enacted environment.  
a. The plotted environment 
 The wheelhouse plotter is the trawl captains’ primary enacted environment when 
beginning a fishing trip. Plotters are instruments that locate objects in space and time. All vessels 
in the Kodiak trawl fleet have a plotter that is typically on continual display on a computer 
monitor in the wheelhouse. Tied to the vessel’s navigational system, the plotter is a computer 
program that plots objects from the past and present in space according to the Cartesian 
coordinate system, and in time according to ‘clock time.’ Similar to the geographical information 
systems that are increasingly commonplace in academic, governmental, and technical industries, 
plotters display types of objects in layers, starting with a base layer that differentiates sea and 
land, then building in layers of information upon other layers, culminating in a rich picture of the 
vessel’s temporal and spatial environment. Such layers include bottom contours, depths, 
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locations of other vessels, regulatory fishing areas, and past fishing and navigational events. 
These are the raw data that captains use to tell a story of what is happening, form which to 
conjecture what to do next, i.e., where to fish.  
 One of the primary ways in which plotters influence captains’ sensemaking of where to 
fish is by recording and recalling fishing and navigational events. Plotters are the means by 
Figure 13: Screen capture of a wheelhouse plotter display. The dispersed gray numbers are depths of 
the ocean bottom, the gray lines depict the contours of the bottom. The colored lines and curves are 
tow lines. Different colors represent different target species and/or fishing seasons, depending on the 
captain’s labeling scheme. Groups of tow lines exemplify spots that are fished relatively often. The 
boxes (the red one above “Alaska”, the blue one above that, and the red box above the blue box) are 
areas that are closed to trawling, either permanently or based on “triggers” (hence the blue box with 
tow lines inside it). The gold-colored line conjoined to two nested gold circles above “KODIAK 
ISLAND” is the vessel (“PROGRESS”) in which this plotter is displayed. Other vessels can be seen 
above this gold line (e.g., “Pacific St” for Pacific Star).  
 82 
which captains see in the present what they have done in the past. They save towing information, 
while also allowing captains to annotate that information. In addition, captains create symbols to 
capture events for future use, such as profitable tows, interactions with navigational or towing 
hazards such as wrecks or lost fishing gear, and places and times in which they have spotted 
potentially profitable aggregations (or bottom types that suggest potentially profitable 
aggregations), even if they did not fish there. As one captain described, “We mark hangs where 
the boat's hung up, where other boats have hung up, fish marks, hard bottom marks. . . these are 
all marks of all the stuff around here, this Christmas-tree stuff here is all of my personal marks. . 
. I got thousands of marks from 20 years ago.”  
Figure 13 is a screen capture from a plotter aboard a vessel on rockfish fishing trip. This 
screen displays land and sea, bottom depths and contour lines, markings of “hangs” and fishing 
events the captain has entered in the past, past towing track lines, other vessels, areas closed to 
fishing, among other objects. While this screen capture is necessarily static, in the wheelhouse 
the display moves as the vessel moves through space. The following is an example of a captain 
attempting to make sense of where to fish using the plotter from which this screen capture was 
taken:  
“This set here I think is what I'm gonna try (pointing to a mark on his plotter). 
The last time I fished for dusky rockfish here, a couple of years ago, I did ok up in 
there. This is real tough towing up through here (pointing to a different area), and 
then this over here has always been fairly good (pointing to a different spot).”  
Objects on the plotter display serve as input to the captain’s production of a hypothesis of where 
to find a potentially profitable nexus of natural materiality to fish in. Using the plotter, the 
captain integrates past and future in the present, exemplifying the “What’s the story here?” 
portion of a sensemaking episode.  
i. Building abductive capacity to find a fishing spot  
 To make sense of their plotted environment, captains tend to supplement their own 
experience with other captains’ experiences. Thus, the past experience that the last chapter 
demonstrated to be an integral part of making sense at sea need not be one’s own - it may be 
another's. While observing fishing trips and fleet meetings during my field research, I often 
found captains sharing fishing experiences. One captain, when asked in an interview to divide up 
the amount of time he spent on the radio with other captains between talking about fishing 
conditions and strategy, political stuff, or ‘other,’ stated, “I'd say 10% other, 20% political, and 
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the rest is fishing. The majority is fishing for me.” Captains seek out information about natural 
conditions at sea from other captains so they can, as another captain stated, “know what to 
expect” before they arrive at a fishing spot. Obtaining information from a captain who has 
recently fished in a certain spot is, as a captain noted, “a good indicator” of what one will find 
there, yet, speaking to the inherently indeterminate nature of natural materiality in this context, 
this captain continued with, “if you are not right in the exact same spot, it could be something 
different, but [information from another captain who has been there] is a pretty good indicator of 
what it is, it’s just not a hard and fast rule.” 
 Captains are disposed seek information about natural materiality from other 
captains. This disposition complements the disposition to fish where one has fished before, as 
one captain exemplified in his response to being asked if he typically fishes in spots he has 
fished in before: “Yeah, or somebody tells you about a spot.” The disposition to use another’s 
experience with natural materiality is due to the efficiency imperative. We can see the 
relationship between importing information from other captains and the efficiency of locating 
aggregations in one captain’s response when asked how often he relied on other captains to 
determine where to fish: “Probably 50% or so. If there's a lot of fish around you don’t need to 
ask a lot of questions, but if they're hard to find, then you get on the radio.” As another captain 
put it, “There's lots of us out there, and if somebody finds something, we go to that spot; we’re 
not going spend time driving around where there's nothing.” Captains import experience from 
one another in order to enhance their ability to efficiently know, with as much certainty as they 
feel is necessary or possible (i.e., a workable level), what they will catch in a certain spot before 
they expend the resources to steam there. In other words, captains choose a fishing spot based on 
a workable level of individual certainty, which is often socially attainted. 
 Importing information from another’s experience with natural materiality is one way in 
which captains enhance their ability to efficiently make sense of their plotted environment, or 
what I call ‘abductive capacity.’ Captains not only engage in abduction, as Chapter Two 
demonstrated, but they use an abductive mode of inquiry, rather than solely deduction or 
induction, because it is a comparatively efficient process. Rescher (1978: 42) characterizes the 
the economy of abduction in the following: “Conjectural fancy is limitless, but resources are 
scarce and life is short. . . possibilities in practice cannot be spun out forever.” Similarly, Peirce 
argues that economy is the driving force of abduction: “[Economy] is in all cases the leading 
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consideration in Abduction. . .  Economy of money, time, thought, and energy” (Peirce, 1931-
1958: 5.598 − 5.600, cited in Rescher, 1978: 66). Abductive capacity is the ability to engage in, 
what Peirce calls, “intelligent guessing” in order to efficiently alight upon a plausibly effective 
next step in one’s organizing process. Captains increase their abductive capacity by 
incorporating information about natural materialities from other captains’ experiences into their 
own sensemaking so that they can more intelligently guess where they will find a profitable 
nexus to fish in.    
The disposition to increase abductive capacity by importing experience from other 
captains manifests in various patterns of interaction. These patterns range from haphazard 
information-sharing events, such as in passing to and from the fishing grounds, to less haphazard 
events, such as when captains are gathered in meetings before and after seasons, to more routine 
information-sharing processes, such as when captains operate in an established fishing group. 
The following conversation among two captains sitting at the dock preparing to go fishing and 
one who is already fishing exemplifies a haphazard occasion of increasing abductive capacity by 
importing information about material conditions at sea:  
Docked captain #1: “It looks like you are traveling at tow speed, what are you 
doing?” 
At-sea captain: “Towing my last tow then coming in” 
Docked captain #1: “Is this your first tow on the east side?” 
At-sea captain: “Yeah, just made a three-hour pass” 
Docked captain #2: “You must have found some fish” 
At-sea captain: “Roger that” 
The docked captains in this example were tracking the at-sea captain’s movement on their 
plotters. From the nature of the at-sea captain’s movement they could tell he was fishing. Thus, 
before leaving the dock, the captains located a fishing spot that another captain had evidently 
already conjectured would be a profitable place to fish. Yet, they sought to enhance their 
understanding of that fishing spot by importing the at-sea captain’s experience with the material 




Figure 14 diagrams the contribution this interaction makes to the docked captains’ 
abductive capacity to find a profitable fishing spot. First, we can assume that the docked 
captains, based on their own past experience, have existing interpretive schemata of the 
characteristics of a profitable fishing spot at that time of year based on their target species (arrow 
2). We can also assume that the specific quota amounts the captains can catch, and the profit they 
want to make at the end of the trip, are also incorporated into their interpretive schemata (arrow 
1). These captains, however, sought information from the captain at sea to better understand 
current material conditions, based on that captain’s experience (arrow 5). Due to the information 
they received - that the at-sea captain towed for at least three hours - the docked captains were 
able to increase their understanding of at-sea conditions, such as how aggregated target fish 
might be in that spot (arrow 3). In terms of arrow 4, the reason the docked captains were seeking 
concrete information about a certain fishing spot was to attempt to understand whether that spot 
would help them move toward their desired future event of enacting a profitable trip. The 
Figure 14: Diagram of an abductive sensemaking event that is distributed across two sets of captains 
occupying two different locations – one who is fishing, the others who are at the dock preparing to go fishing  
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concrete information they gained informed their conjecture as to whether fishing in that spot will 
help them move toward their desired future event of enacting a profitable fishing trip (arrow c). 
What we do not know is whether the docked captains updated any part of their respective 
sensemaking spaces based on the new information, such as altering their desired future event by 
changing the amount of profit they expected to make. Nonetheless, we do know that the docked 
captains enriched their capacity to produce a conjecture of what to do next by using another 
captain’s experience to inform the concrete part of their abductive sensemaking. 
  A less haphazard situation in which captains import experience from one another is at 
regular gatherings on land, such as fleet meetings. Fleet meetings, as described in Chapter One, 
are typically held to so the fleet can structure how they enact a particular fishery, or how they 
progress from one fishery to another, all with the goal of maximizing the ability of each vessel to 
have access to a target species quota. I regularly observed captains seeking and sharing 
experiences regarding natural conditions at sea before, during, and after such meetings. The 
following exchange at a fleet meeting between two captains who are regular members of the 
Kodiak trawl fleet and one who is a regular member of the nearby Sand Point (i.e., Western 
Gulf) trawl fleet (but who attended a Kodiak fleet meeting), demonstrates a more regular 
situation in which one captain shares cues about material conditions with another:  
Kodiak captain #1: “How much do we know about the boats from Sand Point that 
are coming out to harvest the pollock quota?” 
Kodiak captain #2: “One of those guys is right here (points to another captain), 
why don’t you ask him?” (general laughs in the room) 
Sand Point captain: “The reason we came out here is because there wasn’t any 
fish around Sand Point. We’re probably going to go back there and look again to 
see if there’s any fish” 
Kodiak captain #2: “I saw plenty above Mountain Top” 
Sand Point captain: “Pardon?” 
Kodiak captain #2: “I saw plenty of fish above Mountain Top the other day” 
Sand Point captain: “Did you?” 
Kodiak captain #2: “Oh shit yeah, I would have loved to set on it!” 
This interaction during a fleet meeting, diagrammed in Figure 15, consists of an information-
sharing event that connects two implied sensemaking episodes. The first implied sensemaking 
episode is part of Kodiak captain #2’s experience at sea in which he made sense of the natural 
materiality at Mountain Top; the second is the Sand Point captain’s future episode, before he 
goes fishing, in which he will conjecture that a certain place to fish is his best choice among 
whatever options are available to him. And one of those options is, due to this conversation, 
 87 
Mountain Top. Thus, we know that Kodiak captain #2 conjectured that Mountain Top would be 
a profitable place to fish, even though he did not fish there (the pollock season was not yet open).  
To produce this conjecture, Kodiak captain #2 integrated interpretive schemata, distilled from 
past experiences, of what a profitable place to fish for pollock looks like with cues from the 
natural materiality he encountered at Mountain Top. Although we cannot know to what extent 
the Sand Point captain integrated the Kodiak captain’s experiential information into his own 
sensemaking, we can assume that his abductive capacity for finding a place to fish was enhanced 
based on his statement that prior to the meeting he could not find “any fish around Sand Point.”  
In addition to occasional information-sharing events, most captains have groups they 
regularly fish in. Groups tend to range in size from three (e.g., a group the fleet calls “The Three 
Amigos”) to five or six vessels, and the members of groups tend to share a common 
Figure 15: Diagram of two sensemaking episodes, one in the past (at Mountain Top), the other in the future when the Sand 
Point captain goes fishing, which are linked by an information-sharing event at a fleet meeting. This event served to 
distribute the Sand Point captain’s sensemaking of where to fish across these two captains.  
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characteristic in addition to fishing in the same spots, such as delivering to the same cannery 
(e.g., “The Trident Boats”), having the same general homeport (e.g., “The Oregon Boats”), 
perhaps even the same hometown (e.g., “The Newport Boats”), or operating vessels that have 
common owners. Groups share information about material conditions across multiple vessels, 
enhancing individual abductive capacity to make sense of where to fish. In the following quote a 
captain, who is also an owner of three vessels, describes the first day of a pollock fishery, 
demonstrating a group approach to finding a place to fish: 
“I control three boats, it’s a luxury. When we left town, most of the fleet was 
already out. I talked to them, asked how it was going. The three boats I control, 
we all went to the same spot we went to last year. That’s what most people do. 
We went to three different areas. As for the fleet, half the fleet went to one area, 
half went to another area. . . The other two boats would tell us what biomass they 
were seeing [on their sonar], and I would compare that to what I was seeing. Well, 
based on what I saw, the two other boats picked up and ran all night to get to 
where I was. . . As an owner, I was looking at the bottom line of making money. 
Because I have three boats and work with the fleet, nine times out of ten I am on 
the fish.” 
A common strategy among Kodiak trawl captains is to steam to the fishing grounds a day or two 
before the regulatorily-prescribed start to the season in order to find profitable fishing spots. 
Because the fishing season of interest in this quote was the first pollock season of the year, 
captains had time to go out to the grounds to look at concrete conditions before the season 
started. Figure 16 depicts the sensemaking process described by this captain/owner. 
In this sensemaking process, there is one production of a conjecture, but it is informed by 
cues from materialities from different locations. In order to obtain such cues, each captain put the 
fleet’s disposition to fish in the same spots they have fished before into action. After steaming to 
their individual spots, the captains, using sonar, examined the materiality beneath their vessel for 
aggregations large enough to satisfy their desired future event of fishing in the most profitable 
spot of their three options. Captains then shared those cues with the owner of the three vessels 
over their radios (arrow 5), which he used to inform his understanding of concrete conditions at 
all three locations (arrow 3). Using an interpretive schema for choosing the best fishing spot of 
the three (a schema built from past experience, arrow 2, and a desired future events, arrow 1), the 
owner conjectured that one spot was better than the others (arrows a + c), from which he 























other two, moving them from the past and into the future (arrows b + d). Thus, after this 
conjecture, “two boats picked up and ran all nigh” to the third boat.    
ii. Information sharing and incongruity   
While captains are disposed to seek information about the conditions of natural 
materiality from other captains, they are not always disposed to share such information. When 
fishing in conditions in which sharing experience might impact their efficiency, captains are less 
prone to share information that may lead to physically sharing a fishing spot. These are 
conditions in which, as one captain put it, “If you give away your secrets you diminish your 
opportunity to catch more.” Seen through the lens of the abductive sensemaking model, the 
primary issue is when sharing information about concrete conditions one is interrelating with can 
Figure 16: Group-level abductive sensemaking episode aimed at conjecturing that one fishing spot is the best 
choice of three fishing spots in terms of moving toward a desired future event. In this episode, one individual 
(Captain/owner) informs the concrete portion of his sensemaking space by communicating with other 
captains who are in different spatial locations, and are experiencing different material conditions.  
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create incongruity in the movement toward one’s desired future event. In the following a captain 
describes how sharing information about where he is fishing can disrupt his ability to move 
toward a desired future event of a profitable fishing trip: 
“These guys are my friend friends, but I don’t fish with them. . . It’s just that the 
fishing spots aren’t very big. . . If you call them up and tell them, “Hey, there's 
some really hot fishing over here, you should come over here,” then they call 
another guy and go, “Hey, what's his face just said there's some hot fishing over 
here,” and then he says it to somebody else, and fuck it’s over with.”  
What this captain means by “it’s over with” is that the greater the number of vessels that fish 
from the same aggregation, the more depleted that aggregation will become. The depletion of an 
aggregation reduces efficiency in terms of the amount of time and fuel it takes to fill a trawl net, 
as another captain explains:  
“If there's nobody else there messing with them it’s a lot easier to catch them; if 
you are the only boat in an area and if you find some fish it’s certainly a lot easier 
to catch them. And that just means less bottom contact, less time towing, less fuel, 
less everything, more productive fishing.” 
The potential incongruity between sharing actual materiality and moving toward a desired future 
event influences captains to not share information about material conditions, eliminating 
potential increases in their abductive capacity. Table 6 further explores sources of congruity and 
incongruity in terms of sharing natural materiality and moving toward desired future events.   
3. Fishing: Creating a workable level of certainty of what to fish from  
 To enact a profitable fishing trip, captains engage in a process of progressive 
determination of the indeterminate. After they have arrived at their chosen fishing spot, their  
 context shifts from above the sea to beneath the sea, their enacted environment moves from their 
plotter display to their sonar display, and the natural materiality they are interrelating with 
progresses from past to present experience. Captains must make sense of the natural materiality 
that is beneath their vessel, for they must set their net into a particular aggregation or upon a 
particular strip of bottom in order to turn potential profit into actual profit. Determining which 
aggregation or strip of bottom to set upon is largely an exercise of reading the output of their 
sonar, which is an input to their sensemaking. The following examines the processes captains 
engage in to make sense of the natural materiality beneath their vessel so that they can know, at a 
workable level of certainty, where to tow.  
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Table 6: Aspects of the incongruity that emerges between sharing information about 
material conditions and progressing toward desired future events 
Aspect Representative quotes 
Source of incongruity: 
Sharing natural materiality 
influences behavioral 
patterns of target species, 
changing the nature of the 
natural materiality one is 
interrelating with 
“. . . the resource acts different when there's three or seven boats 
compared to 30 boats, how the fish go up and down, and they get 
confused. . . What they do is the come up and down in the same 
spot. Well, if you get a lot of [fishing] effort, they are gonna hang 
out up [and not come down], or move.” 
Source of incongruity: How 
changing the nature of the 
natural materiality one is 
interrelating with can create 
incongruity in one’s 
progress toward a desired 
future event  
“You can imagine, ok each boat, 30 boats. . .   the gear is about a 
quarter mile wide roughly, so quarter mile, quarter mile, quarter 
mile (indicates with hands multiple quarter mile lengths side by 
side), a mile wide. . . and we are there at the back [of the line of 
boats]. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to know what's gonna 
happen with your [catch efficiency], it’s gonna go to hell. And that 
really affects us, you know, our income.” 
Source of incongruity: How 
sharing natural materiality 
can create incongruity in 
one’s progression toward 
the desired future event of 
avoiding bycatch (which 
eventually can impact 
profitability) 
“When you first get there the first day there's a lot of codfish and 
everybody will get fairly clean tows, but the whole fleet will just 
keep pounding back and forth on these tows and it will get dirtier 
and dirtier because the ground gets stirred up, more halibut come 
in . . . and there's less cod to dilute them. But if one guy goes there, 
you can look around and say, 'Oh there's a school, I'm gonna set on 
it.' You, alone, can target codfish; but with 30 boats there, you 
can't do that. By the time you turn around to set on it, somebody 
else is on it, so you got to just tow. So it works with one or two 
guys there. . . Anybody can go there and get clean numbers if they 
are by themselves.” 
Source of incongruity: How 
sharing natural materiality 
in limited spatial conditions 
influences behavioral 
patterns of captains 
“Usually it is 30 guys running over the top of each other, saying, 
'Get out of my way asshole!' and 'I was there first!' and ‘My boat is 
bigger than yours, so if you don't move I'm going to mow your ass 
over.'” 
Source of congruity: 
Avoiding sharing natural 
materiality due to the 
influence doing so can have 
on captains’ behavioral 
patterns 
“I'm one of those guys that, if there are 25 boats in one spot I 'm 
the guy that drives 20 miles away, me and one or two other guys. 
Which doesn’t always work out so well - there is a reason those 25 
guys are there usually. It’s just a hassle to fight with them 
sometimes.” 
Source of continuity: How 
non-limited conditions of 
natural materiality creates a 
lack of potential 
incongruity, which enables 
information sharing  
Captain: “Its been different here with the [lack of competition in a 
‘catch share’ fishery], the information has been freer; they will call 
you up and say, 'Hey they are right here.' Especially last year - the 
pollock fishing was so hot, guys will just call you and say, 'Here at 
such and such place, set and you are gonna be full in 10 minutes.’” 
Interviewer: “Because it wasn’t a risk for them to share 
information?” 
Captain: “Not with they way the pollock was in the Shelikoff, it 
was just incredible.”  
Interviewer: “Even a race (i.e., competitive) fishery?” 
Captain: “Even a race fishery.” 
Source of congruity: Interviewer: “What makes another captain good to work with?” 
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 a. Echoing an enacted environment 
 Captains rely on sonar systems to provide a visual display of the bottom and the water 
column beneath their vessels, including aggregations of fish on the bottom or in the water 
column. Sonar is how captains extract information about materiality before they extract fish from 
it. Yet, the world the sonar perceives lacks important detail. The sight of the sonar is derived 
from differences in the speed and timing of sound waves it has emitted toward the sea floor and 
which have been echoed back to it. The sonar’s transducer continually measures these 
differences and turns them into a visual display. In doing so, the sonar is able to display the 
density, location, size, and shape of objects beneath the vessel. Such objects include the ocean 
bottom, material on the bottom such as wrecks, large aggregations of fish or fishing gear, as well 
as sizable aggregations of fish that are off the bottom and in the water column. Material objects 
that cause large and sustained differences in reflected sound waves are more likely to be seen by 
the sonar. Aggregations of fish that have air bladders are particularly visible, for an air bladder, 
which is an internal sack that allows fish to move vertically through the water column, has 
acoustic properties that echo 85% of a sound wave it encounters (Bazigos, 1981). ‘Roundfish,’ 
such as rockfish, pollock, cod, and salmon, typically have air bladders, while bottom-dwelling 
‘flatfish,’ such as flounders, sole, and halibut, typically do not. Whether echoes are caused by 
fish, fishing gear, submerged vessels, or the ocean bottom itself, the sonar translates echoed 
differences into a real-time picture of the water column and its detectable inhabitants beneath the 
vessel (see Figure 17). As the vessel progresses along its path, what would be a cross-sectional 
depiction becomes a moving picture. This picture is on continual display on a wheelhouse 
monitor during a fishing trip.   
Interlinked desired future 
events opening the door to 
sharing information in the 
interest of cooperating to 
find profitable natural 
materiality  
Captain: “Somebody that, for me, it would be a captain that is 
more concerned with the bottom line that his big head. . . .  
because if he is concerned about his bottom line, and he is doing 
everything to make his profit margin as high as he can, and I'm on 
the same page, and our two combined goals is to make both of our 
bottom lines higher, its easier to do it with two people” 
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 The sonar’s display is based on information derived from “differences which make a 
difference” (Bateson, 2000: 459) to it. Yet, differences which make a difference to the sonar are    
not all the differences which make a difference to captains: the sonar’s display is under-specified 
in relation to the story captains need to tell about the natural materiality beneath their vessels. 
Under-specification can be a problem because captains must choose an aggregation to fish from 
or a strip of bottom to fish upon based on differences between species that are imperceptible to 
the sonar. In the following a captain explains the limited differences the sonar picks up: 
“You can't see sole. The only thing an echo sounder will really truly show you is 
something that it can bounce sound off of, and to bounce sound off of something 
it has to have an air bladder in it, otherwise everything you see just looks like the 
Figure 17: Screen capture of a sonar display. This is a cross-section of the water column as it moves in front 
of the vessel. The thick red and orange band at the bottom is the ocean bottom, and the thinner red band at 
the top is the water surface. The grouped red and green blotches from the left to the center of the middle of 
the display is fish ‘sign.’ From the middle to the right of the center, this sign turns into a ‘feed band.’ The 






bottom. A sole does not have an air bladder, but if you find a place where the sole 
is thick enough, if you get in a place where you are catching 100 thousand pounds 
of sole in an hour, the whole bottom looks a little bit different. . . Feed, smelt, and 
stuff doesn't really have an air bladder, but sometimes there's just so much of it 
that it shows up like backscatter. . . Like this stuff here (pointing to his sonar 
monitor), we don’t really know what that is, I don’t believe that we are actually 
seeing the sole so much as we are seeing what the sole is feeding on. . . But it 
doesn’t have to be feed, it could be a difference in water temperature, or a current 
rip could do the same thing. It picks up the difference.” 
While sonars pick up differences between mere water and large solidities such as the bottom or 
thickly aggregated fish, and between aggregations of different densities and with different spatial 
characteristics, they do not pick up differences between species with similar morphological and 
behavioral characteristics. Thus, the sonar will not depict differences between fish that have air 
bladders and which swim in the same areas of the water column at the same time, such as 
pollock and Chinook salmon, even though they are different species and are regulated quite 
differently.  
 Due to the limited nature of the information a sonar perceives, captains do not know the 
species composition of an aggregation they are towing from until they have extracted part of it 
and brought it on board. As Gulf trawl captains are wont to say, “You never know until you 
tow.” And all individuals of most species that trawlers bring on board are dead, save an 
estimated 40% of the Pacific halibut that tend to survive the ordeal (North Pacific Fishery 
Management Council, 2012). As described in both Chapters Two, due to regulatory limits on 
how much Chinook salmon and Pacific halibut Gulf trawl captains can incidentally catch when 
fishing for their target species, catching high amounts of those fish can constrain the amount of 
target species the fleet can catch, potentially stranding economic gain. Thus, the under-
specification of an aggregation can be a problem when fishing for flatfish on the bottom, as 
halibut is a flatfish, and it can be a problem when fishing for roundfish off the bottom, which is 
where Chinook salmon swim.   
i. Building abductive capacity to differentiate natural materiality 
  One of a captain’s primary duties is wading into their sonar environment and making 
sense of under-specified objects. The objects that tend to incite the most sensemaking are called 
‘sign.’ ‘Sign’ is a general term for objects on a sonar display that suggest the presence of fish. 
Sign might be target species, or it might be, as the captain above suggested, another difference 
detected by the sonar, such as feed, which has shown itself to be a reliable proxy for target 
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species. The following quote concerning fishing for pollock exemplifies the role sign plays when 
determining where to fish: "We look for what we call ‘sign,’ we are looking for feed. Guys will 
say, ‘It looks like a bunch of feedy crap,’ or ‘it’s a lot of something.’ Nobody says, ‘It’s a lot of 
pollock.’” The captains’ reliance on sign to determine what natural materiality to fish from once 
they are on the fishing grounds puts a heavy burden is on sensemaking if they are to meet 
regulatory demands for specificity and the imperative for efficiency. 
  To make sense of sign, captains integrate objects on their sonar display with descriptors, 
cues from other instruments, and past experience. From these integrations, captains produce 
conjectures regarding what sign is (“What’s the story here?”) and what it might mean in terms of 
moving toward desired futures (“What’s next?”). In terms of descriptors, captains have 
developed a collection of adjectives and metaphors for describing the shape and location of sign, 
such as “carpet,” “fluffy stuff,” “clumps,” and “tight scruff,” which they will enrich using colors 
that connote density, such as “light purple,” “blue,” “dark red,” as well as numbers that 
communicate depth. In addition, captains supplement these descriptors with cues from other 
instruments, such as time of day, time of year, latitude and longitude, water temperature, and tide 
information. In applying a system of descriptors and external cues to objects on the sonar 
display, captains complicate the simple differences the sonar measures.   
 Yet, dressing up an object with adjectives, metaphors, and other cues is still mere 
description. Mere description lacks meaning in terms of moving toward desired future events. 
Captains may gain a sense of the object’s physical characteristics, but they do not have a sense of 
how that object integrates into their process of enacting a profitable trip. Only when captains 
overlay an object with past experience can they conjecture what it means in terms of moving 
toward desired future experience. Thus, only when the abstract meets the concrete within the 
dimension of past and future can captains engage in the abductive sensemaking required for 
interrelating with indeterminate natural materiality. For example, while looking at the sonar 
display the first day of a fishing trip, a captain gave the following interpretations of different 
objects: “That’s some nasty mud there,” “That’s actual fish right there,” “That’s the bottom 
there.” This captain was able to identify objects beyond mere adjectival description because he 
had encountered them, or something similar to them, before. In other words, he was able to 
overlay them with past experience. And only then could he conjecture what the sign might mean 
for his ability to move toward desired future events. On the other hand, I, having little experience 
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with a sonar display, could not make such meaningful identifications, for I did not have the 
interpretive schemata built from past experience that would allow me to give objects on the 
display meaning in terms of interrelating with them. Reading the sonar is a process of 
sensemaking: it is a process of imposing differentiation where differentiation is lacking in order 
to tell the story of what is happening and conjecture what should happen next.  
 A relatively recent discovery Kodiak trawl captains made demonstrates the role of past 
experience in reading sign, telling a story of what it means, and then producing a conjecture of 
what to do with it. “A couple or three years ago” (as stated in 2012), captains encountered sign 
they thought was flatfish, but which they eventually determined was pollock, yet not until after 
they fished from it and brought the fish on board. Fishing for flatfish in an area where pollock 
were not known to frequent that time of year, captains encountered sign that was  “plastered 
across the bottom, glued to the bottom” and “up in the shallows.” These behavioral patterns 
indicated by sign were characteristic of flatfish. Yet, when captains fished from this sign and 
started catching a lot of fish in a short amount of time, which was uncharacteristic of flatfish, 
they experienced a loss of a sense of what they were catching, as the following captain 
exemplifies while describing his first experience fishing from this sign: “All of a sudden it was 
like, 'I'm not seeing it, but shit is pouring in the net!’ And it was like, 'holy shit!’” This captain 
knew that he was catching large amounts of fish based on his instruments, but he could not 
conjecture which species of fish it was, hence his use of the generic “shit” to describe his 
understanding of what he was catching. The captain also knew that his unstated previous 
conjecture, that the sign indicated flatfish, was false. In the following another captain describes 
this sign, explaining how past experience with this sign is needed to accurately interpret it, and 
often to even see it: 
“You got to know it’s there. You can see it on both sonars (net and at the front of 
the vessel), but if you didn't know what it was you would drive right over it. [The 
reason we found it was] somebody was towing for sole and then started seeing 
this stuff and then hauled up a huge bag of pollock. . . . And I mean it just adds up 
so fast that you can see it on your net sonar going in the net. But if you didn't 
know what it was you would just drive right over it because it doesn't look like 
much of anything. . . if you are looking up in the water you will see nothing, 
there's nothing there.. . .  And if you saw it on the bottom, you would think it was 
cod or feed, you wouldn't think it was pollock at 35 fathoms in the fall.” 
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In discovering that the sign was pollock, as well as discovering that the sign was not flatfish, 
captains moved from incongruity in their abductive sensemaking to continuity.  
Figure 18 diagrams this transition from incongruity to continuity. In part A, captains 
import past experience into the present in order to know what to look for in their concrete 
experience (“You got to know it’s there”) (diagram A, arrow 3), as well as to know what 
meaning to give to what is seen (“you would think it was cod or feed”) (diagram A, arrow 2). In 
addition, captains’ interpretive schemata are also influenced by their expected future event of 
profitably filling their vessel with flatfish, such as an expectation for a certain catch rate 
Figure 18: Transition from incongruity in 
one’s experience in terms of moving toward 
a desired future event (A) to continuity (B), 
which is gained by updating one’s experience 
and interpretive schemata 
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(diagram A, arrow 1). Captains integrate past and future events into interpretive schemata for 
understanding concrete cues (diagram A, arrow a). Where captains choose to fish is also 
influenced by a desire to catch a profitable amount of flatfish (diagram A, arrow 4) and past 
experience catching flatfish (diagram A, arrow 3). The cues that captains bracket and bring into 
experience are an integrated output of these past and future influences on their concrete 
experience (diagram A, arrow b). In this case, as diagram A of Figure 18 displays, there was an 
incongruous relationship between the captains’ abstract and concrete parts of experience. This 
incongruity resulted in a loss of sense. When captains experience a loss of sense, in this case, 
they face incongruity in their ongoing experience in terms of moving toward their desired future 
event. 
 Part B of Figure 18 diagrams the reconciliation of the abstract and concrete parts of 
experience, and the production of new sense. In diagram A, captains are fishing based on 
expectations that certain sign at a certain depth and time of year signifies flatfish, and they 
experienced incongruity between those expectations and cues from concrete experience. Due to 
the under-specified nature of sonar, captains cannot resolve the incongruity until they haul up 
their nets (i.e., they never know until they tow). In diagram B, captains have hauled up their net, 
realizing that the sign they thought indicated flatfish actually indicated pollock. Although 
captains ‘never know until they tow,’ after they tow they can update what they know (i.e., their 
interpretive schemata for both pollock and flatfish). Thus, after they tow the captains can 
integrate new experience into their interpretive schemata for making sense of sign on their 
wheelhouse sonars. And the better captains are at reading sign, the better their conjectures tend 
to be of what species certain sign indicates. As one captain explained, “Once you have stared at 
it long enough you can start to see the little differences in the sounder, but I think that takes a lot 
of experience.”  
 Just as captains use experience from other captains to gain a workable level of certainty 
of a spot to steam to, they also use experience from other captains to gain a workable level of 
certainty of what sign means - to have greater ability to discern and give meaning to “little 
differences in the sounder.” The following radio conversation between two captains fishing side-
by-side for duskies, Northerns, and perch, which are types of rockfish, exemplifies captains 
working work together to interpret sign, and in doing so increasing one another’s abductive 
capacity: 
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Captain #1:” You saw a little bit of sign yesterday, right?” 
Captain #2: “Yeah, there was some decent sign early to mid-afternoon. . .” 
Captain #1: “Roger. . .  I tried to set at 11:30, there was some fluffy stuff on the 
bottom, and then it all went up [into the water column], and then it came down [to 
the bottom] at around 3 pm.” 
Captain #2:” In the afternoon it started doing that?” 
Captain #1: “Yeah, roger.” 
Captain #2: “Ok, well, I haven't figured out what they do in relation to the tides. . 
. What depth was it when you got your duskies up north there?” 
Captain #1: “I was like 65 fathoms, yeah I think it was around 66, 65.”  
Captain #2: “Ok, same here. I fished here one trip last year and if I stayed at 66” 
and up I got duskies and Northerns, but if I got much deeper I got into perch. 
Yesterday I got into 69 and 70 and there was still no real sign of perch.”  
Captain #1: “Yeah, up there a couple years ago, I think I was at 67, and boy I 
thought I was really in them, the sign looked the pretty much the same, just a lot 
better, and it was straight perch.”  
This conversation depicts captains, who are fishing in the same spot, using a combination of 
descriptors (‘fluffy stuff’), cues from other instruments, such as depth and time of day, and past 
experience (e.g., “I fished here one trip last year”) to make sense of sign. In addition, the captains 
used differences in time and location to produce a sense of ecological process, which can be seen 
in the description of sign moving off the bottom at 11:30 and back down to the bottom at 3 pm. 
These captains are telling a story of what is happening in the present based on what has 
happened in the past, and in doing so they are creating sense that they will employ when they 
encounter similar sign in the future. Put more succinctly, they are abducting conjectures in the 
present that will be imported as expectations in the future. The product of this social abductive 
sensemaking episode is sense that enables the captains to “know what to expect.” Figure 19 
diagrams this collective sensemaking episode. 
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 Table 7 provides additional examples of the interplay between the indeterminacy of 
natural materiality and the workable level of certainty captains try to create, both individually 
and socially, as they wade into their sonar display’s enacted environment. The first two rows 
evidence the indeterminacy that emerges from the relationship between submerged materiality 
and the limited differences a sonar measures and the resulting lack of specification in the objects 
the sonar displays. The table proceeds through the ways in which captains impose specification, 
from their own experience to distributing the abductive process across other’s experiences, so 
that they can know, at a workable level of certainty, which species they are likely extracting, and 
which they are likely not extracting, before they tow.  
3. To stay or leave?: Creating a workable level of certainty of where to fish next 
 A fishing trip consists of captains progressing through enacted environments, from their 
past fishing spots captured on their plotters when they first set out to fish, to the natural 
materialities captured on their downsounder display when selecting materiality to fish from, to 
their captured fish after they haul it on board when determining whether to fish in the same spot 
Figure 19: Diagram of a collective sensemaking episode in which captains 
share the same material conditions but use different past experiences to 
make sense of them 
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again or to move to a different spot. This section examines the sensemaking process aimed at 
their enacted environment of actual fish.  
a. The catch-based environment 
 Once captains and crew haul their catch on board, what was potential is now actual, what 
was fish is now catch. Natural materiality that was previously detected only through past 
experience and sonar technology will available for personal inspection. Assuming the vessel is 
not full, a captain must decide to either “throw [the net] back out” in the same spot or move to a  
Table 7: Creating a workable level of certainty from the enacted environment of the sonar 
display 
Empirical concept Representative Quotes 
Sonar’s under-specification 
of natural materiality 
 
Captain: “The big question is fishing what you can’t see on the 
sonar. Those are all the flatfish, sablefish are hard to see, halibut, 
salmon, things that are in the feed bands.” 
Interviewer: “Do you fish the feed bands?”  
Captain: “Lots of times, most of the time that’s where the fish is. 
Your net only pulls out the big stuff. . . . That’s how it is fishing in 
the Shelikoff, it has a big feed band with salmon, sharks, 
everything” 
 
Interviewer: Do you still see things on the downsounder that you are 
not sure what they are? 
Captain: All the time. You are never sure what it is until you put 
your net down in it. Last year I drove out [to the grounds] and I saw 
this sign and I made a short tow because I didn’t know what it was 
and I had caught mackerel there like two weeks before. I hauled 
back, and got straight pollock, and I said, ‘All right!’ So I went and 
threw it back out, pulled it up and it was like 50% mackerel that time 
- same spot, same sign. I mean what the hell are you supposed to do? 
It was pretty frustrating”  
 
“I don’t know, it looked like it almost lifted off [of the bottom], like 
if we would have had midwater gear we could have caught 
something, but it didn’t look quite right either, it almost went....but if 
I didn’t catch it I wont find out what it was. But I don’t know what I 
am going to do next. Make sure the net is in one piece. I can see how 
any kind of weather is no good for this.” 
 
“That possibly could be some fish, but it could be distortion too.” 
Under-specification due to 
inexperience  
Interviewer: “What are those little spots off the bottom there? 
(pointing to sonar display) 
Captain: “I believe those are fish. I don’t do this enough to get 
really good at it. Now that looks like fish right there (pointing to 
new object on the sonar). I don’t know where it came from, but I'll 
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different spot. In other words, captains must tell a story of what they have caught so that they can 
conjecture what to do next. Yet, captains already have some idea of how much they have caught 
based on the towing process, in which they use wheelhouse electronics to help them determine 
when to haul up the net so that they do not catch too much fish, or instead when they should give 
up towing due to catching too little fish. Catching too much fish can reduce fish quality and 
damage the net and vessel, as well as pose a danger to the deck crew when attempting to haul an 
over-filled net on board. Alternatively, catching too little fish can result in an insufficiently 
efficient fishing process. Both catching too much and catching too little undermine profitability. 
But a captain’s idea of how much he has caught, before actually bringing the net on deck, can 
vary by as much as tens of tons or as little as a few tons.  
Thus, when telling their story of what they have done in order to determine what to do 
next, captains work primarily from the actual catch on deck. In cod and flatfish fisheries, in 
which the catch is usually smaller (est. 30 to 60 tons) but more diverse (in Central Gulf P. Cod 
take it. I sure hope it’s fish.” 
Experience enhancing sonar 
specification 
Captain: “I mean if you are in a place and a time when the sign on 
the sounder that you've seen it so many times, you say, 'I know what 
that is' 
Interviewer: ”Based on experience?” 
Kent Leslie: “yeah” 
 
“There are different subtleties. Sometimes it isn't a lot. Sometimes 
you can't even tell until you get out of the fish and you are towing 
through something that just doesn't go in your net.” 
Enhancing abductive 
capacity through both 
distributed cognition and 
action  
Interviewer: “What still surprises you?” 
Captain: “Oh, not much. Reading the sonar still does. Here’s an 
example, last fall me and another guy were out fishing and there was 
this ball [on both of our downsounders] and we were both scared to 
death to set on it. What if it was rockfish? Not only would we have 
to waste a bunch of rockfish, but then you have to spend hours 
cleaning the fish out of the gear. We were both looking at it and we 
were both like, should we?” 
Interviewer: “What did you do?” 
Captain: “One guy did a quick dip. But most of the time we’re 
pretty good about knowing what we’re seeing on the sonar. But then 
you might hit a ball of herring on the way up. I had that happen, that 
can ruin your day too. There are times when such things can shut 
down an area for other guys.” 
Implied group-enhanced 
abductive capacity 
“Cod fishing can be very difficult. There’s times that the whole fleet 
will go out and fill their boats, but that’s because the cod is in a big 
area where anybody can catch them. But 95% of the time cod is a 
very elusive fish, and there are a certain group of boats that 
constantly catches the cod, and there are boats that constantly 
struggle with that fishery”  
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fisheries, an estimated 27% of the catch is not cod and 10% of the catch is discarded; NPFMC, 
2008), the crew empties the entire net on deck to sort the salable fish from the non-salable fish. 
In pollock and rockfish fisheries, in which the nets and catch tend to be much larger (est. 80 to 
120 tons), as well as less diverse (in pollock fisheries, an estimated 93% of the catch is pollock, 
with less than 1% discarded, NPFMC, 2011), the crew typically rapidly dumps unsorted catch 
straight from the net into the fish hold in order to maintain vessel stability. It is primarily from 
these enacted environments - the catch on deck or the net being dumped into the fish hold - that 
captains tell a story of what they have caught, from which they conjecture what to do next.    
i. Building rate-based sense 
 The primary tool captains use to gain a workable level of certainty of what to do next 
based on their enacted environment of actual fish is the catch rate. The catch rate tells a 
simultaneously retrospective and prospective story - it captures how much fish the captain caught 
and the amount of time it took him to catch it, and it predicts how fast the captain will be able to 
catch fish in the next tow, if the nexus of natural materiality in which he is fishing does not 
significantly change. If a captain wants a different rate he typically has to move to a different 
fishing spot, in which he can fish within a different nexus of natural materiality. 
 To construct a catch rate, captains first determine how much fish they have caught - a 
catch weight. Captains construct a catch weight by employing their knowledge of how much the 
net holds and comparing filled net with empty net; or, captains employ their knowledge of how 
much their fish hold holds and comparing occupied fish hold to empty fish hold; or, captains 
simply look at the catch sprawled on the trawl deck and, drawing on years of experience, 
intuitively estimate a weight. The particular interpretive schema captains use depends on the 
captain and whether the net is dumped on deck for sorting or directly into the fish hold. In any 
case, captains integrate their perception of actual catch with an abstract interpretive schema, and 
in doing so produce a catch weight. The production of a catch weight provides a basic example 
of merging the abstract with the concrete.  
 The catch weight feeds into a determination of the catch rate. To construct a tow’s catch 
rate, captains pair their sense of the catch weight with another factor of the tow – the time it took 
to catch the fish. From this pairing captains create a new sense of the tow in terms of pounds or 
tons per hour. A production of a catch rate is apparent in the following conversation with a 
captain after towing for flatfish: 
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Interviewer: “How much fish do you think that is (looking at catch emptied onto 
the back deck)?” 
Captain: “Oh, about seven thousand pounds. This tow only paid for itself. We had 
four hours invested in that tow, we have to do better than that.”  
In this discussion, the captain paired the catch weight (“seven thousand pounds”) with the 
amount of time that passed while catching it (“four hours”), which is a rate he used to determine 
that the tow was not profitable (“This tow only paid for itself”). In declaring “we have to do 
better than that”, the captain is implying that there is currently an incoherent relationship 
between the natural materiality in his fishing spot and his desired future event of enacting a 
profitable fishing trip. Thus, there is an incoherent relationship between the concrete and future 
aspects of his sensemaking space, which he must resolve.  
 But the captain is not yet finished telling the story of the last tow. In addition to 
incoherence due to a catch rate that is too low, a captain may also experience incoherence 
because his prohibited species bycatch rate is too high. Because catching too much halibut or 
Chinook salmon can result in one or more trawl fisheries closing before their target quotas are 
caught (see Chapter One, section 5.g. for a more detailed explanation of this relationship), 
resulting in stranded potential target catch, captains also often engage in sensemaking that 
concerns a desired future event of not catching a potentially constraining amount of prohibited 
species bycatch. When captains do so, they engage in a different abductive sensemaking process, 
differentiated by different constituents of his sensemaking space. Captains attempt to make sense 
of how much halibut and/or Chinook they have caught in order to project how much they will 
likely catch if they fish again in the same spot. The tool captains use to gain a workable level of 
certainty of how much prohibited species bycatch they will catch next is again a catch rate.  
 The production of a prohibited species bycatch rate is similar to the production of a target 
catch rate. A rate for halibut bycatch is the percentage of the total catch that is halibut. To 
produce such a rate captains will watch as the deck crew sorts the halibut from the cod or flatfish 
and estimate a percentage of the catch that is halibut. The result is a rate of [x] percent halibut 
per tow, which the captain then projects as the likely percentage of halibut in the next tow, if the 
next tow is conducted in the same nexus of natural materiality. 
 The process for producing a Chinook catch rate is somewhat different. To track Chinook 
bycatch, captains typically rely on the deck crew to count the number of Chinook they see 
(Chinook are managed by numbers rather than weight) as fish rapidly flow from the net into the 
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fish hold. Because the crew cannot see all the Chinook during this process, the captain uses an 
interpretive schema to extrapolate a perceived number of Chinook into a conceived number of 
Chinook. Such an extrapolation model states, in general, that for every one Chinook someone 
saw, there are [x] Chinook in the tow. The models captains use vary, with [x] ranging from five 
to ten fish for every one Chinook. The reason for this variance is that extrapolation models are 
interpretive schemata that are distilled from numerous individual experiences of comparing the 
number of Chinook seen at sea to the more accurate number of Chinook a processing plant 
reports were delivered in the catch. A captain describes his process for creating Chinook rates in 
the following:  
“When we haul back I have my crew standing there as the fish are dumping in 
[the fish hold]. If you see one you might have 10, or if you see one there might be 
one; but if we start seeing five or six, then I tell the [captains] that are around me, 
“Hey there might be a bunch of salmon here, be careful and watch your 
haulbacks.” And, you know, if it's ridiculous we'll get out of there.” 
The upshot is that, by merging an abstract structure with cues from concrete experience, captains 
can determine a rate of the prohibited species bycatch in a completed tow, and then use that rate 
to conjecture that the next tow will either have the same rate or a different rate depending on 
whether captains update their material conditions or not. 
ii. Updating a rate-based sense of where to fish next 
 After captains tell the story of what has happened, both in terms of a catch or prohibited 
species rate, they must determine what to do next. A determination of what to do next is either a 
product of, or aimed toward, congruence among the elements of their sensemaking process. If 
there is congruence between the relatively abstract and concrete aspects of one’s experience, in 
the terms defined by both the past and the future, there is no need to change one’s fishing 
practice, and interrelating with natural materiality can proceed without incongruity. If there is 
incongruence in their sensemaking, a captain will update one or more constituents of his 
sensemaking space in order to establish congruence and continue interrelating with natural 
materiality. Thus, based on the abductive sensemaking model, captains may alter their version of 
a desired future event and/or they may look to different past experiences in order to tell a 
different, more congruent story of their current experience. Or, captains may choose to create 
congruence by updating the concrete side of their fishing process by moving to a different 
fishing spot. In one case, captains alter the relatively abstract side of their sensemaking in order 
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to establish congruence with their concrete materiality, in the other case captains update their 
concrete materiality to establish congruence with the relatively abstract side of their 
sensemaking. The following exemplifies a captain deciding to update the concrete portion of his 
sensemaking space after creating a halibut rate that was incongruent with his (relatively abstract) 
understanding of what an appropriate level of halibut bycatch is: 
Interviewer: “What's the plan now?” 
Captain: “We are gonna run three or four miles and find a new spot. We had to 
move, there was just too much halibut in that spot.”   
Interviewer: “A new spot just based on experience?” 
Captain: “Based on one tow I made 11 years ago, but it was in May. Same thing, 
couldn’t catch anything here, weather was blowing hard out of the [Simidi 
Islands], and I ran over there and loaded the boat up in three tows of straight 
arrowtooth. But they were schooled fish, so it’s a whole different deal - a ‘they 
are either there or they are not’ type of deal.”  
This captain’s implied creation of a halibut rate told a story of incongruence between his desired 
future event of not catching too much halibut bycatch on his fishing trip and the ratio of target to 
halibut in the natural materiality he was fishing from. This story set in motion a process of 
making sense of what should happen next in order to restore congruence and continue 
interrelating with natural materiality. The sensemaking episode in which the captain produces a 
conjecture of where to fish next is diagrammed in Figure 20. First, the sense the captain made in 
the interest of creating congruence employed the same disposition he employed to get to his 
previous fishing spot - fishing where he has fished before (arrow 3, from past to concrete). But, 
to update the natural materiality he will fish from, the captain looked to different past 
experiences, perhaps for one that shared a similarity to current concrete conditions (“weather was 
blowing out of the Simidis”) (arrow 3, from concrete to past). Using different past experiences, 
the captain selected a different fishing spot to fish in next, which was a conjecture that by fishing 
in that spot he would catch less halibut, establishing congruence with his desired future event of 
not catching an amount of halibut that would constrain the fleet’s ability to catch target quotas in 
the future (arrow 4). 
 The decision to move requires captains to redeploy a sensemaking process of determining 
where to fish. Thus, the previous sensemaking episode captures the reciprocal nature of the 
process of enacting a fishing trip: interrelating with potential concrete materiality by choosing a 
space in which to fish, choosing an actual nexus of natural materiality to fish within, and then 
either continuing to fish within the same nexus or updating the concrete portion of one’s fishing 
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process by moving to a different spot in order to fish within a different nexus of natural 
materiality. When choosing to move, captains return to interrelating with potential materiality 
rather than actual materiality. Yet, they do so in order to find natural materiality that is 
constituted by a bigger and/or more homogeneous aggregation of target species. This 
sensemaking will again be constructed using one or both of the dispositions to fish where one has 
fished before and to seek experience from other captains. Table 8 provides examples of captains 
determining where to fish next by employing the disposition of seeking experience from other 
captains, and in doing so expanding their abductive capacity to find natural materiality to fish 
from that better satisfies their desired future.  
Table 8: Examples of captains increasing their abductive capacity to determine where to 
fish next after deciding to move from their initial fishing spot 
Empirical concept Sensemaking episodes 
Choosing a spot based on 
one’s own experience and 
the experience of other 
captains, influenced by the 
desired future event of 
Interviewer: “What made you come down here to fish?” 
Captain: “This is where [captain A] and [captain B] were, and I 
have fished here before. . . . I was a little concerned when I set in 
that last spot. Yeah, if I can just get another quick one. I'm tired, I 
might have fallen asleep a couple of times.” 
Figure 20: Conjecturing that updating the natural materiality one is fishing from by moving to 
a different fishing spot, based on different past experiences in light of current conditions, will 
reduce the halibut bycatch rate one produces 
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producing a profitable trip Interviewer: “Yeah, this seems like its been a pretty tiring trip”  
Captain: “This seems like this is how it always is. It would be nice 
if we could stop and sleep, but the clock is running. Its not like you 
are up against other guys beating you to the dock, but you are still, 
with the cost of fuel for you to come out here you have got to bring 
some fish back.” 
Choosing a spot based on 
another captain’s past 
experience, influenced by 
concrete conditions  
Interviewer: “How did you decide where to set?” 
Captain: “Um, towing here before, wanting the right depth, from 
some years of experience. But, then I had another boat come 
through here last night, he was just fishing here, and he says he 
didn’t catch anything, he was all discouraged. I was gonna fish 20 
miles further south, but he said, 'Well the further I got to the north 
the better the fishing got.' So that's one reason we're here right 
now.” 
Choosing a spot based on 
two captains’ past 
experiences 
Interviewer: “Good morning, how is it going?” 
Captain:” Ok. I talked to another [Boat A], he said [fishing] 
wasn’t any good at the Potato Head. . . . but then there's another 
boat at the Coral Patch. . . I talked to him and he got 50 thousand 
pounds yesterday. . . We need another 25 to fill the tanks.” 
Interviewer: “Who was at the Potato Head?” 
Captain: “[Boat A], he said he had about 25 thousand and he tore 
his net up real bad; he said he didn’t think there's much there and 
he knows that spot really good. So I hope this works out. I'm 
getting tired of not making good decisions, I think we probably 
should have just stayed where we were.”  
Interviewer: “So nobody is doing that great?” 
Captain: “Well 25 or 50 down here doesn’t sound that bad, we 
didn't do that much better where we were [before we moved].” 
Choosing a particular tow 
(a predetermined track of 
bottom) based on the 
experience of another 
captain, influenced by the 
desired future event of 
enacting a profitable trip 
Interviewer: “Where are we steaming to?” 
Captain: “Marmot” 
Interviewer: “That's on the other side of the island?” 
Captain: “Yeah, we were fishing over here (pointing to a spot on 
the plotter), now we're going to the other side of Afognak. All this 
really is the closest place you can find anything, nothing real 
special.” 
Interviewer: “Were there guys fishing over here recently?” 
Captain: “The last guy that did fish here that I know of is [boat C], 
oh [boat D] fished here also; actually I'm making the exact same 
tow that [the captain] on [boat D] made, and this one tow was 
worth $5 thousand to [that captain]. But I haven't seen any fish; 
it’s almost like somebody flipped a switch. Three boats in the last 
three days have tied up because they went out, looked at it and 
found nothing. I don’t know if it’s the lunar phase or what, but its 
almost like somebody threw a switch. But this happens.” 
 
4. Conclusion 
 Three interrelated findings stand out from the previous analysis: 1) Captains have a 
disposition to inform their understanding of material conditions by importing another’s past 
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experience; 2) Sensemaking at sea can be a social process that captains use to enhance their 
capacity to gain a workable level of certainty in terms of where to fish; and 3) In a context 
characterized by indeterminate systems, sensemaking often concerns the transition from 
incongruity between the concrete and the abstract, in the terms defined by the past and present, to 
congruity among those elements. Furthermore, when sharing information has the potential to 
induce incongruity in terms of determining what comes next, captains are less prone to share 
information. The following discusses these findings in greater detail.  
The previous analysis traced the progression of sensemaking that is part of the 
infrastructure of a fishing trip. This progression moves through stages, from making sense of 
where to fish first, to making sense of what to fish from, to making sense of where to fish next. 
Each of these stages corresponds to a different enacted environment. While captains make 
individual sense of these enacted environments, their sensemaking is embedded in a social nexus 
of past experiences. Captains make sense of their enacted environments using past experience, 
their own or another’s, in light of current conditions and shaped by desired future events. A 
Kodiak trawl captain not only has a disposition to fish where he has fished before, he has a 
disposition to fish where someone else has fished before, and to seek information to that end. As 
captains attempt to organize with inherently indeterminate systems, past experience imported 
from other captains helps them answer the first sensemaking question, ‘What’s the story here?’ 
in terms of the particular spot another captain has experience with, so that the captain receiving 
the information can, in drawing on a richer set of experiences, provide a more informed answer 
to the second sensemaking question, ‘What’s next?’ In other words, imported past experience, 
one’s own or another’s, enhances a captains creation of a workable level of certainty in terms of 
where to fish.  
 The first sensemaking stage of a fishing trip consists of the enacted environment that is the 
wheelhouse plotter. Plotters allow captains to turn experiences into objects that can be used to 
inform subsequent fishing processes. A fishing trip starts with captains applying abductive 
sensemaking to their plotter’s enacted environment in order to gain a workable level of certainty 
of which fishing spot to steam to under current conditions. The next enacted environment is the 
sonar display, in which captains use abductive sensemaking to determine, at a workable level of 
certainty, whether an object beneath the vessel offers the opportunity to conduct a profitable tow. 
The next enacted environment is emergent from the previous two - the enacted environment of 
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actual catch, from which captains employ abductive sensemaking to decide whether to fish 
within the same nexus of natural materiality or to move to a different spot in order to fish within 
a different nexus. At each stage captains stand in the actuality of the present, which is interpreted 
through the lens of a desired future and a selected past, and tell a plausible story of what is 
happening in order to produce a plausible conjecture of what should happen next.  
 The indeterminate nature of natural materiality at sea, in relation to Kodiak captains’ 
imperative for efficiency and regulatory demands for species-level specificity, puts a heavy 
burden on sensemaking. This burden requires captains to socially-construct and impose 
differentiation into their enacted environments. To enhance their ability to make differentiated 
sense of potential natural materiality as they leave the dock and actual natural materiality as they 
arrive at their chosen fishing spot, captains look outside their own sensemaking space to the 
sensemaking spaces of other captains for experiences that can complement their own. Captains 
use other captains’ experiences to enhance their ability to efficiently make plausible conjectures, 
what I call ‘abductive capacity.’ In doing so, captains engage in social abductive sensemaking.  
 One of the aspects of captains’ experience that incites abductive sensemaking is 
incongruity between the concrete and the abstract sides of their sensemaking spaces. Incongruent 
relationships, such as when there is a mismatch between expectations distilled from past fishing 
events and cues from current concrete materiality, lead to incongruity in terms of moving toward 
one’s desired future event. This incongruity requires updating aspects of experience in order to 
re-establish congruence between the abstract and the concrete, which allows for continuation of 
one’s experience. Updates may come in the form of a new understanding of concrete materiality, 
a new desired future event to work toward, a different past experience to draw from, or new 
concrete materiality to organize with.  
Taken together, the purpose of the model constructed in Chapter Two and expanded in 
this chapter is to enable the dissection of abductive sensemaking events into 1) identifiable parts, 
and 2) relationships among those parts. In doing so, we are better equipped to understand how 
sense breaks down and is re-made when attempting to organize with indeterminate materiality. 
This chapter demonstrates that the breaking down and re-making of sense is both an individual 
and social process of constructing congruity between the abstract and concrete parts of 
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From Hot Spots to Lightning Strikes: Making Sense of Chinook Salmon Bycatch  
 
 
“Consider once more, the universal cannibalism of the sea; all whose creatures 
prey upon each other, carrying on eternal war since the world began.” 
--Melville, H. Moby Dick, p. 247 
 
1. Introduction 
 In Chapter Three I expanded the model introduced in Chapter Two to the social level, and 
well as longitudinally throughout a fishing trip. This chapter expands our ongoing analysis of 
sensemaking at sea to the system level by examining relationships between regulatory processes 
on land and sensemaking processes at sea. In doing so, I go beyond the approach taken in 
previous chapters of examining fundamental aspects of the process of commercial trawl fishing 
to examining how broader parts of a fisheries management system interrelate to impact one of 
the most important conservation issues today - fisheries bycatch (Davies, Cripps, Nickson, & 
Porter, 2009; FAO, 2010; Lewison, et al., 2011; Patrick & Benaka, 2013).     
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This chapter is a ‘focused ethnography’ of an extreme bycatch event that occurred in the 
Gulf of Alaska. Rather than examining commonalities across an array of events, a focused 
ethnography takes as its object of inquiry a particular event, phenomenon, or situation that has 
been delimited in time and space (Nicolini, Mengis, & Swan, 2012: 615, citing Alvesson, 1996). 
The event of interest is a rare event, which was extreme in nature. Extreme events are rare but 
“significant interruptions, exaggerations of a type of stimulus that organizations routinely 
encounter on a smaller scale” (Christianson et al., 2009: 846). These types of events are valuable 
as case studies because they allow researchers to see pernicious factors that come to light in such 
events, but which otherwise tend to be taken for granted and/or are beneficent (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Yin, 2009). This chapter uses an extreme event in the commercial fishing context to extend 
organizational theory, but it also uses organizational theory to extend our understanding of 
commercial fishing, specifically bycatch that is discarded, which is a primary concern among 
fisheries managers and fisheries management scholars (e.g., Abbott & Wilen, 2009; Lewison, 
Crowder, Read, & Freeman, 2013; Patrick & Benaka, 2013). As stated by Bellido et al. (2011: 
318), “discarding is currently one of the most important topics in fisheries management, both 
from economic and environmental points of view.” 
Figure 21: The regulatory areas that constitute the Gulf of Alaska federal management 
area 
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 2. The Western Gulf Chinook Bycatch Event 
In 11 days in October of 2010, approximately 20 vessels participating in a pollock fishery 
in the Gulf of Alaska accidentally caught 28,000 Chinook salmon. This event was the ‘D’ season 
pollock fishery in the Western Regulatory Area (see Figure 21). To review from Chapter One, 
regulators annually create one overarching quota for pollock in the Gulf of Alaska (Gulf), which 
they split across four pollock seasons (A, B, C, D), each of which occurs in areas 610, 620, and 
630. Each of the four seasons start at the same pre-determined, regulatorily-defined dates in each 
area, two in the winter (A, B) and two in the fall (C, D). Thus, there are twelve annual pollock 
fisheries in the Gulf. Because pollock and Chinook have similar patterns of activity that recur at 
certain times of the year in Alaskan waters, vessels tend to incidentally catch Chinook while 
fishing for pollock. 
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Chinook, or ‘king,’ salmon is the largest, least abundant, and most expensive of the five 
salmons caught in Alaska; it is also one of the most culturally important fish to Alaskans, as 
indicated by its status as the Alaska state fish. Due to regulation, Chinook salmon is ‘bycatch’ 
when caught in a pollock fishery. Bycatch is “fish other than the primary target species that are 
caught incidental to the harvest of the primary species” (NOAA, 2006: 5). There are two types of 
bycatch: organisms that are retained and sold and organisms that are discarded. Fishery 
participants (i.e., captains or processing plants) discard catch for one of three reasons: 
mechanical and structural limitations (e.g., fish may be too small to process or catch may be too 
heavy to bring aboard), the catch does not have economic value - or as much economic value as 
other catch does (e.g., captains may discard pollock in favor of retaining Pacific cod), and 
regulations that require certain species, when caught in certain fisheries, to be discarded. 
Chinook fall in the latter category in all pollock fisheries in Alaska.   
 The extreme nature of Chinook bycatch in the 2010 D season pollock fishery in the 
Western Gulf (are 610) is depicted in Figure 22. The rate of bycatch (i.e., the number of Chinook 
Figure 22: Seasonal (A, B, C, D) and annual Chinook salmon bycatch rates in the Western Gulf pollock 
fisheries. A and B seasons are regulatorily scheduled to start on January 20th and end by May 31st, and 
the C and D seasons are scheduled to begin on August 25th and end by November 1st. The 2010 spike in 
the D season is the at-sea portion of the Western Gulf bycatch event. (NPFMC, 2011: 57) 
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caught for every ton of pollock caught) in the event was 3.45, which was 20 times the average 
rate for the previous seven years (0.17 Chinook/ton of pollock). Put differently, the amount of 
Chinook salmon bycatch in the Western Gulf in October 2010 was 165 times the amount caught 
in the same D season fishery in 2009 (six days of fishing) and 19 times the annual amount of 
Chinook caught in that fishery over the previous five years (est. 1,500 fish), over an average of 
14 days of fishing.  
 While all the pollock and Chinook salmon caught in a trawl net die in the process, due to 
regulation, all the Chinook salmon must be either discarded or donated to a food bank. Yet, a 
system for donating bycaught fish to a food bank was not instituted in the Gulf fisheries until 
2011. 10  Therefore, all of the Chinook caught in the Western Gulf bycatch event was discarded 
(approx. 105 tons, or the equivalent of 70 Volkswagens beetles), as was the total amount of 
Chinook caught by Gulf trawl vessels that year (est. 54,000 fish, 200 tons), all of the Chinook 
caught by trawl vessels in previous years in the Gulf (avg. 11,000 fish for the previous 15 years, 
or 40 tons per year). While captains are required to discard Chinook salmon in all trawl fisheries 
in the Gulf, at the time of this event there was not a limit on the amount they could catch.  
The extreme event did not end with a mass catch and discard of Chinook salmon. While 
the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council), which is the body in charge of 
regulating all federal fisheries in Alaskan waters (see Chapter One, section 5a), had been 
analyzing and discussing how to regulate Chinook salmon bycatch in the Gulf trawl fisheries for 
several years, the 2010 Western Gulf Chinook bycatch event infused Council regulators with a 
sense of urgency. One reason for this urgency was that the amount of Chinook caught in the 
2010 Gulf pollock fisheries violated the Endangered Species Act. Another reason is that the 
event garnered a relatively high amount of media attention in Alaska, as well as outcry from the 
salmon industry and from conservation groups. The ensuing regulatory process spanned four pre-
determined Council meetings (the Council normally holds five meetings a year, at the same 
10 In 2013, approximately 20% of the Chinook bycaught in the Gulf was donated to a food bank. The 
structure for regular food bank donation was instituted largely by efforts of the Kodiak trawl fleet in 2011. 
While I have the obtained the donation amounts, in pounds, for 2013 through personal communication 
with the food bank that manages bycatch donations in Alaska (i.e., SeaShare), I am currently attempting 
to get additional data on the amount of Chinook bycatch that has been donated since 2011. The 
calculation of 20% is as follows: In 2013, 19,373 lbs. of Chinook salmon was donated. At an average of 
7.5 lbs. per fish caught in Gulf trawl fisheries (NPFMC, 2011: 117), approx. 2,580 fish were donated. 
There were 13,158 Chinook bycaught in the Gulf in 2013. Therefore, the number donated was 
approximately 20% of the number bycaught. 
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times each year, but in different locations across Alaska, Washington, and Oregon), which were 
held in December 2010, February 2011, April 2011, and June 2011. The purpose of this process 
was “to provide immediate incentive” for the Gulf pollock fleet to reduce their Chinook salmon 
bycatch (NPFMC, 2011: i). The process culminated in a 25,000 limit on the number of Chinook 
captains can annually catch Gulf-wide when fishing for pollock. This means that every year the 
Gulf pollock fleet can catch 25,000 Chinook salmon as bycatch in order to catch their twelve 
pollock quotas. But this also means that 25,000, or approximately 85 tons, of Chinook salmon 
can be wasted each year. This limit became active in the fall of 2012 (prorated for mid-year 
implementation), and was promptly exceeded in the same October fishery that initiated its 
creation two years earlier.  
This is a story about an extreme event, which was constituted by fishing processes at sea 
that precipitated a regulatory process on land. This regulatory process on land was reciprocally 
intended to prevent such extreme events at sea from recurring. Figure 23 depicts this extreme 
event. A “hot spot” is the regulatory and ecological substrate from which large-scale bycatch 
events emerge. A “lightning strike” is the unpredictable integration of fishing activity and a hot 
spot; and a large-scale bycatch event is the unchecked proliferation of lightning strikes across 
multiple vessels. The Western Gulf bycatch event was essentially comprised of A) processes that 
initially produced lightning strikes from a hot spot and then allowed lightning strikes to 
accumulate into a large-scale bycatch event; and, B) the regulatory process aimed at preventing 
individual lightning strikes from becoming large-scale bycatch events in the future. Thus, as 
Figure 23 depicts, there are two pathways that can form when captains fish from a hot spot: the 
production of a lightning strike and the ensuing formation of a large scale bycatch event, or the 
production of a lightning strike and the avoidance of a large scale bycatch event. 
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Figure 23 organizes the remainder of this chapter. Hot spots are necessary conditions for 
a large-scale bycatch event, but they are not sufficient by themselves to create one. They merely 
provide the backdrop of opportunity. As the backdrop upon which the Western Gulf extreme 
bycatch event was constructed, the conditions that form hot spots are the subject of section 3 of 
this chapter, which is constituted by a) a discussion of the materiality of hot spots, both in terms 
of ecological processes and the ocean bottom, and b) a historical discussion of the regulatory 
structures that currently create the ‘hot’ in hot spot. In section 4 I analyze the at-sea processes 
that fostered the development of lightning strikes and the large-scale bycatch event from that hot 
spot (pathway A), as well as the on-land regulatory process aimed at preventing such future 
progressions (pathway B). And in the Conclusions section I discuss the issues that led to the 
extreme bycatch event at sea and how regulators on land attempted to solve those issues. 
3. Hot Spots 
Chapter Two demonstrated that, due to their efficiency imperative, trawl captains have a 
disposition to fish from aggregations. But what Chapter Two did not discuss is the occasion in 
which an aggregation is significantly heterogeneous in terms of species composition rather than 
mostly homogeneous. A heterogeneous aggregation forms when two or more species enact 
similar patterns of behavior, what are described below as ‘action patterns,’ such as feeding on the 
same substrate at the same time. When a captain fishes from a heterogeneous aggregation, and 
Figure 23: Diagram of two pathways that can form when fishing effort is integrated with 
a hot spot. Pathway “A” leads to a large-scale bycatch due to the unchecked proliferation 
of lightning strikes, and pathway “B” does not lead to a large-scale bycatch event due to 
the identification of lightning strikes and alternation of action patterns. 
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his fishing gear does not differentiate between species enacting similar action patterns, he will 
catch bycatch. When this bycatch has been assigned its own regulatory catch limit, and catching 
too much of it can constrain how much target species captains can catch, the heterogeneous 
aggregation is “hot.” Thus, the “hot” in hot spot a regulatory construction imposed on 
interrelating social and natural systems. Without the regulatory imposition of the bycatch limit, 
an aggregation of multiple species would simply be a ‘spot’ in which to fish. The natural and 
regulatory components of a hot spot are explained below.  
a. The ecological creation of heterogeneous aggregations 
The type of hot spot of concern in this chapter is one that is formed by pollock and 
Chinook as they engage in similar ‘recurring action patterns.’ I use the concept of recurring 
action pattern, which I derive from the literature on routines, to better understand pollock and 
Chinook heterogeneous aggregations, and how captains interrelate with them. A routine is 
variably defined as a “pattern of behaviour that is followed repeatedly, but is subject to change if 
conditions change”  (Winter, 1964: 263), “flexible patterns offering a variety of alternative 
choices” (Koestler, 1967: 44), and “a repetitive, recognizable pattern of interdependent actions, 
involving multiple actors” (Feldman & Pentland, 2003: 96). Apparent in each of these definitions 
is the basic component of a routine - the recurring action pattern (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; 
Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011; Rerup & Feldman, 2011; Pentland, Feldman, Becker, & 
Liu,  2012). A recurring action pattern is “a coherent ecology of recurrent actions that affects the 
world in a recognizable way” (Birnholtz, Cohen, & Hoch, 2007: 316). The spatial and temporal 
organization that is the recurring action pattern is a new whole created from what would 
otherwise be a mere aggregation of activity. The whole that “is more than the sum of its parts” is 
the recurring action pattern, while the “sum” is simply the unorganized aggregation of actions 
(Buckley, 1967: 42). 
The parts of recurring action pattern are actions, patterns, and recurrences. Actions, as 
defined by Pentland et al. (2012: 1484), are “the things that actors do.” As the “elementary unit 
of social life” (Elster, 1989: 13), actions are the smallest units of analysis in social settings 
(Lofland et al., 2006). The pattern of a recurring action pattern is composed of interdependent 
actions in that the production of one is dependent on the actual or potential production of another 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Because of the interdependence of actions, one activity can only be 
understood in relation to other activities, and together they create a coherent set of characteristic 
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activities (Birnholtz, Cohen, & Hoch, 2007). In being coherent, interdependent actions 
“powerfully suggest” broader patterns of behavior (Birnholtz, Cohen, & Hoch, 2009: 143). 
Because action patterns recur over time, they become characteristic of the entity enacting them.  
Being ‘characteristic’ means that action patterns can be recognized as “the same” by those 
familiar with them, and their recurrence offers familiar observers predictability. This 
predictability allows actors to identify actions that are “in character” or “out-of-character” 
(Birnholtz, Cohen, & Hoch, 2007: 317). In other words, based on the recurrence of patterns of 
action, familiar observers can create expectations. Yet, due to the contingencies inherent in the 
passage of time and in changes in attributes of space, there is “pattern-in-variety” (Cohen, 2007). 
Thus, recurring action patterns are “subject to change if conditions change” (Winter, 1964: 263), 
yet are also flexible enough to not change their overarching character as they accommodate 
different circumstances (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Turner & Rindova, 2012). 
Both human and natural entities construct, and are constructed of, interdependent actions 
that recur over time and space. In humans these recurring action patterns are not only 
fundamental components of routines, they are also fundamental to practices (Orlikowski, 2002), 
processes of collective mind (Weick & Roberts, 1993), processes of institutionalization (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1966), and organizational capabilities (Cohen et al., 1996). In non-humans, 
recurring action patterns are labeled “life history traits” (Roff, 1992; Stearns, 1992). The non-
human recurring action patterns of certain species are what humans attempt to interrelate with in 
the interest of extracting natural materiality. The following are examples of life history traits that 
form the foundation of both fishing practice and fisheries science: 
• “Pacific cod are known to undertake seasonal migrations, the timing and 
duration of which may be variable (Savin 2008)” (A’mar, Thompson, 
Martin, & Palsson, 2013: 162) 
• “Walleye pollock in the Gulf of Alaska undergo an annual migration 
between summer foraging habitats and winter spawning grounds.” (Dorn et 
al., 2011: 151) 
• “[Adult flathead sole] exhibit a benthic lifestyle and occupy separate winter 
spawning and summertime feeding distributions on the [Eastern Bering 
Sea] shelf and in the GOA. From over-winter grounds near the shelf 
margins, adults begin a migration onto the mid and outer continental shelf 
in April or May each year for feeding. The spawning period may range 
from as early as January but is known to occur in March and April, 
primarily in deeper waters near the margins of the continental shelf” 
(McGilliard, Palsson, Stockhausen, & Ianelli, 2013: 614) 
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As these statements suggest, it is the recurring action patterns of certain species, primarily the 
recurring action patterns that form significant aggregations, that enables them to be a profitable 
target of fishing activity.  
Little is known about recurring Chinook salmon action patterns outside of what is derived 
from their interception either as target fish in directed Chinook fisheries or as bycatch in other 
fisheries (NPFMC, 2011). After spending their first three months to two years in freshwater, 
Chinook spend from one to five years in the ocean before returning to the same river in which 
they were hatched to spawn (they are anadromous species that die after spawning). These ‘runs’ 
of Chinook salmon recur annually from May through July (NPFMC, 2011). Chinook target 
fisheries, including commercial, sport, personal use, and subsistence fisheries, form each year at 
the mouths of various large river systems based on these recurring action patterns. Although 
Chinook do not feed during this migration, when Chinook are feeding their primary diet is 
eupheusiids, i.e., krill, and they have also been found to prey on immature pollock (Davis, 
Armstrong, & Meyers, 2003).  
Pollock spend their entire lives at sea, but during that time they engage in annual 
migrations between summer foraging locations and winter spawning grounds (NPFMC, 2011: 
110). The spawning portion of this larger recurring action pattern is itself a recurring action 
pattern, as the following assessment of pollock populations in the Gulf indicates: “Peak 
spawning at the two major spawning areas in the Gulf of Alaska occurs at different times. In the 
Shumagin Island area, peak spawning apparently occurs between February 15 - March 1, while 
in Shelikof Strait peak spawning occurs later, typically between March 15 and April 1” (Dorn et 
al., 2012: 56). Pollock form large aggregations during spawning periods, yet also aggregate 
during non-spawning periods, most likely interacting with aggregations of ‘feed.’ The primary 
feed source for pollock is, like Chinook salmon, eupheusiids (Dorn et al., 2013).  
It is clear from the fact that 1) Chinook are most commonly bycaught in pollock fisheries; 
2) this bycatch follows “a predictable pattern” of occurring January through April and in October 
and November (NPFMC, 2011: 116; Witherall, Ackley, & Coon 2000: 59) and 3) pollock and 
Chinook feed on the same substrate, that Chinook and pollock enact similar recurring action 
patterns. Pollock captains catch Chinook when constructing their operations according to the 
recurring action patterns of pollock, and Chinook captains catch pollock when constructing their 
operations according to the recurring action patterns of Chinook (archival data: North Pacific 
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Fishery Management Council public testimony). In the winter, pollock captains catch Chinook 
when targeting pre-spawning aggregations of pollock, and in the fall they catch Chinook when 
targeting pollock that are aggregating for other reasons, such as feeding on aggregations of krill. 
Whether they are feeding on the same substrate, or Chinook are feeding on pollock, pollock and 
Chinook tend to enact similar recurring action patterns, which form heterogeneous aggregations..  
b. The regulatory construction of hot spots 
For a heterogeneous aggregation to be ‘hot,’ however, requires the imposition of 
regulatory structure. A hot spot is a heterogeneous aggregation that contains target species and 
one or more bycatch species that have been given their own catch limits, but at a proportionally 
smaller size. If captains are fishing from an aggregation within which the ratio of target species 
to a certain bycatch species is smaller (i.e., more bycatch species in relation to target species) 
than the ratio of available target species quota to the limit that is available to catch that bycatch 
species, captains can reach the bycatch limit before catching their target species quota. Thus, the 
smaller limit can act as a constraint on captains’ ability to catch all of their target species quota. 
The regulatory logic is that this potential constraining effect will incentivize captains to construct 
their operations to curb how much they catch of that bycatch species. Certain ‘prohibited 
species’ in federal Alaskan fisheries have been given their own catch limits, and are intended to 
have this effect on fishing behavior. 
Prohibited species are species that tend to be caught along with federally managed 
groundfish species (i.e., pollock, cod, flatfish, rockfish), which are the types of species trawl 
captains fish for, but which are also managed as target species by other regulatory bodies. Thus, 
the prohibited species in federal groundfish fisheries are themselves targets of other ‘directed 
fisheries,’ but these other fisheries are managed by another governing entity. The prohibited 
species in federal Alaskan groundfish fisheries are the Alaskan salmons (Chinook, chum, coho, 
sockeye, pink), Pacific halibut, Pacific herring, king crab, and tanner crab. The State of Alaska 
manages directed fisheries for king and tanner crab, all salmons, and herring, and both the US 
and Canada jointly manage halibut through a treaty organization. Prohibited species must be 
discarded either at sea or by the processing plant, or they can be given to a food bank. The 
prohibited species approach to bycatch management is the product of a chain of historical 
political events that captured contemporaneous directed fisheries and institutionalized them in 
regulations, which continue to structure how fisheries are managed today.       
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The reason the State of Alaska manages crab, salmon, and herring, and the US and 
Canada jointly manage halibut, is a product of the historical development of political entities and 
the concomitant historical development of fisheries. Salmon and herring fisheries developed in 
the late 1800s in coastal Alaskan waters, and crab fisheries developed in the 1950s in the Bering 
Sea, emerging later further south in the Gulf (Woodby et al., 2005). Between Alaska’s purchase 
from Russia in 1867 and its statehood in 1959, the federal government managed the territory’s 
natural resources. Historians characterize federal fisheries management in Alaska in this period 
as “weak, poorly funded, and ineffectively enforced” (Woodby et al., 2005: 2). One of the forces 
driving Alaska’s movement toward statehood, inherent in which was Alaskans’ desire to ”seize 
control of their own destiny, free of outside interests” (Owens & Shively, 2010: 194), was taking 
“management control of its fishery resources from the federal government” (Woodby et al. 2005: 
2). Natural resource policy, therefore, “played a central role” in the territory’s constitutional 
convention (Owens & Shively, 2010: 1995). Upon becoming a state, Alaska took the reins of 
management of fisheries that local Alaskans engaged in, but which until then been managed by 
the federal government.  
Pacific halibut fisheries developed in the North Pacific in the late 1800s, both in US and 
Canadian territorial waters and in “extra-territorial waters.” The International Pacific Halibut 
Commission (IPHC) was created by a treaty between the US and Canada in 1923, and since 1930 
the IPHC has managed halibut fisheries in the coastal and extra-territorial waters of the US and 
Canada. Thus, when Alaska became a state, the Pacific halibut fisheries established in its coastal 
and extra-territorial waters were already managed partly by another country, and therefore 
beyond the grasp of the newly created state. The seeds of the prohibited species concept, 
however, can be seen in the development of the IPHC. The 1919 draft of a halibut treaty, which 
was an outgrowth of the 1918 Canadian-American Fisheries Conference, contained a provision 
that “restricted sale of halibut taken incidentally to other fishing” (Bell, 1981: 148). Yet, it was 
not until 1944 that the IPHC prohibited the targeting of, and limited the incidental catch of, 
halibut by trawl vessels (Bell, 1981), creating a de facto prohibited species designation.  
While the species that are designated as prohibited species in federal groundfish fisheries 
are the targets of fisheries that developed as early as the late 1800s, the federal groundfish 
fisheries did not develop into major domestic commercial fisheries until the mid-to-late 1980s. 
Prior to this period, pollock, cod, and flatfish fisheries were fished by foreign fleets, primarily 
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Russian and Japanese operations in the Bering Sea, and were managed through international 
agreements and treaties, such as the International Convention for High Seas Fisheries of 1959. 
But domestic shrimp and red king crab stocks in the Gulf crashed in the late 1970s, stocks which 
had, since the 1950s, supported “large and historically important commercial fisheries” (Woodby 
et al. 2005: 25). This crash is largely attributed to a climate-induced shift from a cold to a warm 
water regime, an outgrowth of which was an “ecological community reorganization” in Gulf 
waters. This reorganization is evidenced in the precipitous increase of groundfish catch in the 
mid to late 80s that followed a precipitous decrease in shrimp and red king crab catch in the early 
to mid 80s (Anderson & Piatt, 1999).  
In a sociological process occurring somewhat parallel to the Gulf ecological community 
reorganization, the US Congress was crafting the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act (MSA), which it passed in 1976. The MSA is the organic act for all federal 
fisheries, and has four primary provisions. First, the law established eight Regional Fishery 
Management Councils, whose cumulative jurisdictions cover all the coastal waters of the US. 
One of these councils, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council), manages 
federal Alaskan fisheries. The Council is made up of 11 appointees who represent fishing 
industries from Alaska and Washington, and four additional members consisting of heads of state 
and federal fisheries agencies, the Coast Guard, and an interstate fisheries commission. Second, 
the MSA requires all councils to create Fishery Management Plans (FMP) for the fisheries under 
their jurisdictions. Third, the FMPs are to be constructed so that the enactment of a fishery 
complies with ten National Standards. The two National Standards that heavily influence bycatch 
management are the following: 
1. Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while 
achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery. 
9. Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (A) 
minimize bycatch, and (B) to the extent bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the 
mortality of such bycatch. (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2007: 58-59) 
The Council implemented its first FMP in 1978, which was for the Gulf of Alaska. In 1982 the 
Council produced the Bering Sea FMP. The Gulf FMP has been amended 95 times, and the 
Bering Sea FMP has been amended 99 times. In an early effort to balance the competing 
demands of National Standards 1 and 9, in 1982 a Bering Sea FMP amendment designated 
Chinook salmon a prohibited species on foreign vessels trawling in US waters off Alaska, and 
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established a prohibited species catch (PSC) limit. As described by Witherell and Pautzke (1997: 
16), “Any nation that exceeded their salmon allocation would be prohibited from fishing in much 
of the Bering Sea for the remainder of the season. This amendment set a precedent for fleetwide 
catch limits at trigger areas or entire fisheries closures.” The next year, through another FMP 
amendment, this prohibited species designation was extended to domestic vessels fishing in the 
Bering Sea, and a domestic PSC limit was enacted. PSC limits act as a bank account for fishing 
for target species: as long as captains have enough PSC limit available to support fishing for a 
species whose action patterns are similar to prohibited species’ action patterns, meaning that the 
captains will likely catch one when fishing for the other, they can fish. When the PSC limit runs 
out, fishing ceases. Thus, PSC limits are the product of the regulation of two species that are 
managed in directed fisheries by different agencies, but which tend to enact similar recurring 
action patterns. Yet, while pollock and Chinook enact similar action patterns in the Gulf just as 
they do in the Bering Sea, the Council did not enact a PSC limit in the Gulf until the Western 
Gulf bycatch event.  
Fourth, the MSA created the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). For the preponderance of 
the resource management era prior to the MSA, the US’s territorial waters extended three miles 
offshore. Then in 1966 Congress added a nine-mile contiguous fishery zone adjacent to its 
territorial waters. This act relegated the three-mile zone to state control, and the adjacent nine 
miles to federal control. The MSA expanded the US’s territorial waters, now the EEZ, to 200 
miles offshore. This action, accompanying the ecological community reorganization, consigned 
to the US some of the largest and most productive fisheries in the world.  
The current organization of intercepted fish into target and prohibited species categories 
is largely the result of the regulatory capture of moments in the historical development of 
fisheries rather than our full scientific understanding of ecological systems. The fisheries that 
existed prior to the 1976 passage of the MSA and creation of the EEZ were locked-in to their 
existing management agencies, regardless of their location relative to the EEZ’s boundary 
between state and federal waters, while the fisheries that developed afterward are managed 
according to the spatial location of fishing effort relative to the EEZ. Thus, crab fisheries, which 
occur in both state and federal waters, are managed by the State of Alaska (with federal oversight 
in the Bering Sea); halibut fisheries, which occur in both state and federal waters, are managed 
by the IPHC; and salmon and herring fisheries, which only occur in coastal waters, but which are 
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regularly intercepted in significant numbers in federal waters (herring only in terms of the Bering 
Sea), are managed by the State of Alaska. Meanwhile, pollock, cod, and flatfish fisheries, which 
developed as large-scale domestic fisheries after the passage of the MSA, are managed by both 
state and federal agencies depending on spatial patterns of fishing effort.11 The species that were 
the target of major fisheries that developed prior to the MSA became prohibited species in 
fisheries that developed after the MSA, without regard to spatial location of fishing effort in 
relation to the EEZ. 
4. The At-sea Enactment of Lightning Strikes 
The previous discussion of this event focused primarily on its historical regulatory roots. 
The following discussion is empirical, and is structured to align with the two parts of the event: 
the at-sea portion that created a large-scale catch of Chinook salmon, and the on-land portion 
aimed at preventing future events.12 In terms of the at-sea portion, first I analyze the hot spot that 
formed in the Western Gulf in October 2010. Then I examine the sensemaking processes that 
enabled lightning strikes to be created from this hot spot, and that also fostered the unchecked 
proliferation of lightning strikes into the largest bycatch event, including the largest waste of 
Chinook salmon, in the recorded history of Gulf groundfish fisheries. Next, I analyze the 
regulatory process through which the Council imposed a Chinook bycatch control structure on 
the Gulf trawl fleet. This structure was designed to prevent future interactions of fishing effort 
and hot spots from recurring as large-scale bycatch events.  
a. Creating pathway A 
On October 1, 2010, 20 vessels set out to fish for a pollock quota of 7,577 tons in the 
Western Gulf regulatory fishing area. The average length of this season is 12 days (2001 - 2010), 
ranging from as fast as a 3-day fishery to as slow as a 31-day fishery. In 2010, NMFS ‘in-season’ 
fisheries managers, who track catch rates (both target and PSC) and open and close fisheries to 
11 There are no flatfish fisheries in State waters due to a ban on bottom trawling, with exception of a small 
flatfish fishery in Southeast Alaska, but which has not been fished since 1999 (Woodby et al., 2005). 
12 Unless otherwise noted in the text, the data sources for these analyses are interviews and public 
testimony at the four pertinent Council meetings. The data below are identified by regulators, industry 
members, and community stakeholders. Industry members consist of two primary groups that organized 
in response to this issue: pollock trawl and salmon groups; data within these groups are further 




                                                 
both avoid overfishing and to maximize optimal yield, first closed the fishery at noon on the 9th. 
This closure was based on a prediction as to when the fleet would reach their pollock quota.  Due 
to the amount of target quota left after the 9th, in-season managers re-opened the fishery on the 
14th for a pre-determined three days of fishing. In the first eight days of the fishery, the fleet 
caught 7,300 tons of pollock and 24,000 Chinook, and in the last three days the fleet caught 900 
tons of pollock and 4,000 Chinook. The bycatch rate in the first opening was 3.32 Chinook per 
ton of pollock, and in the second opening it was 4.55 Chinook per ton of pollock.  
In the sections below, I discuss this at-sea portion of the event first in terms of the 
materiality that captains described interacting with during this fishery (aggregations and ocean 
bottom), and second in terms of the sensemaking processes within that interaction that allowed 
lightning strikes to cumulate into a large-scale bycatch event.  
i. The Western Gulf hot spot 
When captains fish in the fall Western Gulf pollock fisheries, they organize their fishing 
practice with certain recurring action patterns of pollock, which are primarily defined by their 
spatial and temporal attributes. As described in chapters Two and Three, a fishing process 
consists of captains choosing a spot to fish in, and within that spot searching for and selecting an 
aggregation to fish from. Pollock are known to aggregate in two or three areas in the fall in the 
Western Gulf, and year after year captains steam to these areas, enacting their own recurring 
action patterns in order to fish from those aggregations, from which emerge recurring interaction 
patterns.  
Yet, Chinook salmon tend to enact similar action patterns that pollock enact. Such 
heterogeneously-enacted, homogeneously-presented natural action patterns are at the heart of the 
following reason a Western Gulf captain gave the Council for the high amount of Chinook 
bycatch in the 2010 D season: “My fear is that we are catching lots of them because there are 
lots of them.” The NMFS in-season manager who opened and closed the fishery made a similar 
observation during a discussion at the December 2010 Council meeting, which was the first 
meeting held after the at-sea portion of the event:   
Council member: “As someone who has observed this for quite some time now, 
do you have any observations or insight as to why the big increase [in Chinook 
bycatch] from 2009 to 2010?” 
NMFS in-season manager: “I think that there was just a lot of salmon in the Gulf 
in 2010, and that it fluctuates from year to year. . . as far as I’m aware in the 
Western Gulf most of those vessels were fishing in the same area. I don’t think 
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that there's been reports of fishing in different areas than usual.” 
Captains fish at the level of action pattern, and organize their operations based on the recurrence 
of those action patterns, but those action patterns may also be enacted by species that they do not 
want to catch, for doing so may limit their ability to catch their quota of target species.  
The type of heterogeneously-enacted, homogeneously presented aggregation captains 
tend to fish from in the Western Gulf is a ‘feed band.’ Feed bands are large, dense aggregations 
of multiple species that form to feed on a large mass of krill (which is itself aggregating for its 
own reasons). These aggregations appear on captains’ sonar displays as horizontal bands (see 
Figure 24). A trawl captain describes feed bands in general in the following: “Most of the time 
Figure 24: Sonar depictions of feed bands of pollock from the same space; the top picture is the daytime, the 
bottom is the ensuing night time. The straight horizontal line in the middle of each picture is the ocean 
bottom and the blotches rising up from the bottom are bands of pollock (and other intermixed species).  
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that’s where the fish is. Your net only pulls out the big stuff.” Another trawl captain describes 
interacting with Western Gulf feed bands in the following:  
“We have really thick feed bands. . . . We look for what we call, sign, we are 
looking for feed. Guys will say, ‘It looks like a bunch of feedy crap’ or ‘It’s a lot 
of something.’ Nobody says, ‘It’s a lot of pollock.’ Or as one guy said, ‘If 1% of 
this is pollock, we’re doing good.’ You just can’t tell using your electronics.”  
Furthermore, these feed bands display their own recurring patterns of behavior, which several 
trawl captains described to the Council, an example of which is the following:  
“During the day there are two distinct bands – you see the feed band and then you 
see the fish band. At night it’s all one band, everything kind of, we call it, it 
‘blows up.’ It all becomes one big band.”  
Figure 24 demonstrates the pollock feed bands captains see on their sonar display, differentiated 
by day as sitting on the ocean bottom, and by night as having lifted off the bottom and expanded 
in size.  
Yet, according to captains’ testimony, the feed bands they encountered in October 2010 
tended to not display typical action patterns. As one captain described to the Council,  
“A lot of the time in this D season the feed and the pollock never did separate in 
the daytime. Like [another captain] said, there was so much feed that we basically 
went the entire D season and never saw a pollock. You just towed and hoped there 
was pollock in the feed. I mean you couldn’t avoid it.” 
Captains entered the D season pollock fishery in the Western Gulf, found a feed band, and fished 
from it much the way they had in previous D seasons. Although there were apparent differences 
in terms of the size and behavior of the feed band, these were not differences that incited captains 
to change how they constructed their fishing operations. Captains recurrently enacting typical 
operational action patterns.  
Aggregations of pollock and Chinook were not the only natural materiality captains were 
interrelating with in the at-sea portion of the Western Gulf Chinook bycatch event. Captains also 
built their operations in relation to the ocean bottom. As described in Chapter Two, aggregations 
of different species tend to interrelate with certain bottom types. In the Western Gulf, pollock 
tend to recurrently form aggregations, which are sufficient to fish from, in only two or three 
areas of the bottom. Further, captains also stated that pollock tend to be in only one of those 
areas at a time, as the following captain states: “There's not a vast amount of square miles where 
we fish, there's the predominant areas, so if you are not here, you are there.” In the following a 
Western Gulf captain describes the relationship between fishing areas, pollock aggregations, and 
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catching Chinook: 
“There are two areas that produce, and I’m just shooting from the hip, 80% of the 
pollock here. And typically there is not fish in both areas - if the fish are in one, 
they are not in the other - they are not in both areas at the same time. So you 
either catch Chinook salmon, or you don’t fish.”  
As this quote suggests, the fact that captains recurrently organize their operations according to 
the recurring action patterns of their target species means that, reciprocally, the recurring action 
patterns of their target species limits the fishing operations captains can construct. In the Western 
Gulf Chinook bycatch event, at least one of the two or three areas in which pollock typically 
aggregate contained a heterogeneous aggregation born of overlapping pollock and Chinook 
action patterns.   
Table 9, drawing from personal interviews and statements both pollock and salmon 
captains made during the Council process following this event, provides quotes that describe the 
natural conditions that occur in the Western Gulf pollock fisheries. The quotes expand from 
describing overlapping pollock and Chinook action patterns to overlapping pollock, Chinook, 
whales, and krill action patterns, to feed bands, and they expand from describing natural 
conditions in the Western Gulf during the event, to the Western Gulf more generally, to the 
broader Gulf of Alaska. The table also includes quotes that describe pollock action patterns 
forming in relation to only two or three bottom areas in the Western Gulf, including how these 
interrelationships limit where captains can fish.   
Table 9: Characteristics of overlapping pollock and Chinook action patterns, as well as 
characteristics of how captains interact with them, in pollock and salmon fisheries, in the 
Western Gulf and in the broader Gulf of Alaska 
Characteristic Source Representative quote 
Overlapping 
action patterns of 
pollock and 




“Based on my 35 years of salmon fishing, what I think what we 
saw this year was a huge abundance of king salmon, it was spoken 
to when they were talking about the fishing in Cook Inlet in 
October. Where those fish came from, or how they got there, that’s 
the first thing we have to look at. . . .  I don’t deny it’s a problem. 
Nobody like bycatch, nobody that fishes pollock out there likes 
bycatch.” 
Overlapping 




in the broader 




members (3)  
Council member: “The Western Gulf had a major increase above 
their average bycatch last October; apparently the conditions were 
such that there was a lot of feed, a lot of pollock, a lot of king 
salmon. Were you fishing at all in Kachemak Bay in last October, 
and did you notice the same thing? Can you give us any insight 
into as to why that spike in king salmon occurred?” 
Salmon captain: “I was, and I think we talked about this in 
December. It was phenomenal, and it is a lot of times in October 
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in the fall, a lot of things conspire to make that a wonderful thing. 
It’s not every year, the Coho population goes up and down too. 
There’s always variables in fishing. . . .” 
 
Council member: “Do you ever fish in the Glacier Spit, the Bera 
Cove area in June for summer kings?” 
Salmon captain: “The refrigerator hole? Of course” 
Council member: “Isn’t it true that at that time you go through a 
lot of bait because there’s a tremendous amount of pollock up 
there, but the kings tend to be so large that its actually worth it to 
stay in that mixed group?” 
Salmon captain: “I carry a lot of bait during that time” 
 
Council member: Do you do salmon charters in [Katchemak] bay 
there? 
Salmon captain: Salmon and halibut  
Council member: Because I know I do a lot of sport trolling there 
and a last couple of months I noticed a really high incidence of 
pollock and really high incidence of king salmon in Katchemak 
Bay, and I don’t know if that’s just me getting lucky or is 
everybody noticing the same thing 
Salmon captain: its been a good fall, its been a good fall, and there 
is a high incidence of pollock, you are right 
Council member: It just seems like, that’s, I don’t know what you 
make of that. I’m not trying to be scientific about it but I noticed 
it, they seem to hang together. There’s a lot of bait in the water 
and they all showed up at the same place, same time 









“We are giving a short overview of a cooperative [research vessel] 
survey of our region that we have been associated with. We are 
presenting this in order to show that the high catch of Chinook 
may relate to unusually high forage fish activity. The survey was 
developed to assist the National Marine Fisheries Service Gulf of 
Alaska pollock survey by investigating the variation and 
distribution of pollock. Recently the survey has been expanded to 
survey krill and forage fish. And in 2010 marine mammal 
observations were added. Preliminary results of the 2010 survey 
indicated that krill abundance was very high in 2010 and the 
biomass of pollock and forage fish presumably accounted for the 
high abundance if Chinook in the survey area. The survey [vessel] 
captured a total of four Chinook during its test tows. Normally one 
or two are taken over the course of the survey. . . It should be 
recognized that this was an anomalous year and that the Chinook 
appeared to be much more abundant than in previous years.” 
 
“If you look back on some of [the data], the hot spots here, they 
are always moving. It doesn’t happen in the same place from year 
to year. It goes with where the feed is and where the currents are 
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and different things. “ 
Overlapping 
action patterns of 
pollock, krill, and 






“This year with my boat I went back and forth across the north end 
of the Shumigans (which are islands in the Western Gulf) quite a 
bit and the ecosystem has changed. There are a lot of fin-backed 
whales that I’ve never seen before except the last couple of years 
with a huge biomass of feed, and that’s where some of the pollock 
boats fish. I think they are capelin myself and we did catch some 
in the harbor in Sand Point when the whales were around. . . .” 
Overlapping 
action patterns of 
pollock, Chinook, 
and krill forming 
feed bands  
Trawl 
captains (2) 
“The problem I saw in this last October was the Chinook seemed 
to aggregate in the feed band, which at night lifts up. . .I think the 
key is the timing – day or night.” 
 
“You notice that you are on the grounds and the feed layer is here 
and the fish are below that and then at night the fish start coming 
up, so the fish come up at nighttime and they are in that feed layer. 
. . “ 
(Non)Recurring 
feed band action 
patterns  
Trawl 
captains (2)  
“We have really thick feed bands, but this fall I did not see it. Two 
years ago (2010) the ocean was alive, that was the year we 
massacred the king salmon.” 
 
“In a normal year the smaller pollock congregate with the feed 
higher in the water column and the larger pollock aggregate near 
the bottom. . . .how it looked for us this year (2010), it was very 
hard to distinguish pollock from the feed. . . “ 
Recurring 
pollock action 
patterns in terms 
of bottom types 




























“There’s not a vast amount of square miles where we fish, there’s 
three predominant areas, so if you are not here, you are there.” 
 
“We’re limited in areas that we can fish. . . I’ve fished [in the 
Central Gulf], and we’ve towed over 50 miles in one direction. 
The longest tow we have in the Western Gulf, where our fish is 
traditionally caught in C and D seasons, is about eight miles long. 
And a lot of times there will only be fish on half the tow, so it will 
work an area of maybe six miles long. We just don’t have a lot of 
options if we identify that as a hot spot.”   
 
 “I’m gonna be a bit loose with gestimates here, but there’s 
basically 2 trenches, one north of Sand Point, one south of Sand 
Point, and 80% of the pollock is taken out of those two trenches. 
And sometimes the only place there will be fish is in one of those 
two trenches. And we will take the C and D quota or the A and B 
quota out of that one area. If there happens to be a high abundance 
of salmon when the fish is available, I just don’t see us agreeing to 
not fish there.” 
 
 
Council member: “From your experience over the years, are you 
are aware of changes in fishing patterns in different areas 
compared to the past?  And this is just expressing my lack of 
understanding about the fishery, but are people really fishing in 




years, or has there been some or any change where people are 
fishing knowing possibly that they have had trips with high 
amounts of bycatch in particular areas? 
Trawl captain: “The fleet is fishing pretty much where we always 
fish. . .  The salmon move around. If you look back on the hot 
spots here, it’s always moving.  It doesn’t happen in the same 
place from year to year.  It goes where the feed is and where the 
currents are and different things. . . When the gun goes off, once 
you start fishing, our seasons are so short, it’s really hard to move 
the stop and move an area. . . and so we’re pretty much fishing the 
same areas, and that’s what is driving it. 
 
ii. Expectations of lightning strikes 
When captains fished in the 2010 Western Gulf D season pollock fishery, they 
encountered a hot spot. By fishing from that hot spot, they incurred lightning strikes. Lightning 
strikes are unpredictable yet relatively large catches of a prohibited species, and are usually 
limited to one vessel (unless they go unchecked). The following are two descriptions of lightning 
strikes captains incurred in this event:  
“There was a boat my size that had horrible [Chinook bycatch] numbers, and I have 
no clue why, because I was pretty much towing where he was towing.” 
 
Interviewer: “What was the first clue that something was going on out there?” 
Trawl captain: “When I hauled back and had an assload of salmon in my net.” 
Incurring a lightning strike of Chinook salmon while fishing for pollock is one of the primary 
reasons captains repeat the axiom, ‘You never know until you tow.’ Captains know they will 
incur lightning strikes, but they cannot predict when, or even where. Therefore, they are only 
aware they have incurred a lightning strike after they have been struck. An example of a 
lightning strike from outside of this event occurred in a 2011 pollock fishery in the Central Gulf. 
In this case, several trawl vessels were fishing from the same aggregation, but only one vessel 
caught a large amount of Chinook salmon bycatch. As this captain commented in a fleet meeting, 
“There is no rhyme or reason to the salmon. I had the highest salmon numbers, and I was fishing 
right there with everyone. So if I had reported my numbers, everyone would have left!” (personal 
observation). What this captain means is that the other captains fishing from the same 
aggregation would have unnecessarily used fuel and time if they moved based on his Chinook 
bycatch numbers. 
Nonetheless, while captains ‘never know until [they] tow,’ as chapters Two and Three 
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demonstrated, captains engage in abductive sensemaking to create a workable level of certainty 
before they tow. Workable levels of certainty take the form of expectations when they are used 
to enact organizing processes (Weick 1995). Expectations are assumptions about how the world 
will react to our actions. They affect what we notice, consider, react to, and remember (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007). Built from understandings of what past events were, expectations are 
predictions of what future events will be; they bridge the past and the future, and help us 
organize our experience by suggesting the probable course of events (Weick, 1995). In contexts 
characterized by obscured and hidden complex systems, to expect that something will happen is 
to propose a hypothesis (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007: 25). As Chapter Two demonstrated, the 
production of a hypothesis in this context is an abductive process.  
 The recurrence of pollock action patterns offers captains the predictability that allows 
them to create hypotheses as to what will come next. Only after acting on hypotheses, however, 
can captains assess whether their expectations were appropriate. Through expectations, captains 
act their way into understanding, and only in retrospect can they understand how accurate their 
expectations were. It is from hypotheses shown to have a workable level of accuracy predicting 
action patterns that captains construct their operations so that they can ‘tow before they know.’ 
The question is, did captains expect to catch high levels of Chinook in the 2010 D season in the 
Western Gulf?  
To analyze captains’ expectations, I divide them into two temporal categories: distal and 
proximate. Distal expectations in this context are derived from past fishing seasons, and 
proximate expectations are built within a current fishing season, either from a previous tow in the 
same trip or a from a previous trip. Both can be based on one’s own or another’s experience, as 
Chapter Three demonstrated. To understand the past experience that could have informed 
captains’ distal expectations for catching high amounts of Chinook in the 2010 D season, I 
examine at the amounts of Chinook captains caught within the same year and across years 
(according to personal communication with NMFS in-season managers, typically the same 
captains fish the Western Gulf C and D seasons in the same year and across years). Thus, I look 
at the 2010 C season, as well as across past D seasons.  
The 2010 C season pollock fishery in the Western Gulf is regulatorily slated to open at 
noon on August 25th to and close on noon October 1, or when in-season managers predict the  
fleet will catch the pollock quota. In 2010 the pollock quota for the C season was the same as the 
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D season (7,570 tons), and in-season managers closed 
the C season on September 16th. While the  
number of days the fleet fished in the C season was 
double the number fished in the D season,  
 the amount of Chinook the fleet caught was 16 times 
fewer (1,800, at a rate of 0.18 Chinook per  
ton of pollock). Therefore, it is unlikely that captains 
created expectations for catching high amounts of 
Chinook in the D season, which would open a mere 
15 days later, based on the amount they caught in the 
C season, and the rate at which they caught it.  
Captains also could have formed expectations 
about the amount of Chinook they might catch in the 2010 D season from their experiences in 
previous D seasons. The 2009 D season, however, was also an extreme bycatch event, but in the 
opposite direction of the 2010 D season. While the pollock quota in the 2009 D season was a 
little more than half the 2010 D season quota (4,391 tons), the amount of Chinook caught was 
155 times less (180 fish), at a rate of 0.03 Chinook per metric ton of pollock. In fact, the amount 
of Chinook caught in all four pollock seasons in the Western Gulf in 2009 was a mere 441 fish.  
But captains may have formulated expectations for the 2010 D season based on a broader 
range of past pollock D seasons. The average amount of Chinook trawl captains caught in the 
Western Gulf D seasons in the six years prior to 2009 was comparatively low, even if somewhat 
variable (see Table 10). Thus, quantitative data suggest that captains likely did not expect to 
catch a high amount of Chinook bycatch in the 2010 D season, even though through the years 
Chinook bycatch amounts were variable. Qualitative data also support this suggestion, as the 
following interaction between a Council member and a Western Gulf captain suggests:   
Council member: “It seems that in the Western Gulf there was fair consistency of 
Chinook catch over time, with some variation - 2005 was up a little bit all across 
the Gulf. So was there anything different about 2010 relative to the activity in 
these other years? Because I think the Western Gulf was very, not level 
necessarily, but had a consistent rate of Chinook bycatch in all years except 2005 
prior to the 2010 season.” 
Trawl captain: “So you are asking me if I thought there was anything different?” 
Council member: “Yes” 
Trawl captain: “We were blindsided. We were commenting amongst ourselves, 
 
Table 10: Historical pollock and 
Chinook catches and Chinook bycatch 
rates in the Western Gulf D season  








2010 8,168 28,203 3.45 
2009 5,196 178 0.03 
2008 6,065 623 0.1 
2007 6,998 1,519 0.021 
2006 6,462 1,928 0.3 
2005 12,425 4,356 0.37 
2004 7,894 1,418 0.18 
2003 4,718 75 0.02 
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‘Where are all these salmon coming from?’ . . . Did I see anything that I thought 
was different? No. Again, we were like, ‘Where are all these coming from?’”  
In terms of expectations based on distal experience, both quantitative and qualitative data suggest 
that captains did not expect to encounter a high amount of Chinook salmon in the 2010 Western 
Gulf D season.  
Another type of expectation is more proximate in terms of the hypotheses captains form 
from one fishing trip, or tow within a fishing trip, to the next. In terms of formulating hypotheses 
from one trip to the next, based on the total amount of actual pollock catch in the event (8,168 
tons), the number of vessels fishing (20), the Gulf-wide regulatory limit on how much vessels 
can deliver each trip (300,000 pounds), and personal interviews, we can assume that on average 
captains made three fishing trips in this event. Three trips from the dock, to the fishing grounds, 
and back to the dock to unload means that on two occasions captains headed back out to fish 
after delivering their catch to a processing plant. In the following, a trawl captain describes to the 
Council their fishing process as it extends from one trip to the next:  
“First of all I want to kind of give an overview of what happens when we go 
fishing. We go out fish, the fish go in the [net], we bring them aboard, we go to 
town, we deliver. When we deliver the pump goes in the hatch, the fish come out, 
they go across the sorting table, employees from the cannery pull all the 
prohibited species, bycatch, anything that’s not pollock out of what's coming out 
of the pump. And they go into totes, the totes get weighed individually, they get 
assigned to the boat, and we go back out fishing again.”  
In addition to these steps, at some point after delivering their catch a captain is issued a ‘fish 
ticket,’ which itemizes the catch they delivered by species. One of the items on the ticket is a 
count of Chinook salmon. Thus, from this information captains could have formulated 
hypotheses about what they might catch on their next trip if they fish in the same spot they fished 
during their previous trip. Based on an assumption that captains on made an average of three 
trips, captains had two opportunities to head out to sea with knowledge of how much Chinook 
salmon they caught on their previous trip. Yet, according to captains and processing plant 
managers, it is typically on the next delivery that captains receive their fish tickets from their 
previous delivery. One captain describes the effect of this information lag in the following: “We 
literally didn't know how many Chinook we caught until a week or two after the D season was 
over.” A commonly discussed aspect of the at-sea portion of the event, by both captains and 
regulators, was untimely feedback on Chinook bycatch amounts from processing plants. This 
untimely feedback meant that captains were less likely to formulate expectations that would 
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enable them to stem the accumulation of lightning strikes into large-scale bycatch events. 
A second potential source of proximately-constructed expectations for catching Chinook 
salmon occurs between tows within the same trip. Chinook salmon bycatch becomes potentially 
visible when captains dump the contents of their net into the vessel’s fish hold. Yet, a common 
description of this process given by interviewees and public testifiers, as well as testimony from 
a NMFS manager,13 is that due to 1) the speed in which pollock are dumped from the net into the 
fish hold, 2) the spatial characteristics of the transition, in which the net tends to be directly over 
the hatch into which the fish flow, and 3) the similar size of Chinook and pollock found in a 
trawl net, it is difficult to visually differentiate salmon from pollock during this transition. One 
trawl captain describes this factor to the Council in the following:  
“What we've actually tried to explain is that on our vessels we don't get a very 
good picture of what actually is going into the fish hold. We have a very narrow 
space to work with, so we don't see a lot. Most of it just goes right in. You might 
see one [Chinook] here or there.” 
The transition between the net and the vessel fish hold is more of a potential place to perceive 
feedback on how much Chinook one is catching than an actual one. A point of discussion in the 
Council process was slowing the process of dumping the net, which captains decried due to 
stability issues that arise with having a large, heavy net on the back of the vessel. Table 11 below 
provides additional examples, taken from personal interviews and public testimony at Council 
meetings, of inhibitors of to forming proximate expectations both between trips and within a trip.   
Table 11: Inhibitors of creating proximate expectations between and within fishing trips 


















“We've all been talking about this - better information. We 
literally didn’t know how many Chinook we caught until a 
week or two after the D season was over. If we get better daily 
information from the plants we can absolutely address the 
issue.” 
 
“We didn’t have the data in a timely fashion, we didn’t even 
know there was a problem until after the D season closed.” 
 
“In the Gulf, we get after the fact bycatch accounting at the 
processing plant, and a vessel could be well into the next trip 
before we know what’s going on in the grounds.”   
13 Which I can personally verify from work experience as a fisheries scientist on board Alaskan trawl vessels 
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in other seasons 
and years 










“We need data sharing and catch accounting between the 
processors and vessels. Even during the A and B seasons we 
were not getting the hard data, i.e., fish tickets, in a reasonable 
time frame. . . we are very dependent on this information.” 
 
Council member: “Perhaps you could share with me then what 
the thinking in the fleet was in 2005 and 2006 when the western 
gulf catches were nearly double what they had been previously. 
Can you tell me what the thinking was when those blips 
occurred, and how the fleet reacted to that?”  
Trawl captain:“That goes back to your statement about poor 
information, we were just never told that it was a problem.” 
Within a fishing 


























“We came to the Council I think it was 22 years ago asking that 
these folks not be fined for bringing salmon on board because 
the problem was then, and this continues to be a problem now, 
that with small Chinook the fishermen can't see them when that 
bag goes on deck and gets unzipped down into the hold. 
Occasionally there will be a 40 pound king and you can see that 
and fishermen have thrown those overboard.” 
 
“We have no idea what’s going in our hauls.  We fill that bag 
up, pull the zipper, drop it in the well, and it all goes there. We 
thought that we would see a few salmon or something like that 
but… the talk on the grounds has been a real struggle in that 
sense.”   
 
 
Council member: “[A NMFS manager] and a lot of other 
people have allowed us how the numbers that come from the 
plant aren’t really reliable because you don’t know what 
happened at sea, we don’t know how many you tossed over at 
sea, and I just don’t know how easy it is to sort, maybe you 
could give a brief description, I guess everybody probably 
knows this, but how easy is it to discard large numbers of 
Chinook in, what is it a 30 or 40 thousand pound tow that you 
bring aboard?” 
Trawl captain: “I think that's what I was trying to explain how 
it kind of works when we go out fishing. A lot of times half of 
our delivery is still in the codend when we get to the dock. We 
fill the boat up, and then we go towing again, and we fill the 
codend up, so we have got 150k pounds in the boat and we 
have got 150k pounds in the codend to make our trip limit. So 
that still hasn’t been touched. I was looking through videos to 
try and find what I could bring to show what actually happens 
when we dump a bag. . . It’s literally, there's a zipper in the 
bottom of the net, its right over an 18 by 24 Freeman hatch, 
well you heard [the NMFS manager] even say it, it’s virtually 
impossible for us to try to sort anything out. . .” 
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Both the lack of timely feedback from processing plants and the inability to see Chinook 
at sea decreases the ability of captains to construct proximate expectations for catching high 
amounts of Chinook. It is proximately-constructed expectations that allow captains to react to 
lightning strikes and prevent them from developing into large-scale bycatch events. For example, 
it became apparent as Council members and captains discussed the event that pollock and 
Chinook action patterns overlapped less during the day than at night. One trawl captain described 
his experience with this pattern in the following:  
“The major part of the bycatch of Chinook was at night. I only made three night 
tows, but I could just tell by what was coming in the net that there was more 
Chinook in those tows, and then my fish tickets verified that. [My fish tickets 
stated] 15, 20, 30 Chinook per delivery, but in my night tows there was over 100 - 
I think 113 in one and 96 in another. So you could definitely see a difference right 
there. That would have been something easy [to change], we could all volunteer 
not to fish at night, and that's fine with me, nights are for sleeping. So if we would 
have even had the data faster, we would have known that.” 
The upshot is that if captains had received more timely feedback about what they were catching 
after delivering their catch to processing plants, perhaps they could have formulated expectations 
about where and when they would catch high amounts of Chinook on their next fishing trip. 
From those expectations they could have adjusted their operational action patterns to match the 
expected temporal action patterns of feed bands. Only with proximate expectations could 
captains adjust their action patterns with the goal of avoiding additional lightning strikes, which 
would potentially preclude the proliferation of lightning strikes into a large-scale bycatch event. 
iii. An acceptable level of ignorance  
We derive our expectations from actions, and we test our expectations when we act on 
them. Expectations built from distal or proximate past experience require cues from ongoing 
experience to confirm or disconfirm their hypotheses about what will happen. Thus, captains 
formulate hypotheses about what will happen next, but they also test those hypotheses. Such 
hypothesis-testing contributes to a sense of what is happening. When cues bracketed from 
ongoing experience support an expectation, a unit of meaning about ongoing experience is 
produced (Bruner, 1986; Weick, 1995), from which the ongoing construction of organizing 
processes (i.e., action patterns) takes shape (Weick et al., 2005). As I demonstrate in Chapter 
Three, when cues do not support an expectation or conjecture about future events, incongruence 
forms, and actors must search for alternate explanations to connect to that cue in order to resolve 
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that incongruence, and therefore make sense.  
This event demonstrates that one way of making sense is by accepting that an cue does 
not fit with expectation, and that this lack of fit is not meaningful. Thus, the cue does not rise to 
the level of creating incongruence in a captain’s abductive sensemaking, and instead is accepted 
as not surpassing an ‘acceptable level of ignorance.’ The following exchange between a Council 
member and a Western Gulf captain exemplifies the sorts of aberrant cues that captains 
perceived in the 2010 Western Gulf Chinook bycatch event, but accepted as not meaningful in 
terms of altering their sense of being able to move toward their desired future event:  
Council member: “Can you tell me was there anything markedly different 
between this year's D season where there was a clear spike in bycatch versus what 
you have seen in previous years? Were you fishing in different areas, different 
times of day, was there a difference that you could identify or was it, were the 
fish, did they seem to be more mixed together?” 
Trawl captain: “I think what we all noticed was a change in the whole area we 
call Wooly Head where we fish, it was alive with krill, or we don’t know what it 
was, we saw it on the [sonar], but it was alive. There were hundreds of whales 
there, more than we've ever seen. Something definitely changed in the whole 
ecosystem just in that little space that for some reason there was more Chinook. 
And you would see fish jumping, this was late August, middle of September, you 
would see fish jumping, and we were wondering what they were; we thought they 
might be silvers (Coho salmon), but I think they were smaller Chinook, and we've 
never seen that before. I don’t know what changed but something changed to 
bring them in like they were, there was definitely more of them around.” 
While this captain noticed differences (e.g., whales, jumping silvers, more Chinook), they were 
not differences that influenced his sense of his ability to move toward his desired future 
experience, and therefore fit within an acceptable level of ignorance. Additional examples of 
captains describing cues that did not inspire them to alter the construction of their operations are 
demonstrated in the following statements made by trawl captains:  
• “This area is usually just alive with fish and feed, and last fall it was just a dead 
zone. Usually we have a lot of whales, I know when we got that hit [of Chinook 
salmon] I counted 60 to 70 whale spouts on the horizon.”  
• “I know there was one vessel that was delivering to Dutch Harbor. . . He actually 
made the comment on the radio in October, ‘there's a lot of these silver bullets 
around.’ It got his attention. . .” 
Captains did not adjust their action patterns in relation to novel cues to construct new action 
patterns. Put differently, captains were aware of differences, but these differences were not, as 
Bateson wrote, “differences which make a difference” (Bateson, 2000: 459). Their acceptable 
 143 
ignorance allowed captains to move forward with enacting another recurrence of their own 
established action pattern, i.e., fishing where they fished before, instead of enacting a new action 
pattern.  
The data suggest, however, that at least one captain did alter his construction of action 
patterns within the event. This captain did so only after he realized he was catching high amounts 
of Chinook salmon, and therefore was able to formulate a proximate expectation that fishing 
both in a certain place and at night would likely produce high Chinook bycatch:  
Interviewer: “So you said you had a trip with a lot of salmon, and then you went 
back out and made a tow. What happened?” 
Trawl captain: “There was a lot of salmon in it. I got right on the radio, there 
were two other boats there, and [one captain] told me, 'I was over on that other 
edge further to the southwest and I didn't have that salmon problem.' Well he was 
fishing during the day, and I went over there but I didn’t get there until night. And 
low and behold I had another bad salmon tow. So I said 'Ok that's it, I can't do this 
anymore.' So I moved over to the other side of the islands and found some fish 
and wacked ‘em and it was clean as a whistle. There wasn't one salmon in it. Full 
boatload, not one. So you know, with a little communication amongst the 
fishermen.”  
Expectations are products of abductive processes, and, as this quote demonstrates, captains can 
enhance their ability to create expectations about what they will catch by enhancing their 
abductive capacity through communication. Thus, communication among participants can lead to 
an enhanced ability to build expectations about potentially catching Chinook, but the data also 
show that expectations for potentially catching Chinook can lead to increased communication, 
primarily in terms of identifying hot spots and moving to avoid those hot spots (even though 
locations to move to are extremely limited in the Western Gulf, as previous data indicate). Table 
12 provides further data on the Council’s and captains’ realization that enhanced communication, 
both among captains and between captains and processing plant managers, can enhanced the 
construction of expectations, and that enhanced expectations can in turn increase 
communication.  
Table 12: Characteristics of enhancing capacity to create expectations for potentially catching 
Chinook salmon  
Characteristic Source Representative quote 
Expectations 
built since the 








Council member: “How do you interact with your processor? What 
kind of collaboration or communication do you have with your 
processor in addition to the fish tickets?”  
Trawl captain: “I fish for Trident, and we do talk to the plant 








































little bit better. . . and keep us more aware of it I think that would 
help. . . I fished both A and B seasons (in 2011), and . . .  there is 
more awareness, like [another captain ] said, we are communicating 
with one another.” 
 
“Bycatch is a concern. It has always been a concern of mine, and I 
have noticed it to be a concern in the fleet. I think [another captain] 
spoke to it, we sort of got blindsided by this. . .  I guarantee you that 
next D season there's gonna be a lot of talk on the channel that we 
share and with our processors about king salmon,” 
 
“The fishermen, we all talk amongst ourselves, there is one general 
channel we are all on. We don’t necessarily share all of our fishing 
information, but when it comes to the possibility of losing fishing 
time because somebody has gotten into some Chinook, we are gonna 
be sharing that.” 
 
“We talk a lot [at sea] and we don’t want to be shut down. The 
biggest problem for us has been C and D season, and the C and D 
seasons in the last three, four, five years abundance [of pollock 
aggregations] really hasn’t been an issue. We could move a little bit. 
In the A and B seasons abundance is kind of an issue sometimes, and 
you get stuck fishing somewhere because that's the only place there's 
any fish - but we haven't had a Chinook problem in the winter. In the 
fall when we have a couple more places where we can actually fish, 
it’s easier. We are definitely willing to talk with each other to move 
around.” 
 
Council member: “Skippers have been up here today, including you 
guys, have all said, 'Hey, we are gonna work on this,' and I am sure 
you are. But not all of the skippers are here obviously, and not all of 
them are necessarily motivated the same way you guys are. And I am 
wondering what your suggestions are for making sure that there aren't 
just one proportion of the fleet out their changing their behavior and 
working at reducing bycatch. How do we as a council make sure that 
everybody out there is sort of similarly motivated and operating on a 
level playing field relative to bycatch reduction expectations?” 
Trawl captain: “Its hard, there's 17 of us, I mean, communication is 
everything. We only fish in a couple of different spots. We have to 
fish very close to each other most of the time. I mean, this winter the 
first question everybody asked, was, ‘Did you catch any salmon?’ 
‘Did you catch any salmon?’ ‘Did you catch any salmon?’ There was 
one spot where there was a few salmon this winter and we avoided it. 
I have to go back to fish ticket data, but I got five salmon all winter. I 
mean, I guess we will need a cap at some point, but we need to know 
how many we are catching first, and somebody needs to believe we 




b. Regulating Pathway B 
Recurring action patterns also constitute the regulatory process enacted by the Council. 
This section analyzes the action patterns the Council enacted in its response to the at-sea 
interaction patterns that produced the extreme amount of bycatch. The on-land portion of this 
event was a seven-month process that ran through four consecutive meetings, starting in 
December 2010 and ending in June 2011. Captains operate at the action pattern level, organizing 
with pollock by creating and testing hypotheses about the recurrence in time and space of their 
action patterns. In doing so, captains construct their own recurring action patterns. Together, 
pollock and captains form recurring interaction patterns at sea. The Council, whose construction 
of regulatory operations is driven by the need to uphold historically-constructed regulations that 
differentiate fisheries by species and management agency, operate at the species level. The result 
is at-sea operations that function at one level, and on-land operations that function at another 
level, and a broader fisheries management system that is more about maintaining historical 
differentiations than managing according to current ecological processes. The following traces 
the Western Gulf Chinook bycatch event through the Council process.  
The Council typically meets five times a year - February, April, June, October, and 
December - in order to create and revise fishery management plans (FMPs) and set quotas for 
upcoming years. Changes to FMPs start with a proposal from the public, a stakeholder group, 
NMFS, or the Council itself, which is presented to the Council at a meeting or in writing. The 
Council then decides whether to place the issue on an agenda for a future meeting. Once an issue 
is on a meeting’s agenda, it is elevated from a mere topic of concern to an “agenda item.” The 
Council’s process of discussion, deliberation, public testimony, motion-making, and voting on 
each agenda item strictly follows Robert’s Rules of Order.  
Although the regulatory portion of the Western Gulf Chinook salmon bycatch event 
began in earnest at the Council’s December 2010 meeting (the meeting after the at-sea portion of 
the event), the issue of Chinook salmon bycatch in the Gulf was previously a recurring agenda 
item as part of the process called ‘Gulf rationalization.’ Gulf rationalization was a four-year 
process (2003-2006) in which the Council and stakeholders worked toward developing a catch-
share plan for all groundfish fisheries in the Gulf. A primary goal of this process was reducing 
prohibited species bycatch, including Chinook salmon. Gulf rationalization was brought to a halt, 
however, when Alaska Governor-elect Sarah Palin sent the “kill letter” to the Council (see 
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Appendix A). On its face this letter advised the Council to postpone its work on Gulf 
rationalization, but in effect it created a political condition on the Council in which the Gulf 
rationalization program would not receive enough votes to pass. The Council, therefore, tabled 
that agenda item.  
The agenda item aimed at reducing Chinook bycatch in the Gulf was revivified in 
October 2007 when the Council tasked its staff analysts (fisheries scientists, economists) with 
producing a discussion paper on developing measures to reduce both crab and salmon bycatch in 
the Gulf. As is the case with all issues that the Council elevates to discussion papers, the Council 
reviews discussion papers, deliberate the issue, hears input from its industry and scientific 
advisory committees, and discusses the issue with the public during the public testimony that is 
part of every agenda item. From these discussions the Council suggests additional information 
and analyses for its staff analysts to include in the paper, as well as determines what steps to take 
next. The Council reviewed the salmon and crab bycatch discussion paper in June 2008, at which 
time it narrowed the issue to tanner crab and Chinook salmon bycatch in the Western and Central 
Gulf.  
After one or more rounds of discussion papers, the Council will vote on whether to 
elevate the item again, the next level of which is initial public review. An initial public review is 
the first formal step the Council takes when it is planning to create an amendment to an FMP. At 
this time, analytical staff will enhance the discussion paper into a formal analytical document. 
This step usually includes the construction of a problem statement and a suite of initial 
alternatives for the regulatory action the Council will ultimately take, both of which guide the 
ensuing construction of the analytical document, Council deliberation, committee input, and 
public testimony, motion-making, and voting. Thus, the Council constructs and assesses a set of 
alternatives in the interest of choosing the optimal one, all of which is made possible by a 
formalized structure of recurring action patterns.  
The Council operates as a rational system with clearly-defined goals that provide criteria 
for choosing between alternative actions, guided by explicitly formulated patterns of action 
(Scott & Davis, 2007). This formalization allows “stable expectations to be formed” by 
participants (Simon, 1997: 110). Formalization also, according Scott and Davis (2007: 38),  
enables participants or observers to diagram the social structures and the work 
flows, allowing them to depict these relationships and processes with the 
possibility of consciously manipulating them - designing and redesigning the 
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division of responsibilities, the flow of information or materials, or the ways in 
which participants report to one another.  
The Council’s action patterns are designed to be rational, and with every recurrence - with the 
process every agenda item goes through - a rational decision-making system re-emerges. 
In terms of recurring rational action patterns involving Chinook salmon bycatch, the 
Council further reviewed the evolving tanner crab and Chinook salmon bycatch discussion paper 
at multiple meetings, split the issue, and in April of 2010 the Council scheduled its next 
discussion of the paper for its December 2010 meeting. At the June 2010 meeting, this 
discussion was changed to “tentative” on the Council’s public calendar. After the October 
meeting, which was held before the outcome of the Western Gulf D season pollock fishery was 
known, the discussion of the Chinook salmon bycatch paper scheduled for the December 
meeting was still tentative. 
At the December 2010 meeting, the first meeting after the at-sea portion of the Western 
Gulf Chinook bycatch event, what was a tentative agenda item was elevated to an “expedited 
review and rule making” process. After hearing discussion of the event from NMFS in-season 
managers, discussion of Chinook bycatch amounts and patterns in the Gulf from Council and 
NMFS analysts, the council discussed the event with both trawl and salmon industries during 
public testimony. A primary goal of these discussions, and discussions at all subsequent 
meetings, was understanding the nature of captains’ fishing processes, the nature of Chinook 
ecological processes, and the nature of their interrelationship.  
At the end of the first meeting after the at-sea portion of the event, the Council tasked its 
analytical staff to elevate the Chinook salmon bycatch discussion paper to an initial review 
paper. The Council also deliberated, voted on, and passed a motion in which it divided the issue 
into a longer-term process of addressing salmon bycatch in all Gulf trawl fisheries and a shorter-
term process of addressing Chinook bycatch in Gulf pollock fisheries. In terms of the shorter-
term, “fast track” process, the Council created a problem statement and constructed a set of 
initial alternatives of regulatory actions, including a Gulf-wide limit on Chinook bycatch, called 
a ‘hard cap’, which means that when the fleet caught their limit of Chinook, all fishing for 
pollock would cease, the creation of “bycatch control cooperatives,” in which groups of vessels 
would work together to control their Chinook bycatch amounts, and other measures. Although 
creating hard caps was a common method the Council employed to control bycatch, as was 
evidenced by Pacific halibut hard caps in the Bering Sea and Gulf and Chinook hard caps in the 
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Bering Sea, bycatch control cooperatives had never been instituted by the Council.  
At the Council’s next meeting, which took place in February 2011, it reviewed its work 
plan for the expedited process, tentatively slating “final action”, in which the Council selects one 
alternative as a new regulation, for its June 2011 meeting. In February the Council also modified 
its alternatives, including providing more detail for its conceptualization of Chinook bycatch 
caps and control cooperatives, and revised its problem statement, including adding the following 
sentence: “Management measures are necessary to provide immediate incentive for the GOA 
pollock fleet to be responsive to the Council’s objective to reduce Chinook salmon PSC.” The 
logic of using incentives to control Chinook bycatch in the Gulf guided and pervaded the 
Council’s ensuing discussions, deliberations, public input, and its ultimate selection of a new 
regulatory measure. The following is illustrative of the incentive-based logic the Council used to 
integrate its action patterns with at-sea interaction patterns:  
“If there isn’t a cap, what's the incentive to change your behavior? If the council 
was to take no action, or delay action into some time in the future, what's the 
incentive to change your behavior?” 
Table 13 provides examples of both the Council’s and the public’s emphasis on incentives as a 
means to, as several Council members stated, “change behavior.” The Council enacted a 
recurring action pattern, but the goal of that process was to use incentives to manage how 
captains enact interaction patterns. 
The initial review document released for the next meeting did what all initial review 
documents do – it analyzed the initial alternative actions in much greater detail. The initial 
review presented at the Council’s April 2011 meeting was a 295-page document that included a 
Regulatory Impact Review, which is a cost-benefit analysis required by Presidential Executive 
Order, an Environmental Assessment as required by the National Environmental Policy Act, and 
an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act. In terms 
of meeting mechanics, the analytical staff presents the initial review document to the Council, 
the Council is advised of its committee’s opinions on the alternatives, and hears public 
testimony. Then the Council will deliberate and choose a preliminary preferred alternative, or 
perhaps send the document back to the analytical staff for further analyses (or both). The 
selection of a preliminary preferred alternative, which signals what will likely be the Council’s 
final action, gives stakeholders time to prepare comment before final action. Because Chinook 
bycatch issue was on the “fast track,” with final action tentatively set for the June 2011 meeting, 
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the Council both issued its initial review paper and chose a preliminary preferred alternative at 
the April 2011 meeting.  
In April the Council formally selected the preliminary preferred alternative of a Gulf-
wide hard cap of 22,500 Chinook salmon. The Council also eliminated the mandatory bycatch 
cooperative alternative from the suite of alternative actions based on a determination by NOAA 
General Council that it would be an illegal delegation of management authority to resource users. 
Other measures were also included, but are beyond the scope of this chapter. The primary 
decision left to be made at the June meeting was whether to adjust the preliminary preferred 
alternative. After further discussion of the document, public testimony, and Council deliberation, 
in June the Council took final action in which it voted to institute an annual Chinook bycatch 
limit of 25,000 in the Gulf pollock fisheries. After the Council takes its final action on any issue, 
it hands the process over to NMFS, which will begin its rule making process according to the 
Administrative Procedures Act, which governs all federal government rule making. Thus, 
regulators met their institutional requirement to “minimize” Chinook bycatch in the Gulf, “to the 
extent practicable,” over 35 years after the requirement to do so was instituted by the MSA. The 
Council did this by incentivizing captains to avoid catching one species that shares patterns of 
action with the species that they are targeting. 
i. The hard cap sensemaking incentive 
The hard cap incentive is meant to encourage captains to avoid integrating their fishing  
process with homogeneous natural action patterns that are heterogeneously created by pollock 
and Chinook. An incentive-based approach to managing behavior assumes that, “when faced 
with several courses of action, people usually do what they believe is likely to have the best 
overall outcome” (Elster, 1989: 22). Incentives are means by which rational systems control the 
behavior of its actors, which it assumes are rational as well. Thus, they are structures that link the 
system to the individual. A hard cap works as an incentive to change behavior when two species 
that are caught together, one of which can be sold, the other of which cannot, are given catch 
limits such that catching the limit of one will constrain an ability to catch the limit of the other. 
When the ratio of one catch limit to the other is smaller than ratio of abundance in which the 
species are found together in the water, captains will be in jeopardy of not being able to 
maximize their catch of the species they can sell. For example, if a catch limit ratio is 100 tons of 
pollock for every 1 Chinook, but captains are encountering 3 Chinook for every 100 tons of 
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pollock, they will run the risk of reaching their Chinook limit faster than they will reach their 
pollock limit. Thus, catching relatively high amounts of Chinook when catching pollock could 
decrease the fleet’s potential to catch the full pollock quota, thereby reducing potential economic 
gain.  
Table 13: Examples of incentive-based language in Council public testimony  
Council member: I’m concerned by your pessimism, or I guess by your unwillingness to 
acknowledge the importance of trying to find a solution, and I’m just not understanding 
why it is so impossible to at least work toward some solutions to reduce bycatch in that 
fishery. 
Trawl captain: Well first of all, I hope I’m wrong. You know I hope we get together 
and we say, “hey let’s make an attempt on excluders,” but to back up what [another 
captain] said, the fleet is, for arguments sake, divided in half. There’s half that are 
serious pollock fishermen, and then there’s another half than when fishing is good, they 
suit up.  And there has been a number of C and D seasons the last several years, where 
they’ve come out and tried it for a day or so, and it’s not been good enough, so they 
quit. . . . And I just don’t see them going to the expense and putting the effort into 
making an excluder work. . . .  You know if it were just for me, if I had a bycatch pistol 
to my head, yeah I’m going to be putting in an excluder. But to do it for someone else, 
does that make sense? 
Council member: I’ll guess I’ll follow up on your last comment: What makes you think 
that you don’t have a bycatch pistol to your head? 
Trawl captain: Ok I do have a bycatch pistol to my head. I understand that. But if only 
30% of us put in the effort and the expense to reduce bycatch, is that going to be 
enough? 
Council member: “Do you suppose then that it would be equitable for the council to try 
to establish a similar level of incentive to avoid salmon in the western gulf and in the 
central gulf by deciding how to split the cap?” 
Council member:” Skippers have been up here today, including you guys, have all said, 
'hey, we are gonna work on this,' and I am sure you are. But not all of the skippers are 
here obviously, and not all of them are necessarily motivated the same way you guys 
are, and I am wondering what your suggestions are for making sure that there aren't just 
one proportion of the fleet out their changing their behavior and working at reducing 
bycatch, how do we as a council make sure that everybody out there is sort of similarly 
motivated and operating on a level playing field relative to bycatch reduction 
expectations?” 
Council member: If there's a cap or some type of closure or some type of action that 
limits bycatch, wouldn't that create an incentive within the fleet to look at all different 
ways of reducing bycatch including gear modification versus having to mandate that?  
Because there could be many ways of reducing bycatch.   
Council member: “Do you suppose then that it would be equitable for the council to try 
to establish a similar level of incentive to avoid salmon in the western gulf and in the 
central gulf by deciding how to split the cap? 
Council member:  “How do we as a council make sure that everybody out there is sort 
of similarly motivated and operating on a level playing field relative to bycatch 
reduction expectations?” 
Council member: “If there were an incentive or a disincentive economically in the Gulf, 
don’t you think your fleet will respond and work within a bycatch cap and figure out 
how to catch the pollock?” 
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Salmon industry manager: “The 30k and the 22.5k (alternative level hard caps) are 
rewards for dirty fishing, and I think that we need the hard cap of 15k because it will 
provide the incentive to change behavior and it will also remove the complacency that 
does come into being within a couple of years, it’s like an 'oh well, it’s just a couple of 
kings' type of deal. They need to get off the hot spots, they have to stop bunching 
together, they have to slow down, they cannot have night fishing, and the fishermen do 
know what to do, and the processor needs to help the fishermen to do the right thing. . . 
Bycatch is wrong. It is unacceptable, and it is an additive impact to coastal communities 
. . . So I think the 15,000 king crown is needed so that the boys can get to work on the 
solutions of behavior . . . They know what to do, and they need the incentive from you.” 
Salmon industry manager: “We need to manage on a precautionary level, and establish 
a meaningful cap as stated in the problem statement, 'management measures are 
necessary to provide immediate incentive for the GOA pollock fleet to be responsive to 
the Council's objective to reduce Chinook salmon PSC.' The incentive lies in the cap.” 
Trawl industry manager: “The other part that I wanted to address is the idea that the 
only way you are going to get good behavior from fishermen is if you hammer them 
over the head. In Kodiak, the fishermen that I work for care about conservation. We are 
trying to be proactive on the salmon, but I realized after our experience this year that the 
only way that you are gonna get true bycatch reduction versus bycatch control is a full-
blown quota share, rationalization fishery at the pollock level. Otherwise, it’s like trying 
to collar a bunch of people who want to do the right thing but their whole livelihood 
depends on the target fish, where the money flows. . . So I have some big concerns 
about how this is gonna move forward and we all end up in the right place.”  
Trawl industry manager: “The problem that we have is that we are assumed to be the 
bad guy. We are the disobedient child that this council needs to stand up and slap up 
around to make us behave.” 
 
Yet, while the Council, beholden to its rational decision-making assumptions, took an 
incentive-based approach, this incentive was clearly intended to influence captains’ sensemaking 
at sea of potential and actual Chinook bycatch. During each meeting that comprised the on-land 
portion of this event, the Council went to great lengths to understand how captains constructed 
their fishing operations to interrelate with natural systems. The following are examples of such 
questions Council members asked trawl captains:  
• “[Captain], you have a lot of experience on both large and small boats relatively 
speaking in the trawl world. I is there a difference between the two, the way larger 
and smaller boats operate in the trawl fisheries that we need to be aware of in 
terms of bycatch, or it is it pretty much the same?” 
• “The [agency] person isn’t here today but he told us, and a lot of other people 
have told us, how the [Chinook bycatch] numbers that come from the plant aren’t 
really reliable because we don’t know what happened at sea, we don’t know how 
many you tossed over at sea; and I just don’t know how easy it is to sort [Chinook 
out of the catch at sea], so maybe you could give a brief description. How easy is 
it to discard large numbers of Chinook in, what is it a 30 or 40 thousand pound 
tow that you bring aboard?” 
 152 
• “You mentioned something that I don’t know that I have ever heard before and I'd 
like to explore a little bit, you described that you could see when you were 
making those night tows that you were getting more Chinook than you were when 
you were fishing during the day. Could you describe what you were seeing that 
told you that when you were fishing?” 
• “I know that you are restricted somewhat because the areas you can fish now for 
pollock are fewer than they were before the sea lion restrictions, so I guess my 
question is, if you are fishing and you do encounter large numbers of Chinook 
salmon, do you know that? And if so, can you communicate that to other boats” 
Do you all go to the same radio channel at some point and say ‘Hey I found a hot 
spot’? But [if you do], really is there any other place to go? I'm just sort of 
exploring what people in the fleet can do should they encounter large numbers. 
Are you aware of it, and if so, what can you do about it?” 
• “I am just wondering, now that we've got your attention, what kinds of changes 
you are thinking you will make to your pollock fishery, and your own fishing, 
next year relative to managing Chinook bycatch?” 
• “Are you thinking of net modifications at all [to avoid Chinook bycatch], like 
trying to fish with an excluder? I know it gets really tough on a small operation 
like yours, but I’m just wondering if you think it scales down at this point, or 
what?” 
After a four-meeting, seven month Council process that included questions such as those above, 
and answers to those questions provided by trawl captains, the Council homed in on several 
reasons they believed the Chinook hot spot in the Western Gulf in 2010 transitioned into a large 
scale bycatch event. Key reasons include a lack of communication among captains regarding 
material cues that actually or potentially indicate the presence of Chinook salmon, captains not 
able to see how many Chinook are in their catch as they dump the codend into the fish hold, and 
a lag in communication between processing plants and captains in terms of informing captains of 
how many Chinook they delivered in their catch prior to the captains returning to sea (often to 
the same fishing spot). The council created the Chinook salmon hard cap to incentivize to be 
more aware of cues that potentially indicate, or that actually indicate, the presence of Chinook 
salmon bycatch, to communicate those cues, and to communicate with processing plant 
managers about the amount of Chinook salmon in their previous delivery before heading back 
out on a subsequent fishing trip. In short, the Council created a rational choice theory tool in the 
form of an incentive, but their intention was to influence captains’ sensemaking at sea. They 
created a ‘sensemaking incentive.’  
In the Western Gulf Chinook salmon bycatch event, unexpected cues captains noticed 
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when they set out to fish, such as hundreds of whales, a huge feed band of pollock, krill, and 
Chinook that did not separate during the day, “silver bullets” in the catch, all went unheeded. 
This means captains did not incorporate cues from the concrete portion of their experience into 
their abductive sensemaking of where to fish, what to fish from, and where to fish next. This lack 
of incorporation of certain natural cues into their action patterns left captains selectively 
disconnected from part of the concrete portion of their experience (Figure 25). Captains told a 
story of what was happening, but it was an impoverished, selective account, based on certain 
cues from concrete experience, and in both conscious and unconscious ignorance of others due to 
their acceptable level of ignorance. The conjectures captains produced from those stories were 
routine conjectures, such as continuing to fish where they had fished before. The hard cap 
sensemaking incentive was intended to strongly encourage captains to incorporate such cues into 
their abductive sensemaking in subsequent pollock fisheries, to incorporate Chinook salmon into 
their stories of what is happening, as well as their conjectures of what to do next.  
Figure 25: Model of Abductive sensemaking in the Western Gulf Chinook bycatch 
event, characterized by a partial disconnect from concrete materiality created by not 
heeding, and not seeking, cues regarding the presence of extreme amounts of Chinook 
salmon 
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5. Conclusion  
The fisheries management system demonstrated in the Western Gulf bycatch event is 
comprised of at-sea and on-land processes of integrating action patterns from disparate systems. 
At sea, captains integrated cues from natural action patterns with their expectations for those 
patterns, built from past recurrences of natural action patterns, from which they built their own 
operational recurring action patterns. Captains used abductive processes to accomplish this 
integration. Such integration creates an emergent system of interaction patterns, and individual 
fisheries are fleet-level recurrences of these interaction patterns. Due to fishing from a hot spot 
and lack of expectations for high Chinook bycatch, as well as cues that were judged to not 
warrant a change in the enactment of established action patterns, the system created at sea 
resulted in a large-scale bycatch event.  
On land, the Council integrated species-level outcomes from the at-sea portion of this 
event into their pre-established recurring action patterns, creating another emergent system of 
interaction patterns. The Council used rational decision-making structures to make sense of 
species-level outcomes from the 2010 Western Gulf pollock D season, as well as with outcomes 
Gulf-wide pollock fisheries across multiple years. Each Council process, from agenda item to 
final action, creates an emergent system of interaction patterns. Guided by a historically-
structured system of regulations, the emergent system the Council created on land – the species-
level annual Chinook hard cap – was an incentive-based structure intended to prevent large-scale 
bycatch events from recurring. One of the primary goals of fisheries management is to control 
the extent to which the interaction of fishing operations and hot spots moves beyond lightning 
strikes and develops into large-scale bycatch events. A rational system of management assumes 
that it can shape the behavior of its actors through incentives, and influence its own inputs. 
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While the relationship between sensemaking and rational choice processes and tools 
tends to be depicted in the literature as alternative approaches to understanding the same 
phenomena (e.g., Scott & Davis, 2007; Weick, 2003), this chapter demonstrates the two as 
complementary parts of a greater whole. The trawl captains’ axiom, “You never know until you 
tow,” points to the retrospective relationship between knowing and acting. Because captains 
operate based on indeterminate inputs, they learn what they were fishing from after they have 
extracted it from the depths. The rational choice theory version of the trawl axiom would be, 
“You must know before you tow,” in which captains should know what they are towing from, at 
the species-level, before they tow from it. This version points to the prospective relationship 
between knowing and acting. Both versions are extreme retrospective and prospective aspects of 
the relationship between acting and knowing (see Figure 26). The hard cap incentive ideally 
pulls the two closer to the middle, in which regulators recognize that captains cannot know 
everything they need to know before they tow, and captains alter their action patterns to engage 
in more sensemaking in an attempt to know more before they tow than they did prior to 
operating under the hard cap. Thus, the hard cap incentive moderates the antipodal relationship 
between abductive sensemaking and rational choice approaches to creating interaction patterns. 
Fishing is contemporaneously a retrospective and prospective process. Because 
awareness of which species, and the relative abundances of species, one is catching is 
retrospective, captains must operate prospectively using expectations. As natural entities 
construct action patterns proximately in space and time, and as these action patterns recur with 
regularity over time, captains observing and interacting with these recurring action patterns are 
able to construct expectations. These expectations are hypotheses as to how their actions will 
Figure 26: Continuum of the antipodal relationship between abductive sensemaking processes and rational 
choice processes in terms of the relationship between knowing and acting; in abductive sensemaking, actors 
are acting in order to then know, and in rational choice processes, actors are acting after knowing. The hard 
cap incentive requires actors to know more before they act, and to also learn more after they act.  
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interrelate with natural action patterns, from which captains construct their own action patterns. 
When captains act on their hypotheses to enact action patterns, they create interaction patterns. 
Acting on their hypotheses generates cues that test those hypotheses, and therefore captains can 
only know the validity of their hypotheses after they have acted. This is the basis of the axiom, 
“You never know until you tow.” It is the matching of expectations and cues at a workable level 
of certainty, embedded in which is an acceptable level of ignorance, that gives captains a sense 
of what is happening. Captains’ prospective actions, which operate at the level of action pattern, 
allow them retrospective clarity at the more abstract species level. As this process repeats, the 
result at the level of action is recurring interaction patterns, and the result at the level of species 
is patterns of target catch and bycatch amounts, which are inputs to regulatory processes.  
Hot spots, ecologically-speaking, are aggregations of different species that are enacting 
similar action patterns. Regulatorily-speaking hot spots are aggregations of a target species and a 
prohibited species that has its own catch limit and which can constrain how much of the target 
species captains can catch. Bycatch is a foreseeable outcome of species-level regulation of 
action-pattern level interactions with heterogeneous aggregations. Yet, while fisheries regulators 
incentivize captains to avoid fishing from hot spots, captains can only know they have fished 
from a hot spot after one or more captains have already done so. This mismatch between species-
level regulation and action-pattern level fishing is made congruent by the logic that discard, up to 
a certain level, is an appropriate element of a bycatch management system. Prohibited species 
bycatch reduction programs in federal Alaskan fisheries, whether they are hard caps, catch 
shares, cooperatives, or mixed approaches, all rely this logic. This is why an acceptable outcome 
of the regulatory process was a rule that the Gulf trawl fleets can catch, and discard, up to 25,000 
Chinook salmon in the Gulf pollock fisheries each year (the Bering Sea trawl fleet is allowed 
55,000 Chinook each year in their pollock fisheries, which they must either discard or donate). In 
2013, a year and a half after food bank donation programs were installed in the Gulf, only 20% 
of the Chinook that was bycaught was donated. The wastage of Chinook salmon, as well as 
Pacific halibut, is due to historically-, rather than ecologically-, derived regulations.  
There is a mismatch between the level of regulatory management and at-sea operations. 
This mismatch is more a factor of the historical trajectory of regulatory development than the 
ecological nature of managed species. The product of this mismatch is great waste of life and 
resources. In the Conclusion chapter, I make recommendations for alternative approaches to 
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bycatch management, in which fisheries management systems emerge from congruent on land 
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APPENDIX A:  












“Consider the subtleness of the sea; how its most dreaded creatures glide under 
water, unapparent for the most part, and treacherously hidden beneath the 
loveliest tints of azure. Consider also the devilish brilliance and beauty of many of 
its most remorseless tribes, as the dainty embellished shape of many species of 
sharks. Consider once more, the universal cannibalism of the sea; all whose 
creatures prey upon each other, carrying on eternal war since the world began. 
Consider all this; and then turn to this green, gentle, and most docile earth; 
consider them both, the sea and the land; and do you not find a strange analogy to 
something in yourself?”  
--Melville, H. Moby Dick, p. 247 
 
1. Introduction 
 My goal in conducting this research was to provide an answer to the following question: 
How do commercial fishing managers make sense of indeterminate natural systems as they 
attempt to extract material resources from them? My purpose in conducting this study was to 
elucidate the sensemaking processes commercial fishing captains enact as they interrelate with 
natural systems at sea. In doing so, I provide an understanding of fishing processes that cannot be 
found in a fisheries management literature dominated by rational choice theory assumptions and 
frameworks, and an understanding of sensemaking that cannot be found in a literature dominated 
by social processes and artifact-based materiality. These understandings coalesce in the 
following overarching finding: In order to interrelate with natural systems that are typically 
indeterminate, commercial trawl captains move through different yet interdependent enacted 
environments during a fishing trip, each of which requires them to tell a story of present 
experience by merging abstract interpretive schemata with cues extracted from concrete natural 
phenomena, a move that is informed by past experiences of their own or other captains,’ and 
guided by desired future events. Based on that story, captains decide what to do next by 
conjecturing that a certain action will efficiently move them toward a desired future event. This 
is the abductive sensemaking event. Abductive sensemaking is the process through which 
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captains “narrow the range of ‘might occurs’” and establish “a workable level of certainty” 
(Weick, 1969: 40) in the face of the indeterminacy inherent in natural systems at sea. 
Furthermore, conjectures issuing from an abductive sensemaking event help enact future 
environments, and actors objectify and import past abductive sensemaking events into future 
enacted environments to aid sensemaking of those environments. This reciprocal process of 
making sense of natural systems enables captains to transform indeterminate natural systems into 
determinate material artifacts.  
 The practical issue this study addressed is fisheries bycatch. Bycatch, one of the primary 
concerns among fishing captain and fisheries managers, regulators, and scholars, is fish that is 
neither retained for personal use nor for sale. Most of what is bycaught in trawl fisheries does not 
survive, but is nonetheless returned to the sea, and therefore is wasted. This practical issue can be 
informed by the theoretical issues this dissertation addressed because bycatch starts out as 
‘natural’ materiality in that is can exist outside of society (Bansal & Knox-Hayes, 2012), but, 
through processes of interrelating at sea captains integrate it into social systems, at which point it 
becomes artifactual. Because the processes that produce bycatch stem from indeterminacy in the 
relationship between captains and natural systems, specifically the indeterminacy created when 
different species enact the same action patterns, the relationship between captains and natural 
systems is an appropriate subject of an abductive sensemaking analysis.  
 The empirical chapters of this dissertation unfolded as follows: I first elucidated the 
natural elements captains attempt to make sense of as they build their operations to interrelate 
with and ultimately extract resources from natural systems at sea. Then I constructed a model of 
the sensemaking processes through which captains interrelate with natural systems. Next I 
expanded that model to social processes, as well as to situations characterized by a loss of sense. 
My final move was to apply this model to a real-world event in which making sense of natural 
systems was clearly deficient and an issue of concern in the broader fisheries regulatory system.   
 I conclude the previous chapters in six additional parts. In part 2 I discuss the primary 
theoretical concepts that were both introduced to and emerged from my empirical chapters, 
namely why I used the interpretive perspective of sensemaking, the emergence of the concept of 
abduction. In this section I also discusses the embedded relationship between sensemaking and 
decision making, which is counter to how current literature describes their relationship (i.e., 
interacting yet separate), as therefore counter to how I conceptualized them in the Introduction 
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chapter. In part 3 I examine how the concepts of abduction and sensemaking work together when 
combined into one concept, the abductive sensemaking event, and analytical tool, the abductive 
sensemaking interpretive framework. Part 4 demonstrates how the abductive sensemaking 
framework works as an analytical tool by re-examining the three enacted environments explored 
in Chapter Three (i.e., plotter, sonar, catch), while also breaking down the Western Gulf Chinook 
bycatch event into those three enacted environments. In part 5 I discuss additional theoretical 
implications of the empirical chapters, namely the ‘concatenating’ model of abductive 
sensemaking, and clarifying the relationship between sensemaking and storytelling by examining 
the transition from the one abductive sensemaking moment to another. Part 6 discusses 
suggestions for future research (i.e., additional sensemaking studies conducted in natural 
resource contexts, at frontlines, and further exploration of the relationship between sensemaking 
and decision making). And finally, in part 7 I provide recommendations for practice, focusing on 
the issue of bycatch discard.  
2. Theoretical Elements of Previous Empirical Chapters 
All trawl target species enact recurring action patterns in which they aggregate in certain 
time and spaces, year after year. It is the predictability of their aggregative action patterns that 
enable them to be targets of commercial trawl fishing operations. Yet, the specific location of an 
aggregation that is sufficient for enacting a profitable fishing trip is creates indeterminacy. Trawl 
captains must not only find sufficient aggregations, but these aggregations must also be 
associated with weather that is conducive to fishing, and ocean bottom that is amenable to 
trawling. Captains must make sense not only of the location of an aggregation of a certain target 
species in time and space, they must also make sense of its relationship to other natural 
materiality, primarily weather and ocean bottom. The combination of a sufficient aggregation, 
amenable bottom, and conducive weather is a nexus of natural materiality. Trawl captains have a 
disposition to fish recurring nexuses of natural systems that enable them to move toward their 
desired future event of enacting a profitable fishing trip, and they do so recurrently. 
When setting out to fish, captains choose a spot to steam to that they feel will provide 
them with the ability to efficiently fill their vessel. When determining what to fish from, captains 
make sense of the species composition of an aggregation at that fishing spot, and set their nets 
into an aggregation, or upon a strip of bottom, they feel will provide them with the ability to 
efficiently fill their vessel. When determining where to fish next, captains make sense of what 
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they have caught in order to choose to either stay in the same spot or move to a different spot, 
depending on which one they feel will provide them with the ability to efficiently fill their 
vessel. Due to the indeterminacy of the time and location of target species aggregating behavior, 
as well as how long aggregations will occur in any given location (either due to dispersal 
behavior or vessel extractive activity), the species composition of an aggregation, and even the 
species composition of actual catch, trawl fishing is an adventure in the unknown. Yet, due to 
their efficiency imperative, captains cannot readily sample multiple potential locations, take test 
tows from aggregations, or identify all the fish in their catch in an attempt to engage in rational 
decision-making. Captains must engage with the unknown while efficiently telling a story of 
what is happening and they conjecturing what to do next. This conjectural process of inquiry is 
aimed at efficiently creating a workable level of certainty in the face of the indeterminacy 
inherent in interrelating with, and ultimately extracting from, natural systems. The following 
explains why this is a sensemaking process, why it is abductive, and what makes it an abductive 
sensemaking process as well as a decision-making process.   
b. A sensemaking process    
 To explain how the process of interrelating with indeterminate natural systems is a 
sensemaking process, I start with the textbook instigators to sensemaking: “Explicit efforts at 
sensemaking tend to occur when the current state of the world is perceived to be different from 
the expected state of the world, or when there is no obvious way to engage the world.” And in 
the face of either difference or deficiency of meaning, “people look for reasons that will enable 
them to resume the interrupted activity and stay in action” (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005: 
131). Sensemaking is a process inquiry enacted in the interest of understanding how to proceed. 
When setting out to sea, captains cannot know where their next sufficient aggregation will be. 
The natural conditions at a certain fishing spot are a source of indeterminacy. They also never 
know what the species composition of an aggregation will be until after they have towed from it. 
The composition of an aggregation is a source of indeterminacy. Absent sensemaking, captains 
would either never leave the dock, or never set their nets. Or, alternatively, they would engage in 
a rational decision-making process of gathering all the information they need (rather than what is 
available) about each fishing spot by both steaming to multiple spots and sampling the 
aggregations at each spot and communicating with captains at other spots. Based on their 
complete and accurate information about the location and composition of aggregations at 
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potential fishing spots, captains would then engage in a comparative process, ultimately choosing 
the one correct answer in terms of which spot that will provide them with the most efficiency. 
Such an approach to determining where and from what to fish, however, would require so much 
time and fuel that it would render the practice unprofitable.  
 As Rescher (1978: 42) states describing the work of scientists, “Conjectural fancy is 
limitless, but resources are scarce and life is short.” The same need for economy of inquiry that 
shapes the scientific process shapes the fishing process. Both scientists and captains inquire into 
the unknown, and both face constraints born of efficiency imperatives on enacting a rational 
decision-making process. Yet, managing a commercial fishing vessel is more akin to the type of 
management Robert Chia describes, rather than the type of processes scientists undertake:  
Managing is firstly and fundamentally the task of becoming aware, attending to, 
sorting out, and prioritizing an inherently messy, fluxing and chaotic world of 
competing demands that are placed on a manager’s attention. It is creating order 
out of chaos. It is an art, not a science. Active perceptual organization and the 
astute allocation of attention is a central feature of the managerial task. (2005: 
1092)  
Captains engage in the art, rather than the science, of commercial fishing, and are not beholden 
to the strictures of precision that scientists are. But they are beholden to the need for accuracy. 
Captains never know until they tow, yet they must tow somewhere, and more importantly, they 
must tow somewhere that offers them the ability to enact an efficient, profitable fishing process. 
They are continuously faced with potential incongruence in terms of moving toward their desired 
future events due to the indeterminacy of concrete natural phenomena, and abductive 
sensemaking is how they resolve that incongruity. 
a. An abductive process  
 The process of determining where, when, and from what to fish is primarily an abductive, 
rather than deductive or inductive, process of inquiry. In deductive processes of inquiry, known 
conclusions must follow from the premises; in inductive and abductive processes of inquiry, 
conclusions are unknown. The process of selecting a fishing spot is not deductive because the 
conclusion that a sufficient aggregation will be at a chosen fishing spot does not necessarily 
follow from the premise that having found such an aggregation there before in certain conditions 
means an aggregation will be there again in similar conditions; captains, in fact, operate from the 
premise that they can never be certain what they will find in a spot until they arrive in that spot.  
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 While both inductive and abductive types of inquiry are used when conclusions are 
unknown, only one, based on a distinction identified by Schurz (2008), applies to the processes 
captains undertake: induction and abduction have different targets of inquiry. Induction is used in 
planning when one needs to infer something about the future course of events in order to adapt 
one’s actions to them. Abduction, however, concerns identifying explanatory reasons for future 
events (i.e., hypotheses) in order to adapt the course of events to one’s interests. Abduction 
concerns enacting future events in order to meet one’s interests, while induction concerns 
adapting one’s interests to inferred future events. Rescher (1978: 42) describes abduction’s 
function of identifying explanatory reasons in the following: “The task of abduction is to 
determine a limited area of promising possibility within the overall domain of theoretically 
available hypotheses, a region which is at once small enough for detailed examination and 
research, and large enough to afford a good chance of containing the true answer.” The future 
fishing spot or the species composition of an aggregation is an abductive inquiry in that its 
purpose is extending knowledge beyond observation in the interest of adapting the course of 
events to the captain’s need to enact an efficient fishing trip. Captains no not simply infer 
something about the course of future events; as one captain said, “The future is not given to us, 
we create our future.”  
c. An abductive sensemaking process 
 Abductive sensemaking is a process of inquiry into the unknown, but which offers both 
efficiency and a plausible opportunity to find the answer one is seeking. What distinguishes an 
abductive sensemaking process from more traditional sensemaking processes is its emphasis on 
economy, the instigators to sensemaking, and the interrelationship of decision making and 
sensemaking. In terms of economy, when undertaking an inquiry in which given conclusions do 
not follow directly from premises, in which actors are venturing into the unknown, actors must 
tell a story of what is happening, and what may happen next, both intelligently and efficiently. 
An actor engaging in a process of inquiry into the unknown is “launched upon a boundless ocean 
of possibilities” (Peirce, 1931-1958, cited in Rescher, 1978: 49), yet, as is the case in most 
practical contexts, “possibilities cannot in practice be spun out forever” (Rescher, 1978: 42). 
Captains fish where they have fished before, but they have fished multiple spots before, and due 
to their efficiency imperative, captains cannot sample multiple past fishing spots. Abduction 
becomes important when the “main problem [a group faces] is, how, with a given expenditure of 
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money, time, and energy, to obtain the most valuable addition to [their] knowledge” (Pierce, 
1931-1958, cited in Rescher, 1978: 70). Although the ‘father of abduction,’ Charles S. Peirce, 
drew from the scientific process to argue that a primary function of abduction is providing 
scientists with efficiency in their explanatory processes (Rescher, 1978; Schurz, 2008), this 
dissertation demonstrates that the same concerns for efficiency hold true when trawl vessel 
captains inquire into the unknown and must act their way into knowing.   
 In terms of instigators to sensemaking, the at-sea context houses environmental cues that 
are different from the contexts found in most of the sensemaking literature. Existing theories of 
sensemaking concern cues that are weak (Rerup, 2009; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), ambiguous 
(Corley & Gioia, 2004; Vaara, 2003), equivocal (Weick, 1979, 1995), shocking (Bean & 
Eisenberg, 2006), or discrepant (Jett & George, 2003), resulting in problems of either identifying 
cues (Rerup, 2009; Weick, 1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), or the categorization (Dunbar & 
Garud, 2009), classification (Stigliani & Ravasi, 2013), and labeling (Gioia & Thomas, 1996) of 
cues, or both (Whiteman & Cooper, 2011). Taken together, the sensemaking problem in existing 
research primarily concerns a struggle with fitting a cue from concrete phenomena to abstract 
interpretive schemata (i.e., a cue to a frame), which multiple authors have noted to be the basic 
act of sensemaking (e.g., Mills, 2003; Jeong & Brower, 2008: Weick, et al., 2005). This is a 
problem because it creates incongruence between the meaning of current experience and an 
ability to continue to progress toward desired future experiences. This incongruence is the reason 
the fundamental problem of organizing has been argued to be “the problem of what will come 
next” (Cooper & Law, 1995: 242). What will come next is the problem that actors engaging in 
sensemaking attempt to solve (Weick et al., 2005), whether that ‘next’ involves understanding a 
past event or how to move toward a future event.  
 While all sensemaking concerns a question of what will come next, the instigators of that 
problem can be different. When sensemaking concerns unexpected or weak cues, the problem of 
what will come next focuses on correcting connections between cues and interpretive schemata, 
either in terms of updating schemata or finding alternative cues to fit existing schemata. The 
problem in the at-sea context faced by trawl captains, however, is akin to the context of the 
Bhopal disaster analyzed in Weick (1988, 2010). Rather than being a problem of alertness and 
detecting weak cues, or a mismatch between detected cues and interpretive schemata, the 
problem in the Bhopal disaster was one of missing or invisible cues. In the face of missing, 
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invisible, or otherwise indeterminate cues, sensemaking takes on more of a conjectural form 
(Weick, 2006, 2010). An overt examination of the nature of sensemaking when cues are missing, 
invisible, or otherwise unknowable is rare. This study demonstrates that abductive sensemaking 
is a process of determining what’s next in order to find missing cues. As Rescher (1978: 47) 
states, “Abduction tells us where to shine the beam of inquiry’s light. There is no point in 
researching, however carefully, in the wrong spot.” In contexts in which cues are known to be 
invisible, missing, or, more generally, indeterminate, but not unexpected or weak, sensemaking 
takes a conjectural approach, producing intelligent guesses about the cues that will be found in 
future experiences.  
 The final difference between abductive sensemaking and traditional sensemaking is the 
interrelationship of decision making and sensemaking. I have demonstrated that abductive 
sensemaking is a process of producing a conjecture of what to do next when faced with the 
indeterminacy of natural materiality. This conjecture is a decision. Furthermore, captains engage 
in a conjectural process in the interest of efficiency, which is one of the primary interests of 
decision-making researchers (Elster, 1989). Captains select certain places to fish at a certain time 
that will offer them the potential to enact an efficient fishing process. But captains do not have 
the resources to conduct a rational analysis of alternative fishing spots in order to obtain perfect 
information of current conditions. Their decisions are often based on “a feeling,” a conjecture or 
hypothesis, as well as information of current conditions. Abductive sensemaking at sea includes 
salient decision points, but these points are mere slices of the broader sensemaking process of 
which they are a part; yet decisions are key parts of sensemaking processes, both in terms of 
spotting them, understanding them, and identifying and understanding how they connect to other 
events.  
 A I detained in Chapter One, sensemaking and decision-making have been 
conceptualized as characteristic of distinctive views of organizations (Scott & Davis, 2007). 
They have also, however, have been conceptualized as distinctive yet interdependent processes. 
Maitlis and Christianson (2014: 21) make the case for this distinctiveness and interdependency in 
a recent review of the sensemaking literature: “Sensemaking thus both precedes decision making 
and follows it: sensemaking provides the “clear questions and clear answers” (Weick, 1993: 636) 
that feed decision making, and decision making often stimulates the surprises and confusion that 
create occasions for sensemaking.” Rudolph, Morrison and Carroll (2008), in a rare study that 
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incorporated both sensemaking and ration decision-making frameworks, came to a similar 
conclusion: 
In action-oriented problem solving, choice follows sensemaking. Indeed, there 
can be no choice without a previous sensemaking process; action and 
interpretation are needed to make available the information used for choice. And 
sensemaking follows choice as the selection of a new guiding hypothesis sets the 
problem solver on a new course of action. In contrast, classic rational choice 
approaches posit that preconstituted information is given and perfectly 
understood, and the decision process is decoupled from the sensemaking process 
that created the preconstituted information. (749)  
In this study I demonstrate a different relationship between sensemaking and decision-making 
processes. In the preceding chapters, decision-making is embedded in sensemaking. Decision-
making is part of the sensemaking process, and is often intended to influence sensemaking, such 
as the sensemaking incentives generated by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council. 
Sensemaking, however, clothes decision making in broader  processes. To examine decision 
making alone first requires excising its connections to the broader processes of which it is a part, 
and then abstracting it for attention. Weick (2003: 186) describes this type of relationship 
between sensemaking and decision-making in stating that sensemaking is “intended to break the 
stranglehold that decision making and rational models have had on organizational theory. 
Sensemaking implies that key organizational events happen long before people even suspect that 
there may be some kind of decision 
they have to make.”  
In the perspective recommended here, 
decisions are an abstraction from 
broader sensemaking processes. This 
in turn means that sensemaking 
processes are more concrete than 
decisions are. While we tend to think of concepts as increasing in abstraction the more complex 
they are, i.e., the more they include other concepts under their umbrella, abstractions from 
experience are the opposite - the simpler they are, the more abstract they are. The closer we are 
to describing the complexity of concrete systems, the less abstract we are operating. Conversely, 
the closer we are to describing the complexity of intellectual systems, the more abstract we are 
operating. The narrower our bracketed cue is from concrete phenomena, the greater our 
abstraction from those phenomena. Whitehead (1968: 138) describes the implications of this 
Figure 27: The abstraction of decision making from 
sensemaking 
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difference between abstract concepts and abstraction from experience in the following:, “An 
abstraction is nothing else than the omission of part of the truth. The abstraction is well-founded 
when the conclusions drawn from it are not vitiated by the omitted truth.” Excisions from 
concrete experience are more abstract the thinner the slice of experience; the question that 
Whitehead elucidates is, have we excluded too much in our abstraction? For instance, the 
concept of ‘species’ is more abstract than the ecological processes from which it was excised, for 
it includes less concrete complexity, capturing a thinner slice of the concrete phenomena captains 
experience at sea. Operating in terms of species excises much of the ecological processes of 
which they are a part. There is a loss of the complexity that is inherent on concrete phenomena. 
When increase our abstraction from concrete phenomena, we can know more about that 
abstracted element, but at the same time we know less about the concrete world of which it is a 
part. This is why Whitehead argues, “You cannot think without abstractions; accordingly, it is of 
the upmost importance to be vigilant in critically revising your modes of abstraction” (1967: 59).  
A previously unstated purpose of this dissertation is to ‘critically revise our modes of 
abstraction’ from frontline fishing practice. This revision expands a traditional focus on decision 
making to a less abstract, and more concrete, focus on sensemaking, for the latter subsumes the 
former. We cannot know sensemaking without knowing decision making, and it is important to 
revise our mode of abstraction from frontline fishing processes to include the sensemaking 
processes of which decision making is a part.  
3. The Abductive Sensemaking Event   
  Abductive sensemaking is a process of drawing from two interdependent dimensions of 
experience, abstract <—> concrete and past <—> future, in order to produce a workable level of 
certainty in terms of progressing through the present, into a desired future, while in the shadow 
of the past. Scholars have discussed sensemaking as a process of merging the abstract and the 
concrete (e.g., Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012; Jeong & Brower, 2008; Mills, 2003; Weick et al., 
2005), and they have discussed how sensemaking connects the future to the present (e.g., 
Gephart, Topal, & Zhang, 2010; Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012) and the present to the past (e.g., 
Brown, 2004; Gephart, 1993; Taylor & Van Every, 2000). None, however, have formally 
modeled all four anchors of experience within the same process. As this study demonstrates, the 
future and past parts of experience are inseparable from the abstract and concrete parts. As 
Whitehead (1967: 43-44) states, “Either there is something about the immediate occasion which 
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affords knowledge of the past and future, or we are reduced to utter skepticism as to memory and 
induction.” The abductive sensemaking model is a tool for analyzing how captains merge the 
abstract, concrete, past, and future anchors of experience in order to tell a story of what is 
happening and produce a conjecture of what should happen next. In what follows I break the 
abductive sensemaking event into abductive sensemaking moments, then I combine those 
moments into the abductive sensemaking analytical model. Following those discussions, I apply 
this model to the enacted environments analyzed in empirical Chapter Three, while breaking 
down the Western Gulf Chinook bycatch event to correspond to those enacted environments.  
a. Abductive sensemaking moments 
 While producing a workable level of 
certainty is done in the interest of continuing 
with ongoing organizing projects (Weick, 
1969), sensemaking is the processes by which 
actors produce a workable level of certainty 
(Weick et al., 2005). The production of a 
workable level of certainty, as a function of 
sensemaking, therefore can be broken down 
into the two sensemaking questions: “What’s 
the story here?” and, “Now what?” (Blatt et al., 
2005; Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012; Weick et al., 
2005). The abductive sensemaking event is 
constituted by two parts, or moments, of 
sensemaking that correspond to these questions 
(Figure 28). First, actors merge cues from 
concrete phenomena with abstract mental 
models, what I have been calling ‘interpretive 
schemata,’ in order to answer the question, 
‘What’s going on here?’ As the top model in  
Figure 28 indicates, this merger is influenced by 
 
Figure 28: The abductive sensemaking moments 
of telling a story of what is happening and 
conjecturing what to do next 
 176 
past experiences and potential future experiences (as external arrows), but as they are instantiated 
in abstract interpretive schemata and influence the selection of the concrete phenomena captains 
are interacting with. In this study, the natural processes that captains encounter at sea were the 
primary concrete phenomena of interest, and interpretive schemata, such as operating models 
like the disposition to “fish where we have fished before,” regulatory structures such as 
prohibited species regulations, and the efficiency imperative continually imposing its will from 
desired future events, were the primary abstractions of interest.  
 In the bottom model of Figure 28, actors use stories of what is happening to answer the 
question, ‘Now what do I do?’ in terms of moving from past experience toward desired future 
experiences. The common past events that were salient in this study are past fishing events, and 
the future event that was a primary concern among all captains was the experience of enacting a 
profitable fishing trip. The connection between the past and future is a decision point, yet this 
connection relies on abstract interpretive schemata and concrete phenomena of interest, which 
are, in this moment, relegated to the background of external arrows.  
 In terms of the sensemaking formula, “How can I know what I think until I see what I 
say?” (Weick, 1977, 1988), as well as the trawling axiom, “You never know until you tow,” the 
first moment of abductive sensemaking concerns the present experience of looking back on 
elapsed experience and telling a story of what is happening at sea based on the plotter, or what is 
happening beneath the vessel based on the sonar, or what is happening with the catch based on 
the fish on deck. The second moment concerns progression from that experience, in which the 
captain, with a newly enhanced repertoire of past experiences, conjectures what to do next. Both 
moments make up the whole that is an abductive sensemaking event. 
b. The abductive sensemaking model 
 The two moments of sensemaking form a sensemaking event, which is modeled in Figure 
29. But in order for these two parts to constitute the whole that is a workable level of certainty of 
what to do next, the relationships among anchors of experience must be congruent. Thus, there 
are six potential sources of incongruence in the relationships depicted by the internal and 
external arrows. Starting with the external arrows, for experience to be sensible, what is abstract, 
such as regulations or dispositions toward certain actions, must be congruent with past 
experience (arrow 2) and desired future experience (arrow 1). Likewise, cues extracted from 
concrete phenomena must be congruent with past experience (arrow 3) and desired future 
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experience (arrow 4). In terms of the internal arrows, past experiences must be congruent with 
desired future experiences (arrows b & d), and interpretive schemata must be congruent with 
concrete phenomena (arrows a & c). Each of these requirements for congruence is also a 
potential instigators to sensemaking. This study has focused on how natural systems, in their 




Figure 29: The abductive sensemaking event overlaid with the two dimensions of experience: past future 
and abstract concrete 
  
 Using the abductive sensemaking model s an analytical framework requires three steps.. 
First, it requires the researcher to dissect an event to four key parts. These parts are the abstract 
and concrete sides of experience that are salient in the event, and the past and future events that 
are imported into the present to inform abstractions and shape the selection of cues from concrete 
phenomena. These four key parts will be constituents of the story an entity tells of phenomena. 
Second, the framework requires elucidation of relationships among those parts that may be 
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sources of incongruence. And third, the framework requires the identification of the conjecture 
that resolves the incongruence, allowing the entity to move on. 
4. The abductive sensemaking events of this study 
 Chapter Three introduced three of the primary enacted environments that captains work 
through when enacting a fishing trip: the plotter, the sonar, and fish on deck. Each of these 
environments require decisions in which captains answer the sensemaking question, “now 
what?” In each enacted environment, captains face indeterminacy inherent in their relationship 
with natural systems, which creates potential incongruences at that point in their fishing trip. 
Therefore, at each enacted environment, captains must decide how to move forward in the face 
of potential incongruences. Captains must resolve the potential incongruence born of 
indeterminacy, and do so efficiently. The following applies the abductive sensemaking analytical 
framework to three primary enacted environments - the plotter, the sonar, and the catch - both in 
Figure 30: Indeterminacy (“?”) and potential incongruence (“x”) at the plotter-based stage of a 
fishing trip   
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terms of a typical fishing trip and in terms of the Western Gulf bycatch event described in 
Chapter Four.   
a. Plotter-based abductive sensemaking 
 The first enacted environment analyzed in this study is the plotter. Because cues from 
natural processes at a particular fishing spot are unknown at the dock, (see Figure 30, the “?” 
stemming from the concrete material phenomena portion of their experience), captains cannot 
give a fully-informed account of what is happening that allows rational decision-making. Rather, 
captains must instead determine what to do next based on incomplete information. Captains 
know that they “never know until they tow,” but they also know that they must tow somewhere, 
and from something. Every decision to steam to a certain spot is a conjecture that in that spot 
will be an aggregation of fish that is sufficient enough to conduct an efficient fishing trip. The 
potential incongruence at this point lies in the relationship between indeterminate concrete 
phenomena and desired future experience of enacting a profitable trip (Figure 30, arrow 4). This 
incongruence is the focus of sensemaking in this enacted environment.  
 As Chapter Three demonstrated, captains can enrich their ability to produce an accurate 
conjecture of what they will find at a fishing spot by importing experience of other captains, 
 Figure 31: Captains sharing past experience at the plotter-based stage of a fishing trip to enhance their 
abductive capacity to resolve potential incongruence; note that Captain B’s abductive sensemaking model 
is displayed in reverse 
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perhaps captains who have fished at that same spot in the recent or distant past, or who are 
fishing there contemporaneously. Figure 31 depicts the relationship in which two captains share 
past experiences, with Captain A importing the past experience of Captain B (note that the model 
of Captain B’s abductive sensemaking is depicted conversely to Captain A’s, such that their past 
experiences overlap). They are sharing past experiences so that Captain A can resolve the 
potential incongruence in his abductive sensemaking of a particular place to fish in terms of the 
relationship between the potential concrete material phenomena at a certain spot and his desired 
future event of enacting a profitable fishing trip. These captains are sharing past experiences, but 
not actual concrete phenomena, conjectures, or interpretive schemata. Put differently, one is, or 
both are, increasing their abductive capacity by sharing past experiences, but not by engaging in 
shared abductive sensemaking.  
 In the Western Gulf bycatch event, viable fishing spots to choose from at the dock were 
limited. Captains stated that, based on the aggregating action patterns of their target species, 
pollock, there are typically three areas in which they can fish in that fall pollock fishery. Captains 
further noted that pollock aggregations are typically in only one or two of the three fishing areas 
at a time. The combination of an efficiency imperative, a race regulatory structure, and the 
limited variation in action patterns of their target species led captains to fish where they had 
fished before. In addition, plotters tell captains the locations of other vessels, whether they are 
docked or fishing, from which captains can infer in which spot the pollock aggregations are. The 
action patterns of pollock inspire vessel action patterns, and captains use these interaction 
patterns to determine where to fish. Thus, in this event there was little sensemaking of where to 
fish because there was little indeterminacy in terms of the natural phenomena occurring at the 
three fishing spots, and therefore little potential incongruence.  In such cases, the decision to 
steam to a certain fishing spot is neither a pure rational decision-making process, nor a pure 
sensemaking process, but more of a routine process enabled by interaction patterns between 
target species and vessel behavior.  
 At the plotter stage in the Western Gulf bycatch event, before captains arrived at their 
chosen fishing spot, there is the remaining issue of anomalous cues from natural phenomena, 
such as “hundreds of whales,” “silvers jumping,” things captains “had not seen before. Several 
captains stated that such cues suggested something had changed in the “whole ecosystem.” Yet, 
because these cues did not correspond to any sort of incongruence in their ability to move toward 
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their desired future event of enacting a profitable fishing trip, captains did not incorporate them 
into their abductive sensemaking of where to fish. Thus, captains saw the cues, but ignored them 
based on their lack of indication of an incongruent relationship with their desired future events. 
These were not weak cues in that they did not signal any potential threat (Rerup, 2009). Instead, 
they were simply ignored cues.   
b. Sonar-based abductive sensemaking 
 The next enacted environment is the sonar that depicts aggregations (“sign”) at a fishing 
spot a captain has steamed to. At this point, captains are on the fishing grounds. The sonar 
enacted environment allows captains to assess their previous conjecture that a selected spot will 
offer an ability to enact a profitable fishing trip. But it is also a source of indeterminacy. The 
indeterminacy inherent in the sonar enacted environment is the species composition of the 
aggregation the sonar is depicting. Every decision to tow is a conjecture that the sign on their 
Figure 32: Depiction of an abductive sensemaking event at the sonar-based stage of a 
fishing trip, in which the captain cannot create a conjecture due to the mismatch between 
the level of abstraction that regulatory structures impose on frontline processes and the 
level of abstraction he is able to discern from his sonar-based environment. This 
mismatch created potential incongruence between his concrete phenomena and his ability 
to move toward his desired future event 
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sonar is a certain species, or at least enough of a certain species to be worth the cost of towing. 
At this decision point, the potential incongruence stems from the inability to differentiate species 
that are managed differently, and have different economic profiles, but that enact the same action 
patterns as depicted by the sonar. These similar action patterns cause different fish to appear the 
same on the sonar. Because captains fish based on the recurring action patterns of their target 
species, these are, at this level of abstraction, the same fish. Extracted fish of a certain species are 
merely outcomes of fishing based on the recurring action patterns of that species. Lightning 
strikes occur when captains target one species based on its recurring action patterns, but 
unexpectedly catch a high amount of another species that was enacting the same action patterns. 
I experienced several lightning strikes firsthand while working as a fisheries observer, and 
secondhand during my field research. Lightning strikes of non-target, non-prohibited species can 
violate captains’ efficiency imperative, while lightning strikes of prohibited species that have 
catch limits (i.e., Pacific halibut and Chinook salmon) can close target fisheries, impeding the 
fleet’s ability to be profitable. When lightning strikes go unchecked, large-scale bycatch events 
can form, such as the one that occurred in the Western Gulf Chinook bycatch event. Large-scale 
bycatch events of prohibited species that have catch limits pose a great threat to profitability.  
 The indeterminacy of the species composition of sign imposes a potential incongruence 
between concrete material phenomena and the desired future event of enacting a profitable 
fishing trip. This incongruence stems from the different levels of abstraction from concrete 
phenomena and abstract interpretive schemata. The job of the captain is to conjecture that certain 
action pattern-based cues correspond to certain species-level abstractions (Figure 32). Lightning 
strikes occur when captains make inaccurate conjectures, in which there is a mismatch between 
the species-level category captains impose on action pattern-level cues, and the actual species 
captains extract. This potential inaccuracy creates potential incongruence between concrete 
material phenomena and the desired future event of enacting a profitable fishing trip, season, or, 
more extremely, year.  
 Like the plotter enacted environment, captains can enrich their ability to produce an 
accurate conjecture of the species-level meaning of sign by importing experience of other 
captains, perhaps captains who have fished from sign that looks the same, who have fished at 
that same spot in the recent or distant past, or who are fishing alongside the captain attempting to 
make sense of the sign. Figure 33 depicts the relationship in which captains are looking at the 
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same sign on their sonars, sharing past experiences, interpretive frameworks, and desired future 
events. These captains have moved beyond simply sharing past experience to engaging in shared 
abductive sensemaking in an attempt to conjecture what that sign is at the species-level. This is 
another way captains can increase their adductive capacity to ‘know before they tow.’ 
 In terms of the Western Gulf bycatch event, the data suggest that captains, especially 
across the Kodiak and Sand Point fleet, only minimally shard past experiences or engaged in 
shared abductive sensemaking. There are multiple reasons captains did not increase their 
abductive capacity through communicative processes, but I will focus on two. One is the 
conditions of the natural systems that tend to form the fishing grounds around Sand Point Island, 
which is where pollock fishing tends to occur in the Western Gulf. These conditions are such that 
the places captains can fish from sufficient aggregations are limited. The greater the number of 
vessels that target the same aggregation, the faster the aggregation will be depleted, and the 
greater the potential incongruence between concrete material phenomena and the desired future 
event of enacting profitable trip. And as Chapter Three demonstrated, this potential incongruence 
Figure 33: A model of a shared abductive sensemaking event. This model depicts two 
captains who are sharing past experiences, interpretive frameworks, concrete 
phenomena in that they are fishing in the same spot, and desired future events in that 
they both want to fish both efficiently and profitably. 
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decreases the extent to which captains are likely to share information. They conjecture that 
sharing information about where they are fishing will impact their ability to be efficient. Thus, 
this potential incongruence limits the extent to which captains increase their abductive capacity 
by sharing past experience (see Figure 34).  
 
 
Figure 34: A model of an abductive sensemaking event in which captains do not share past experience due to 
the potential incongruence doing so can interject into a captain’s (Captain A) abductive sensemaking of how 
to move toward a desired future event of enacting a profitable fishing trip.  
 The second reason captains did not share experiences or engage in shared abductive 
sensemaking in terms of the species composition of the aggregations on their sonar is because 
they did not need to. They were not incentivized to make sense of sign at a more abstract level 
than the action-pattern level. Even though captains perceived anomalous cues in relation so the 
sign, such as the feed band not separating during the day, they did not have a profitability-based 
reason to make more abstract sense of the sign on their sonars. This was the primary logic that 
the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council) employed in their rational process of 
imposing a regulation that would prevent large scale bycatch events like the one that occurred in 
the Western Gulf in 2010 from recurring. The creation of “hard cap” on Chinook salmon 
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interjects a potential incongruence in captains’ abductive sensemaking in terms of moving 
towards a profitable trip, season, or even year. The new potential incongruence lies between 
concrete natural phenomena and desired future experience of enacting a profitable fishing trip, 
and it incentivizes captains to tell a more nuanced story, but a more abstract story, of their sonar 
enacted environment. The Council also employed the logic that this potential incongruence 
would inspire captains to share past experiences as well as engage in shared abductive 
sensemaking. The Chinook salmon hard cap was a “sensemaking incentive,” which further 
argues for the overlap of sensemaking and decision making perspectives.  
c. Catch-based abductive sensemaking 
 The final enacted environment is catch on deck. When captains bring up the catch, they 
have their first encounter with the materiality they have been making sense of since they left the 
dock, and they have the ability to check their assumptions from their previous conjecture about 
the composition of aggregations on their sonar. At this point, captains can also interpret the 
natural systems at the same level of abstraction in which regulatory processes interpret them - the 
species-level. Yet, as Chapter Four demonstrated, in pollock fisheries captains have difficulty 
differentiating pollock from Chinook salmon on deck due to morphological similarities and the 
mechanics of dumping a large bag of pollock, as well as an efficiency imperative to dump the 
bag as fast as they can and set it back out to fish. Thus, in the pollock fisheries, there is 
remaining indeterminacy. In the Western Gulf bycatch event, captains often did not know how 
much Chinook salmon they caught in a trip until after they delivered their catch to a processing 
plant and were back out fishing. Some did not know until after they delivered their next vessel 
load to the processing plant. This lag in updating the species-composition of their catch creates 
indeterminacy between past experiences and regulatory limits on prohibited species catch 
(Figure 35, arrow 2). This lag also creates potential incongruence between the profitability of 
desired future events and the concrete phenomena in the fishing spot a captain will chose in 
terms of whether it is a hot spot or not (arrow 4).  
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Figure 35: An abductive sensemaking model from the catch-based part of a fishing trip, in which the captain 
does not learn the amount of Chinook he caught in his last trip before he has to make sense of current 
concrete conditions in terms of choosing his next fishing spot. This lag in feedback creates potential 
incongruence in terms of the material phenomena he may find at his next fishing spot and moving toward his 
desired future event of enacting a profitable trip  
 In the Western Gulf bycatch event, the indeterminacy of actual catch amounts of Chinook 
salmon were not tied to a catch limit, and therefore there was no potential incongruence that 
emerged from that indeterminacy. A goal of the Council, therefore, was to create potential 
incongruence that would incentivize captains to slow down the process in which they dump their 
codends in order to look for Chinook salmon, as well as encourage them to find out from 
processing plants how much Chinook they caught on a trip after delivering their catch and before 
heading back out to sea. Learning the amount of Chinook salmon they caught on their previous 
trip would in turn impact their abductive sensemaking at the docks from their plotter-based 
environment as they chose their next fishing spot. Thus, the plotter-based environment is an 
outgrowth of the catch-based environment, which is an outgrowth of the sonar-based 
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environment. The abductive sensemaking conducted at each environment uses outcomes from 
the previous environment as inputs, and provides outcomes for abductive sensemaking at the 
next enacted environment.  
5. Additional theoretical implications  
 The preceding analysis was one long elucidation of the abductive sensemaking process and 
analytical model, which extends our current understanding of, and provides a tool for future 
analyses of, sensemaking in natural resource extraction contexts. Embedded in the contribution 
detailed above are specified relationships between sensemaking and abduction, sensemaking and 
decision making, and sensemaking and materiality. There are, however, two additional key 
theoretical contributions embedded in this study. The first contribution involves the processual 
nature of sensemaking, in terms of whether it is continual or episodic (Maitlis & Christianson, 
2014; Weick, 2012). As Maitlis and Christianson (2014) state in a recent review of the 
sensemaking literature, “Although epistemological differences regarding the nature of 
sensemaking may not be resolved, a more detailed examination of its temporality, whether or 
when sensemaking starts and stops, and how sense is made and remade will greatly enrich our 
theorizing.” (Maitlis & Christianson. 2014: 97). The second further specifies the relationship 
between sensemaking and storytelling.  
a. The concatenating model of abductive sensemaking 
  Thus study demonstrates how abductive sensemaking processes, composed of interlinked 
abductive sensemaking events, which are composed of interlinked sensemaking moments, help 
captains ‘know before they tow.’ This product of the preceding analyses helps address an 
emerging tension in the sensemaking literature. As Weick (2012: 146) describes, “The tension is 
generated by the question, is sensemaking episodic or continuous?” Does sensemaking “start 
with chaos” (Weick et al. 2005: 411) or does it “never start” (Weick 1995: 43)?  The answer to 
this question has important implications for the role sensemaking plays in natural resource 
management, primarily in terms of whether extraction processes should be managed to allow for 
sensemaking in the face of crisis events, or should the extraction process itself be managed as 
one ongoing sensemaking process.  
 The sensemaking literature, as Maitlis and Christianson state in a recent review, 
“diverges on whether sensemaking takes place continuously or in an episodic fashion” (2014: 
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97). There are multiple clear examples in the literature of an episodic conceptualization of 
sensemaking, in which the process is triggered by a disruption that produces a loss of sense, and 
ends with the reconstruction of sense, or, more tragically, with the loss of the ability to make 
sense. For example, Cunliffe and Coupland (2012) studied an episode of “sensemaking within 
the flow of experience” (65) in documentary footage of a rugby team, which started with a 
disruption and ended with a redemptive narrative; Cornelissen (2012) studied the use of different 
metaphors by communication professionals to make sense of, and move on from, multiple 
critical incidents; Blatt et al. (2006) studied multiple “mishap incidents” in which hospital 
residents experienced and recovered from lapses in reliability; Maitlis (2005), in her study of 
orchestra organizations, produced a typology of sensemaking “accounts” (“discursive 
constructions of reality that interpret or explain” pp. 21, citing Antaki, 1994), which she labeled 
“guided, restricted, fragmented, and minimal”; Luscher and Lewis (2008) studied the episodic 
nature of sensemaking within a strategic restructuring process, in which the process began with a 
“mess,” progressed through several stages, and ended with workable certainty.  
 Alternatively, there are also examples of sensemaking studied as a continuous process. 
Such studies conceptualize sensemaking as an interpretive and enactment process that is not so 
much triggered by a disruption but instead continually emerges from the ongoing need to create 
meaning as actors carry out their practices. Studies of continual sensemaking, however, due to 
the temporal constraints imposed by the research process, tend to focus on a bracketed period of 
sensemaking that is extracted from a continual process, from which scholars construct a model of 
how actors accomplish sensemaking as an ongoing process. For example, Weick and Roberts 
(1993) studied ongoing sensemaking on aircraft carrier and found that a variant of ongoing 
sensemaking - heedful interrelating -  supports reliable functioning, and is accomplished through 
acts of contributing, representing, and subordinating; Stigliani and Ravasi (2012), in their study 
of a product design process within a larger firm, produced a model of future-oriented 
sensemaking in which the transition from individual to collective sensemaking is mediated by 
material objects, and which was constituted by processes of noticing and bracketing, articulating, 
elaborating, and influence; and Abolafia (2010), in his study of Federal Reserve meetings, 
produced a model of sensemaking as narrative construction, which was constituted by 
continuous processes of abduction, plotting, and selective retention, and facilitated by the logic 
of appropriateness.  
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 Rather than a dichotomy, this study presents a model of sensemaking in which the 
process is both continuous and episodic. Abductive sensemaking relies on importing experiences 
across space, time, and people in order to create outputs (i.e., conjectures) that move one forward 
toward a desired future event, but in doing so enacts new environments. These subsequent 
enacted environments are the source of new, and novel, sensemaking events. Jeong and Brower 
(2008: 235) make a similar point: “sensemaking as enactment can be said to be an 
interdependent authoring process (Giddens, 1979) in which individual actors continuously invite 
new situations (settings) that often require further sensemaking." Sensemaking of the plotter-
based environment set in motion events that led to the sonar-based environment, and 
sensemaking of the sonar-based environment set in motion events that led to the catch-based 
environment. And sensemaking of the catch-based environment set in motion events that led to 
the next plotter-based environment. These events interlink into a sensemaking process that is the 
backbone of a fishing trip. This conceptualization of a sensemaking process aligns with Herne’s 
(2008: 45) conceptualization of the relationship between events and process: “Events make 
processes, and they can make processes only by connecting to other events. Also, they can make 
up processes only by embodying the past, the present, and the future. . . In this lies an inherently 
process view, however difficult it may seem for practical research.” Abductive sensemaking 
events create the enacted environments from which subsequent enacted sensemaking events 
arise, and actors use past events of sensemaking to make sense of those newly enacted 
environments.  
The model below (Figure 36) depicts sensemaking events as occasioned by different 
enacted environments, interlinked by conjectures that both enact future environments and are 
imported into the next event as past experiences. The ‘sense’ that is the product of one 
sensemaking process serves a progressive authoring function by enacting new environments, and 
is also objectified and imported into subsequent sensemaking processes where it serves a 
retrospective interpretive function. Czarniawska makes a similar argument: “The difficulty here 
is that, in order to grasp the practice of organizing, it is not enough to study single events. The 
whole point is to know how they are related to other events, to study chains of events. Again, 
events do not chain spontaneously: the actors or the observers tie them to one another, usually in 
the activity of story making” (2004: 779). This is the concatenating model of sensemaking, in 
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which one sensemaking process is both outcome and input to other sensemaking processes, 





Figure 36: The concatenating model of abductive sensemaking as it occurs in a fishing trip 
 
More generally, a concatenating understanding of abductive sensemaking means that 
episodes may be connected between different individuals, groups, or, more generically, entities, 
or the abductive sensemaking events may occur within the same entity; in addition, abductive 
sensemaking events may be sequential, one happening right after another, or one event may 
occur at one time, and it may be objectified, picked up and used in an event at an altogether 
different time, such as captains discussing potential fishing spots in a fleet meeting. Furthermore, 
events may occur within the same space, such as captains sharing the same fishing grounds and 
discussing the meaning of rockfish sign, or events may be connected across space, such as a 
group of captains who are searching for the best pollock fishing spot across in three different 
locations. Abductive sensemaking events are linked through time, but not necessarily by time in 
that the output from one event serves as an input to a future event, but not necessarily the next 
event. The model encompasses both individual and social, and proximate and distal relationships 
between events, which may be linked through time and across space, but not necessarily by time 
or by space. 
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b. The relationship between sensemaking and storytelling 
 The conceptualization of the abductive sensemaking event as the whole that is constituted 
by the moments of telling a story and conjecturing what to do next clarifies an ambiguity in the 
current organizational studies literature. This ambiguity concerns the difference between 
sensemaking and storytelling. Storytelling is an existing domain of organizational research (e.g., 
Boje, 1991; Brown, Gabriel, & Gherardi, 2009; Lounsbery & Glynn, 2001), as well as a 
burgeoning genre within the sensemaking literature (e.g., Brown, 2004; Daily & Browning, 
2014; Colville, Brown, & Pye, 2012). According to Maclean, Harvey, and Chia, stories are 
“sensemaking vehicles” (2012: 19), and as Islam states, “Sensemaking in organizations often 
takes the form of stories. . . ” (2013: 29), while Brown states that “Sensemaking is essentially a 
narrative process” (2004: 97, citing Brown, 2000). Colville, Brown, and Pye, in their 
introduction to a special issue of the journal Human Relations on linkages among storytelling, 
sensemaking, and organizing, point to the following relationship between sensemaking and 
storytelling: “[The] ascription of meaning to experience provides the link between sensemaking 
and storytelling” (2012: 7). Taken together, sensemaking is a function of storytelling which 
occurs when actors “attach,” “ascribe,” or “inscribe” experience with meaning through 
storytelling or narration (Colville, Brown, & Pye, 2012). 
The problem with this current conceptualization of the relationship between sensemaking 
and storytelling, however, is that we can identify when the two are overlapping (when actors 
ascribe meaning to experience) but we will never find the two not overlapping. Experience is 
always being ascribed with meaning, for there is no experience without meaning, and there is no 
meaning without experience. Without getting mired in the chicken-and-egg question of which 
comes first - experience or meaning - we need only recognize the fact that even as we bemoan a 
lack of meaning, we have still inscribed experience with meaning. In other words, we still have 
told a story. But have we made sense? My argument is that what differentiates sensemaking from 
storytelling is whether the story is actionable. Thus, a story may be meaningful, but is it 
meaningful for practice or other ongoing projects? Action has always been regarded as integral 
to sensemaking (Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005), yet stories do not always give rise to actions. 
Storytelling is necessary for sensemaking, but it is not sufficient. When the progression 
of one’s experience fails to shift from answering the question, “What’s the story here?,” to 
answering the question, “Now what?,” a story fails as a sensemaking vehicle. A captain may be 
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able to tell a story of the concrete phenomena on his sonar, but if he has no past experience to 
draw from in order to determine what to do next, he has failed to make sense. Likewise, if 
captains merely pontificate about past fishing experiences, but these experiences have no 
relationship to current or future concrete phenomena, they are simply storytelling. The abductive 
sensemaking model, as split into moments (see Figure 28) provides a clear demarcation of the 
point at which storytelling does or does not evolve into sensemaking. When a story fails to 
progress to a conjecture, it fails as a sensemaking vehicle. This evolution, as Chapter Three 
demonstrates, turns on the creation or loss of congruence among anchors of experience. When 
captains import past experiences from others, or share abductive sensemaking processes, they 
increase their abductive capacity for either producing a plausible conjecture from a story of what 
is happening, or for telling a story that enables one to make a conjecture, or both. 
 An examination of Weick’s (1993) study of the Mann Gulch disaster, using the abductive 
sensemaking model, illustrates the relationship between storytelling, congruence, and 
sensemaking. In this event, 15 Forest Service wildland firefighters were dropped from a 
helicopter to fight what became an unexpectedly large and dynamic forest fire. The firefighters 
began with the institutionalized conjecture, distilled from past experiences with wildland fires, 
that the fire would they would face would be a “10 o’clock fire” (Figure 37, model a). One of the 
functions of this institutionalized conjecture was to provide the firefighters with interpretive 
schemata to use to both tell stories of what was happening and conjecture what to do next. Yet, 
as the firefighters’ experience progressed, incongruence formed between cues from the concrete 
portion of their experience, such as the fire unexpectedly jumping from the other side of the 
gulch to their side, and their past experiences with fighting a 10 o’clock fire (Figure 37, model 
b). This incongruence required the firefighters to update their understanding of events by telling 
a new congruent story of what was happening based on their new past experience of the fire 
jumping across the gulch (Figure 37, model c.).  
 Only one fighter, Wagner Dodge, was able to tell a congruent story, drawing from distant 
past experience involving reading about grassland fires, which enabled him to produce an 
‘intelligent guess’ that was “marked by good sense” (Peirce, 1931-1958, cited in Rescher, 1978: 
42). Dodge’s story consisted of fitting current material cues to a frame, perhaps guided by the 
organizing logic of, “this event is similar to another event.” Dodge’s connection between past 
experience and current concrete conditions of natural systems allowed him to conjecture that 
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building a “backfire” may save him (Figure 37, model c). Yet, as Weick describes, the other 
firefighters did not import Dodge’s past experience into their sensemaking. One reason is that, 
under the dire circumstances, Dodge simply told them what to do instead of sharing his 
experience with them. The firefighters failed to engage in shared abductive sensemaking, or to 
even share past experience, either of which could have increased their abductive capacity to 
conjecture what to do next beyond a decision to run. The upshot is that, at least partly due to an 
inability to tell a story of what was happening, instead reverting to a primal flight response, 13 
firefighter died. The one who lived was able to tell a story of what was happening, and from that 






Figure 37: Different stages of abductive sensemaking in the Mann Gulch Fire as analyzed in Weick (1993), 
moving from a conjecture that it would be a “10 o’clock fire (a) to experiencing incongruence beween 
concrete natural phenomena and past experience (b), causing participants to attempt to tell a new congruent 
story of what was happening, to one firefighter conjecturing that a backfire (c) might save him based on 
distant past experience he imported into the present  
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C. Sensemaking and routines 
In terms of theoretical contributions, this study demonstrates that abductive sensemaking 
processes are the glue that connects and binds recurring action patterns across social and 
indeterminate natural systems. While a few studies and conceptual papers examine both routines 
and sensemaking-related analyses and concepts, such as updating routines on the occasion of rare 
events (Christianson et al., 2009), the more or less mindful character of routines (Levinthal & 
Rerup, 2006; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006), routines as process facilitators of sensegiving (Maitlis & 
Lawrence, 2007), and the introduction of a routine as an occasion for sensemaking (Colville, 
Pye, & Carter, 2013), fewer studies have overtly incorporated both sensemaking and recurring 
action patterns in the same study. The only apparent such study is Weick and Robert’s study of 
interrelating on an aircraft carrier (1993). The authors demonstrate that the recurring heedful 
interconnection of actions produces a system of stable-yet-flexible recurring action patterns. Yet 
the creation and maintenance of the glue that binds recurring action patterns across systems has 
been the unstated subject of several sensemaking studies, including Snook’s (2001) study of the 
“practical drift” or loosening of sense that binds different sources of military action patterns into 
one system, Kramer’s (2007) study of the organization of doubt that is necessary to construct 
military operations in relation to dynamically complex environments, or Monin, et al.,’s (2013) 
study of the dialogical sensemaking and sensegiving processes that structure the postmerger 
integration of two logistics companies. These studies suggest that salient sensemaking episodes 
are often triggered by the incongruence of action patterns across disparate systems, and a 
primary duty of the sensemakers in each study to attempt to merge those action patterns into 
congruent interaction patterns. This study makes the relationship between sensemaking and 
routines, merely suggested in previous studies, evident, while also, drawing on the abductive 
sensemaking process detailed in chapters One and Two, detailing the processes through which 
sensemaking accomplishes this interaction.  
6. Suggestions for Future Research  
 The preceding empirical chapters, as well as the deeper storyline elucidated in the 
previous discussion of this chapter, suggest several areas for future research. These include 
comparing sensemaking processes across different commercial fishing and natural resource 
extraction contexts, examining sensemaking across different frontline contexts, and further 
examining relationships between sensemaking and decision making.   
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a. Sensemaking in natural resource extraction contexts 
 In aiming for theory generation, this dissertation is appropriately a single case study of 
sensemaking processes in one resource extraction context. Yet, as such, all the limitations of case 
study research apply, the primary one being that I cannot generalize the findings of this study to 
other contexts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). Therefore, additional studies in different 
commercial fishing contexts are needed to assess the generalizability of this study’s findings. For 
example, in fisheries contexts characterized by less indeterminacy, such as salmon set netters and 
seiners, do captains still engage in adductive sensemaking, or do they engage in another 
interpretive and decision-making process and they determine where to fish, what to fish from, 
and where to fish next? Or, is there a different process altogether by which captains chose a 
fishing spot? Further, in non-trawl fisheries, do captains employ the disposition to fish where 
they have fished before, or to they engage in more exploratory and trial and error search 
processes? Another important research question regards the relationship between regulatory 
structures and frontline fishing processes: How do different regulatory structures impact how 
captains in other commercial fisheries make sense of natural systems? 
 A logical extension is to explore frontline sensemaking in other resource extraction 
contexts. Such research would allow us to understand how sensemaking changes as the character 
of natural materiality changes. Different natural systems offer different concrete cues and enact 
different action patterns, and frontline actors generate different expectations based on those cues 
and action patterns. The material cues bracketed from the natural systems specific to the logging 
industry are different from the material cues found to be salient in the commercial fishing 
industry, and they are different from the material cues important in the fracking industry. 
Because these different natural systems exhibit different action patterns, the interaction patterns 
resource extractors create in their process of interrelating, are also different. Studying the 
similarity and variation of salient cues and action patterns across different natural resource 
extraction contexts would go a long way toward improving our understanding the proximate 
dimensions of organizational theory, as well as how sensemaking varies, and does not vary, as 
natural systems vary.  
b. Sensemaking in frontlines    
 Abductive sensemaking is employed, perhaps even required, when actors operating at a 
frontline must interrelate with parts of a system that are unknown, unpredictable, or in some 
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other way indeterminate. ‘Frontline’ is a commonly used (e.g., Bidwell, 2010; Gabriel, 2002; 
Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Sonenshein & Dholska, 2012; Whiteman & Cooper, 2011), yet 
little defined concept. In the broader academy, the concept is typically associated with military 
operations, medical practice, policing, and service industries. In terms of organizations, the 
frontline has generally been identified with employees or managers ‘lower’ in the organizational 
hierarchy than middle managers (Beck & Plowman, 2009; Stein, 2013), as well as with the area 
at the “periphery of the organization” (Smith, 1965: 390). Beck and Plowman (2009), focusing 
on the role of middle managers in service industry organizations, characterize the frontline as 
“the ‘technical’ subsystem that processes materials and provide services to customers” (914: 
citing Van Cauwenbergh & Cool, 1982). Yet, while Beck and Plowman implicitly refer to 
interrelational processes between different systems, they curiously locate the frontline within the 
confines of one organization. Furthermore, concepts such as “boundary spanning structures” and 
“task environment” (Thompson, 2008, citing Dill, 1958) also do not capture the 
conceptualization of frontline as described here. Boundary spanning structures extend from an 
organization’s “technical level” into its task environment in order to adjust to environmental 
variation, but maintain distinctions between organization and environment. Characterizations 
that associate a frontline only with certain actors, or that place the frontline within an 
organization, or that maintain distinctions between an organization and its environment, overlook 
the interrelational and emergent nature of a frontline. The frontline does not belong to one 
organization; rather, it is a product of interrelating, and even integrating, processes belonging to 
different systems into one emergent system. 
 A frontline is an interaction pattern that emerges from the proximate interplay of action 
patterns belonging to characteristically different systems. For instance, the frontline of military 
operations is emergent from the interaction of opposing armies; the frontline of the medical field 
is emergent from the intermingling of medical personnel and patients; service industry frontlines 
are products of interacting service personnel and customers; and frontlines in natural resource 
extraction industries are enacted by the integration of industrial and natural processes. It is an 
emergent whole that is constituted by parts, which are parts of different systems. To distinguish 
one system from another, and to distinguish the systems from the emergent frontline, the concept 
‘organizational character,’ can be used. ‘Organizational character’ is a coherent ensemble of 
dispositions or impulses that generate distinctive patterns of action, allowing familiar observers 
 198 
to identify certain actions as “in character,” and others as “out of character” (Birnholtz, Cohen, & 
Hoch, 2007). Defining organizational character according to actions rather than actors enables 
researchers to include non-human entities, such as populations of fish, stands of trees, and shale 
gas, alongside more typical human organizations when studying frontlines.  
 Every entity is always creating frontlines, and those efforts are always being shaped by 
regulatory and management structures. The emergence of a frontline needs to be managed to a 
greater or lessor degree depending on the effect of the frontline on its interrelating systems.  For 
example, the interaction of hiker and forest results in the ongoing creation of a frontline, but one 
that tends to require less management than the interaction of logger and forest, for the logging 
frontline impacts its systems (i.e., the forest ecosystem and logging industrial system) to a 
greater degree than the hiker’s does. Thus study suggests that it is through sensemaking that 
frontlines are created. Yet frontlines may also be created through rational decision making 
processes, routines, as well as other interpretive and action-oriented processes aimed at 
interrelating disparate systems. Frontlines are paradigmatic places where organizing, 
interrelating, and integrating occur. They also tend to be places of great conflict, suffering, and 
destruction. Studies are needed to understand the creation, maintenance, and management of 
frontlines. Such research requires comparing frontlines across different contexts. Important 
questions include, what characteristics of frontlines are common across different contexts? How 
are frontlines created, maintained, and managed in different contexts? How do participants make 
sense of frontlines in different contexts, and in different types of interrelational processes (e.g., 
peaceful vs. hostile)? Comparing frontlines, which are necessarily found in every organizing 
entity, allows researchers to examine the similarities between/among contexts and entities that 
would otherwise appear incommensurate. 
c. Sensemaking and rational decision making 
 I began this dissertation by justifying my research on sensemaking in the commercial 
fisheries context by distinguishing sensemaking and rational decision making. I end this 
dissertation, however, by arguing that the two processes are distinguishable only by the artificial 
imposition of pre-formed categories. I argue that you cannot understand sensemaking without 
understanding rational decision making, and you cannot understand rational decision making 
without understanding sensemaking. Just as rational decision making theory is preoccupied with 
efficiency (Elster, 1989), sensemaking can also be preoccupied with efficiency. In fact, in this 
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study, captains make sense of how natural systems relate to their efficiency imperative, not of 
natural systems alone. Abductive sensemaking emerged in this study as necessary for the 
economy of commercial fishing practice. This point was emphasized in Chapter Four when I 
analyzed why captains did not incorporate anomalous cues of “hundreds of whales” and “silvers 
jumping” into their abductive sensemaking processes. While one study has examined 
relationships between sensemaking and decision-making (Rudolph, Morrison, & Carroll, 2009), 
which supported the pre-existing notion that the processes are distinct, this study, which finds 
that the processes are distinguishable only by conceptually slicing one out of the other, opens the 
door to research on a number of topics that have thus far been rendered separate along with 
sensemaking and decision making. The inclusion of decision making within sensemaking, 
rather than the separation of the two, opens the door to connecting two extensive bodies 
of literature that have largely been disconnected. This study demonstrates that sensemaking 
can take on some of the same properties that decision-making does, such as an overarching 
concern with efficiency, clear decision 
points, and a goal of accuracy. For 
example, we can now study how actors 
make sense of efficiency, how efficiency 
imperatives impact sensemaking, and 
how sensemaking itself be a source of 
efficiency or inefficiency. We know that 
in many contexts, actors try to maximize 
their economic potential; this study 
suggests that abductive sensemaking is a 
key contributor to that maximization. In 
what other contexts is this the case? In 
what contexts is this not the case? How 
do the economics of sensemaking 
change in different contexts? What facts 
enable or impede sensemaking to act as 
a source of economy of organizing? 
Figure 38: A model of the abductive sensemaking process as a 
tool to align inputs from regulatory systems with inputs from 
natural systems 
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7. Recommendations for practice     
My primary recommendation for practice is directed at on-land policymaking, but 
grounded in at-sea sensemaking. Kodiak trawl captains are charged with aligning their 
operations with both natural and regulatory systems, guided by, their need to, as multiple 
captains stated, “make a living.” As Figure 38 depicts, captains align their operations with 
natural and regulatory systems through abductive sensemaking. This is the frontline of 
commercial fishing. The way in which captains align their operations with natural systems 
shapes how they align their operations with regulatory systems, and the way in which captains 
align their operations with regulatory systems shapes how they align their operations with natural 
systems. My recommendation for regulatory practice focuses on one of the ways in which the 
federal Alaskan regulatory system influences how captains interrelate with natural systems, 
namely the incentivized and required discarding of certain species.  
Worldwide, the amount of fish that is discarded is anywhere from 8%, which is over 
seven million tons (Kelleher, 2005) to 25% (Davis, 2002) of the total catch. In the US, annual 
estimates are around one million metric tons (Harrington, et al., 202; Kelleher, 2005). Discards, 
as Kelleher (2005:1) states, “are generally considered a waste of fish resources and inconsistent 
with responsible fisheries.” Similarly, as Diamond and Beukers-Stewart (2011: 232) put it, “It is 
widely considered accepted that the dumping of fish at sea is unethical and represents a 
substantial waste of resources.” The following recommendations regarding discarding at the 
frontline the Kodiak trawl fleet consists of four parts. In the first part I define discarding. In part 
(b) I review the regulatory roots of discards, specifically prohibited species, in Alaskan fisheries. 
In part (c) I introduce potential problems with the regulatory practice of requiring or 
incentivizing discarding. And in part (d) I suggest an alternative approach to managing the catch 
of certain non-target species, one that aligns with findings from this study regarding how 
captains actually determine where to fish, rather than how rational choice theory, upon which 
regulations are built, assumes they should. 
a. Defining discarding 
 Discarding is a primary issue in the fisheries management literature (e.g., Abbott & 
Wilen, 2009; Bellido et al., 2011; Catchpole, Frid & Gray, 2005; Cook, 2001). As defined by 
Kelleher (2005: 1), discarding is “that portion of the total catch which is dumped or thrown 
overboard at sea.” While some definitions of discard and bycatch differentiate the two, for the 
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purposes of this dissertation, they are the same. Bycatch is “fish that are captured in a fishery but 
not retained for sale or personal use” (Patrick & Benaka, 2013: 470). Therefore, both target and 
non-target species can be bycatch if they are discarded. Animals belonging to a target species 
may be discarded if they are too small or damaged to be sold or processed, or if it is too 
dangerous to bring them onboard, and certain non-target species are often retained and either 
sold or kept for personal use. Kelleher (2005: 56) further defines “good” and “bad” discards, in 
which good discards are animals that have both survived being caught and will live after being 
discarded, and bad discards are those that have been killed in the process of being caught. This 
discussion concerns bad discards.  
b. The regulatory construction of discards 
 The practice of discarding can be grouped in two categories: discretionary and regulatory. 
Some discarding is the result of a choice captains make based on whether the animal is salable or 
not, or whether it is more or less salable than other animals are. Thus, captains may keep one 
species over another species based on which will fetch a higher price, thereby maximizing the 
value of their fish hold space. Regulatory discard, however, “refers to catch that could have been 
retained if regulations had not prohibited retention” (Patrick & Benaka, 2013: 470). My 
recommendation for practice concerns regulatory discards, specifically what are called 
‘prohibited species discards’ in federal Alaskan groundfish fisheries management.  
‘Prohibited species’ are certain bycatch species caught in Alaskan waters that trawl 
captains are required by regulation to discard, even though these species tend to be targets in 
state-regulated fisheries. The Gulf groundfish fisheries management plan (FMP) offers more 
detail on prohibited species regulations:  
Prohibited species identified in this FMP are Pacific halibut, Pacific 
herring, Pacific salmon, steelhead trout, king crab, and Tanner crab. 
Species identified as prohibited must be avoided while fishing groundfish 
and must be immediately returned to the sea with a minimum of injury 
when caught and brought aboard. . . (NPFMC, 2014a: 40)   
An important aspect of the prohibited species discard requirement is that all herring, salmon, 
trout, and 65% of the halibut (NPFMC, 2014b) and 80% of the crab (NPFMC, 2007) are “bad” 
discards in that they die in the process of being caught in a trawl net.  
 While the language above states that captains must return all prohibited species to sea, 
other language in the Gulf FMP allows captains to donate Chinook salmon and Pacific halibut to 
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food banks. Prior to 2011, in which infrastructure for donating prohibited species catch in the 
Gulf was first constructed, donating prohibited species catch in the Gulf was not an option. The 
option to donate Chinook salmon and Pacific halibut to a food bank potentially mitigates the 
negative effects of prohibited species discard. Yet, limited available data indicate that only 
around 1% of the halibut caught each year in the Gulf trawl fisheries is tallied at the dock as 
donated to food banks.14 And due to the incommensurability of the way Chinook salmon bycatch 
is managed (by numbers) and the way they are recorded by food banks (by dressed weight), it is 
impossible to derive an accurate percentage of the amount of Chinook that is donated. 
Nonetheless, based on personal communication with SeaShare, the organization that manages all 
food bank donations from federal trawl fisheries in Alaska, in 2013 only 19,373 pounds of the 
29,367 individual salmon caught in Gulf trawl fisheries (which tends to be 90% Chinook and 
10% chum) made its way into the food bank system. Donations are low because it requires 
expenditures of resources for both vessels and processing plants, which, in terms of vessels, 
amounts to space that could otherwise be occupied by salable fish. Because captains cannot sell 
them, they are incentivized to discard them. The upshot is that every year thousands of tons of 
prohibited species are discarded, and over the decades hundreds of thousands of tons have been 
wasted.  
 But amounts of discards are not important to my policy recommendation. Rather, what is 
important is that the federal Alaskan regulatory system requires or encourages any fish to be 
wasted. As Chapter Four explained, the prohibited species regulations are artifacts of 
historically-constructed management authorities, which act contemporaneously to maintain those 
authorities. Throughout history, fisheries have developed where salable species aggregate to an 
extent that catching them is a profitable endeavor. But just as ‘history is written by the victors,’ 
fisheries were written into regulatory structures in terms of the species sold at market, not the 
species that were discarded along the way. Furthermore, in Alaskan fisheries the agencies that 
seized management control of those marketable fisheries, in which they determine who gets to 
deliver those fish to market, and when, where, and how they get to catch them, have maintained 
that control, regardless of changes in political boundaries that would now assign management 
authority to a different governing body. Thus, the International Halibut Commission continues to 
14 Personal communication with, and archival data from, SeaShare, Inc. SeaShare is the organization that 
manages all prohibited species food bank donations in Alaska. 
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manage halibut, even though since its start in 1930 political boundaries have been established 
that situate halibut fishing within state and federal waters. Similarly, the State of Alaska 
continues to manage king crab fisheries (with federal oversight), regardless of the fact that 
aggregations of king crab are recurrently targeted in federal waters. Fisheries established after 
passage of the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) in 1976, however, are managed based on the 
location of fishing effort relative to the state, federal, and international boundaries it established.  
The disaggregation of catch into target species, bycatch, and prohibited species is a 
historical social construction imposed on current frontline operations that captains attempt to 
construct to align with current ecological patterns. Prohibited species regulations in the federal 
groundfish fisheries requires captains to disaggregate their catch by agency authority, and then 
discard those fish whose regulatory authority is not the same as the agency under which they are 
fishing (e.g., catching Chinook, which is managed by the State of Alaska in a pollock fishery, 
which is managed by the federal government). 
 But fish do not heed regulatory boundaries, nor do they behave differently based on 
which political entity is managing them. Fisheries tend to develop where species are known to 
recurrently aggregate to a profitable degree, but as the Western Gulf bycatch event demonstrated, 
species also aggregate where they are not recurrently targeted, resulting in large-scale bycatch 
events. And as less extreme/more regular bycatch patterns show, species are also caught as 
bycatch where they do not aggregate (i.e., are not swimming in schools). Species managed by the 
State of Alaska and the International Halibut Commission are caught along with federal trawl 
target species when they enact the similar action patterns that federally-managed target species 
do. Catching more than one species at a time is an unavoidable product of the necessary 
commercial fishing practice, grounded in sensemaking as chapters Two and Three demonstrate, 
of fishing based on the recurring action patterns of target species. Discarding certain non-target 
species caught as they are co-occurring with target species is an avoidable product of the 
historical construction of federal fisheries management in Alaska 
 Discarding prohibited species is a regulatorily-constructed solution to the regulatorily-
constructed problem of species encountered together at sea and but managed by separate 
agencies on land. Yet, the regulatory construction of both the prohibited species problem and 
discard solution appears to be little recognized in the literature. For example, Bellido et al. (2011: 
318), in an article on discarding on a global scale, characterize all discarding as discretionary: 
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“Discarding involves a conscious decision made by fishers to reject some part of the catch.” 
Similarly, Kelleher (2005: 56) states that “bad” discards “indicate undesirable fishing practices.” 
The federal Alaskan prohibited species regulations, however, take discarding decisions, as they 
relate to prohibited species, out of the hands of captains, predetermining the practice. My 
recommendation is derived from the alternative perspective that bad discards indicate 
undesirable fishery regulations, which lead to undesirable fishing practices.  
c. The problem with discards 
 Discarding has been shown to have primarily negative ecological and entirely negative 
economic impacts. In terms of ecological impacts, while discarding has been shown to have a 
positive influence on bird populations (Cook, 2001), it has been shown to disrupt food chains 
and create pollution (Murawski, 1996) which can lead to localized anaerobic conditions 
(Chapman, 1981). Further, Diamond and Beukers-Stewert (2011) found that a Norwegian ban on 
discarding in the Northeast Arctic is associated with increases of stocks and economic 
performance of cod, haddock, saithe, and herring fisheries. Yet, as Kelleher (2005: 69) states, 
many ecological impacts remain unquantified. 
While the ecological soundness of discarding is unclear, scholars are largely in agreement 
that discarding is economically unsound (Alverson, Freeburg, Murawski, & Pope, 1996; Branch, 
Rutherford, & Hilborn, 2006; Diamond & Beukers-Stewart, 2011; Patrick & Benaka, 2013; 
Pascoe, 1997;). Scholars discuss both the loss of the value of the discarded catch that could be 
sold at market and the relationship between discarding and foregone potential catch. Foregone 
potential catch is an outcome of early fisheries closures triggered by reaching catch limits 
attached to discarded species. Early fisheries closures results in foregone target catch. These two 
economic issues, however, are distinct. The wastage of caught fish that has economic value has 
its own economic costs in terms the loss of income from caught fish, regardless if any catch limit 
is triggered. The trigger limit is a separate regulation to the one that requires certain species be 
discarded. Thus, captains could reach a limit that triggers fisheries closures, even if they were not 
required to discard, and waste, those fish.  
d. Solving the discard problem: Aligning levels of abstraction  
 Discarding salable fish is antithetical to catching fish. During my field research, Gulf 
trawl captains lamented, on multiple occasions, having to discard fish. Multiple captains 
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suggested “full retention” as the solution to the bycatch problem. Similarly, according to 
Kelleher (2005: 60), “Discard bans have wide support among fishers if they are applied in a fair 
and pragmatic manner.” And as Bratton (2000: 2) describes in her study of two commercial 
fisheries, “This author and her students, in a series of interviews of both commercial fishers and 
charter fishers, on the Pacific coast of the US and in Ireland, found that fishers dislike waste of 
any commercial species, and protest regulations which force them to toss edible catch 
overboard.” In my research, and in my experience working as a commercial fisheries observer, I 
do not recall encountering a captain who expressed pleasure in dumping salable or edible fish 
overboard, and I do recall several captains expressing displeasure. My proposed solution, 
admittedly ambitious, is aimed at creating a better fit between the level at which regulators make 
sense of frontline fishing operations and impose regulations (the species-level) and the level at 
which fishing captains make sense of natural systems and extract catch (the action pattern-level). 
These are two different levels of abstraction, and the species-level is, perhaps counterintuitively, 
more abstract, i.e., less concrete, than the action pattern-level is.  
 Due to the prospective indeterminacy of marine systems, captains fish according to 
certain behavioral traits related to schooling, or what I have called recurring action patterns. 
Using past experience, their own or another’s, and the co-incidence of other natural factors (e.g., 
weather, the structure of the ocean bottom), captains hypothesize that certain patterns of activity 
are being enacted by certain species. Yet, as suggested by bycatch lightning strikes, captains may 
increase the intelligence of their conjectures, but they will never really know until they tow. 
Until captains are afforded perfect information regarding the natural systems they are extracting 
fish from, which would allow captains to construct rational decision-making processes at sea, 
there will always be bycatch. A sensemaking view of at-sea operations makes it clear that 
although captains act their way into understanding the natural system they were interacting with, 
after which they have the opportunity to adjust their actions to act their way into different 
interactions, captains still encounter unexpected catch. Captains attempt to increase their 
abductive capacity, but they ultimately never know until they tow. Perfect information about 
natural systems is unattainable at sea, which is the reason sensemaking is a core component of 
commercial trawl fishing. Captains can increase the plausibility of their stories, and the 
intelligence of their guesses of what’s next, but they cannot create determinacy before they tow. 
Chapters Two, Three, and Four demonstrated this aspect of the art of commercial trawl fishing.   
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 The catch captains extract, however, does allow for retrospective determinacy. Captains 
can know the species composition of what they were towing after they have towed (though as 
described in Chapter Four, in pollock fisheries this knowledge is not always easily attainable). 
As do regulators, for it is the determined species composition of catch that is the primary input 
from frontline fishing operations into regulatory processes. Due to these determinate inputs, 
regulators construct their rational decision-making action pattern with an understanding of the 
species that captains were catching, and then attempt to predetermine the maximum amounts of 
certain species that captains will catch in the future. In other words, regulators, based on 
retrospective species-level catch information, and through their own rationality-based action 
patterns, attempt to determine their own species-level inputs.  
 As Chapter Four demonstrated, regulators interject species-level regulations, in the form 
of target species quotas and prohibited species bycatch limits, into action pattern-level 
operations. Regulatory inputs force captains to operate at the species-level, but the indeterminacy 
of marine systems forces captains to operate at the action pattern-level. The species and action 
pattern levels are different levels of abstraction from natural systems. And because more than 
one species can display the same action patterns, yet only one species can be one species, the 
species level is more abstract than the action pattern level is. This understanding of abstraction is 
explained in section b.iii. Captains are required to reconcile the level of abstraction at which they 
determine where and from what to fish, the action pattern-level, with the regulatory level of 
abstraction, which is the species-level.  
 If regulations were constructed at the same level of abstraction that fishing operates, the 
Western Gulf extreme bycatch event would not have been a bycatch event at all. Rather, it 
simply would have been a catch event in which two predominant species were enacting the same 
action patterns. Conversely, if captains operated at the same level of abstraction that on-land 
regulators operate, i.e., the species level, the Western Gulf extreme bycatch event again would 
not have been a bycatch event. Rather, it would have been a pollock catch event, for captains 
would have been able to differentiate pollock from Chinook prior to extracting fish. Discarding 
would not be necessary if captains knew what they were interacting with and could separate it 
into different species before they towed. When regulations impose one level of abstraction from 
natural systems on practice that operates at another level, incongruence may emerge. This 
incongruence is a system-level creation, which the Western Gulf extreme bycatch exemplifies.  
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Alternatively, when each part of the frontline system (natural systems, operational 
processes, and regulatory structures) operates at the same level of abstraction, congruence is 
achieved. But, as Chapter Three demonstrated, operating at the species-level in the enacted sonar 
environment of a fishing trip is not possible. Captains, operating from their enacted trawl-deck 
environment may be able to react to the species-level composition of their catch, perhaps fishing 
differently in the same spot or moving to a different spot, but they still encounter lightning 
strikes. They still fish at the action pattern-level. They never know until they tow. Absent 
technology for prospectively differentiating target species from other species,15 captains must 
operate at the action pattern level, even if catch can retrospectively be differentiated at the 
species level.  
 As Chapter Four also demonstrated, regulators recognize the incongruence between 
species level regulations and action pattern operations, and take a two-pronged approach to 
resolving it. The first prong is a prospective means, in which regulators use incentives to 
encourage abductive sensemaking at sea. The goal is for captains, using their own and others’ 
past experiences, to create informed conjectures about the species-level differentiations of the 
natural systems they are interrelating with. In other words, to guess intelligently before they tow, 
even if they still only know for sure after they tow. Yet, because natural systems at sea are 
indeterminate, and because multiple species can enact similar action patterns, incongruence 
cannot be fully resolved through abductive sensemaking. Even when the Council enacts catch 
share structures, as they are planning to do for Gulf trawl fisheries, which afford captains much 
more flexibly in terms of when and where they fish, as well as how much they communicate 
when they fish, captains still never know until they tow. Under catch share regimes, captains 
may be better able to update their action patterns in response to bycatch, or they may be better 
15 Prohibited species excluder technology is a method of prospectively differentiating target species and 
prohibited species based on behavioral and biological characteristics. Alaskan trawl fisheries have 
designed and tested halibut and salmon excluders, which are sewn into trawl nets. In the Gulf trawl 
fisheries, halibut excluders are currently being used, and salmon excluders are currently being tested. 
Halibut excluders allow halibut to escape in cod and sole fisheries. Salmon excluders are used in pollock 
fisheries. Salmon excluders have been shown to reduce Chinook salmon catch by 25 - 40% on Bering Sea 
trawl vessels, which tend to be larger and more powerful than Gulf trawl vessels (Gauvin, 2012), and 
halibut excluders have been shown to reduce halibut in the Gulf trawl vessels by 86% (Rose, n.d.). But 
because not all captains use excluders (several captains who participated in this study expressed a dislike 
for halibut excluders, and many expressed a distrust of the untested salmon excluder), and because 
excluders do not exclude all fish of a certain species, prohibited species catch is unavoidable, and limits 
are necessary. 
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able to conduct ‘test tows’ to get an idea of the species composition of the aggregation they are 
interacting with before the conduct a full tow. But they will still face an efficiency imperative 
due to fuel costs, other overhead costs, and the need to return caught fish to the processing plant 
in order to maintain freshness. Thus, captains will still attempt to enact an efficient fishing 
process in order to increase their profitability. They will never be able to know with certainty 
before they tow, and they will alway attempt to fish efficiently, which means they will not 
always take the time to know as much as they can before they tow. Trawl captains will always 
catch multiple species enacting similar action patterns, which is why catch share regimes still 
have prohibited species catch limits..  
 Therefore, the second prong of the Council’s approach to resolving the incongruence 
created by merging different levels of abstraction is requiring, or incentivizing, the discarding of 
certain species from the catch so that captains do not bring them to market. Discarding is a 
retrospective means of matching the level of abstraction from at-sea operations to the level of 
abstraction from on-land regulations. Discarding may solve the problem in which captains catch 
fish whose management is ‘owned’ by other agencies, but it creates its own issues when 
discarding involves “bad” discards. It is the ecological and economic issues that discarding 
creates, in the interest of solving a regulatorily-constructed problem, which makes it a perverse 
management tool. 
 The discarding approach to creating retrospective congruence favors maintaining 
historically-created management authorities over creating congruence with current ecological 
realities. My recommendation is that rather than imposing history on the present at a potential 
ecological cost and an actual loss of economic potential, regulations should allow the present to 
determine the present. As sensemaking at-sea processes tell us, catching fish ancillary to the 
species one is targeting is unavoidable. But requiring and incentivizing its waste is avoidable. If 
we constructed fisheries management structures anew today, it is difficult to imagine that the 
system would divide the management of species that are caught together into different agencies, 
and further require that those species ‘belonging’ to one agency be discarded when caught under 
the authority of another agency. Fisheries should be managed based on current ecological and 
economic realities, not historical management authorities.  
 The interaction pattern, which is the regulatory-shaped, sensemaking-accomplished 
conjoining of natural and operational action patterns, is the actual underlying structure of a 
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fishery, and should play a central role in fisheries management regimes. I recommend the 
interaction pattern as the basic unit of fisheries management. But fisheries management scholars, 
deeply committed rational choice frameworks, see entities, rather than processes of interaction, 
as the basic units of management. For example, eminent fisheries management scholar Ray 
Hilborn argues, “We don’t manage fish, we manage people” (2007). This proposed shift in 
emphasis is a move in the right direction, but it goes too far. It suffers from the same assumption 
that supported the outdated notion, according to Hilborn, that managing fisheries is managing 
fish. This is the assumption that we manage separate systems. Hilborn overlooks perhaps the 
most important entity in his consideration of the entities that we may or may not manage: the 
recurring interrelated patterns of action that mutually define both fish and fishers. In other words, 
frontline interaction patterns.  
 My (working) solution to the discard problem is to begin to interject rules which allow 
fisheries to be constructed from the ground up, as well as from the top-down. This construction 
starts at the natural end of the spectrum from humans to nature, with fisheries science-based 
assessments of fish populations, from which species-level fishing quotas are derived. Thus, we 
maintain quota-based management for both target and bycatch species. From there the system 
moves into the overlap of natural systems and fishing operations, i.e., at-sea interaction patterns. 
Because it is the nature of multiple species to enact similar action patterns, and because captains 
fish for these action patterns, fishing activity should be regulated according to recurring 
interaction patterns of multiple fish species and fishing operations (in addition to regulating 
based on fish populations). Therefore, when captains, fishing for certain species, continually 
encounter other species that are enacting the action patterns as the target species that captains are 
fishing for, captains must keep those species and deliver them for sale (unless, of course, catch 
may be turned into good discards). My recommendation allows good discarding and disallows 
bad discarding. Nothing salable should be discarded at sea or wasted by a processing plant. This 
includes retaining non-target, ‘trash’ fish for fishmeal.  
 As long as captains do not exceed a limit they are fishing under, be it target or bycatch 
limit, they sell all that they catch. Which means that processing plants buy all that they are 
delivered. Outside of at-sea operations, this regime would force processing plants to adapt to 
receiving multiple species at a time, such as being more entrepreneurial in developing markets 
for fish that are currently discarded. There have been multiple instances in which new markets 
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have been developed for species that was ‘trash fish’, such as spiny dogfish on the US east coast 
and skate wings in Alaska. There is also a current effort by a group of chefs called Chefs 
Collaborative to serve “Trash Fish Dinners.” These are dinners, held in different locations 
nationwide, in which eminent chefs introduce the public to fish for which markets have not been 
developed, and therefore are discarded by captains at sea or processing plants on land.  
 In terms of the potential issue of captains targeting non-target species that they are not 
licensed to target, quota amounts can be crafted in ways that incentivize captains to avoid certain 
species in favor of targeting another or other species - such as avoiding Chinook in favor of 
targeting pollock. These limits may be at the individual, group, or fleet levels. This approach is 
simply a matter of setting the limit for Chinook low relative to the amount of Chinook captains 
are likely to encounter when fishing for pollock. When captains reach their Chinook limit, but 
have not reached their pollock limit, they must stop fishing. Such an approach is already taken in 
Alaskan fisheries, as was exemplified in Chapter Four in terms of the Council creating a ‘hard 
cap.’ But in this case, the compensation captains get from selling salmon or halibut can help 
make up some of the difference of foregone target catch. Furthermore, there is enough 
monitoring through fisheries observers and satellite tracking that mangers would know if 
captains were operating outside of their normal fishing grounds in the interest of targeting non-
target species.   
Nature should not be wasted in the interest of maintaining ownership that has been 
determined by archaic political events. What a captain can keep and sell, rather, should emerge 
from the ground-up based on sensemaking at-sea, while being structured from the top-down 
based on rational decision-making on-land. This ‘no-discard regime’ is a mere sketch, or 
collection of principles, to be elaborated into a contextually appropriate fisheries management 
system, or to serve as guidance for altering current systems. Norway is an exemplar of the no 
discard regime, which, as Kelleher (2005: 61) describes in the following: “It is incumbent on a 
particular fishery to justify discards or show why they are unavoidable. Then, legislation may 
make allowance for such unavoidable discards, and agencies can examine means of reducing the 
discard, developing alternative fishing opportunities, or financing the phasing out of the wasteful 
fishing technologies.” Alaskan federal fisheries regulators, now that they understand the 
sensemaking processes through which captains catch fish, should construct regulatory regimes to 
accommodate and encourage those processes, while also recognizing the limitations of 
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sensemaking at sea, rather than taking the simplistic approach of regulating according to how 
rational choice theory assumes captains should catch fish,   
 William Wordsworth’s poem, The Tables Turned, which began this dissertation, captures 
the nature of sensemaking at sea as well as the larger approach to commercial fisheries 
management that I have been laboring to describe and justify. Captains make sense of the natural 
systems they interact with through day-in-and-day-out experimentation, trial and error, leaps of 
faith, and communication. The most successful Kodiak trawl captains, as one captain described, 
“are just uncanny. They have been fishing for a long, long time too. They know where to go, 
they know what to look for, and they know how to make their gear work in any different 
situation to its utmost potential.” Being a successful captain is not a rational decision making 
process, it is a sensemaking process. The abstractions imposed by those detached from the 
frontline create differentiations that do not exist in the concrete reality that captains encounter. 
They “dissect” in order to differentiate current nature into historical categories of who can reap 
value and who cannot, and what can be retained and what cannot. Such an approach “murders” 
in that it creates economic waste and ecological problems. Fisheries instead should be regulated 
to encourage and support the sensemaking processes through which captains gain an “uncanny” 
ability to operate in natural systems, while also constraining the rational processes through which 
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